Irish-American Workers and White Racial Formation in the Antebellum United States

Low-browed and savage, grovelling and bestial, lazy and wild, simian and sensuous - such were the adjectives used by many native-born Americans to describe the Catholic Irish 'race' in the years before the Civil War.\(^1\) The striking similarity of this litany of insults to the list of traits ascribed to antebellum Blacks hardly requires comment. Sometimes Black/Irish connections were made explicitly. In antebellum Philadelphia, according to one account, 'to be called an "Irishman" had come to be nearly as great an insult as to be called a "nigger".' George Templeton Strong, a Whig patrician diarist living in New York City, considered Irish workmen at his home to have had 'prehensile paws' rather than hands. He denounced the 'Celtic beast', while maintaining that 'Southern Cuffee seems of a higher social grade than Northern Paddy.'\(^2\) Nativist folk wisdom held that an Irishman was a 'nigger', inside out. But by no means did nativists, who more typically developed a 'moral' rather than a 'racial' critique of the Irish, corner the market on calling the whiteness of the Irish into question. A variety of writers, particularly ethnologists, praised Anglo-Saxon virtues as the bedrock of liberty and derided the 'Celtic race'.\(^3\) Some suggested that the Irish were part of a separate caste or a 'dark' race, possibly originally African. Racial comparisons of Irish and Blacks were not infrequently flattering to the latter group.\(^4\) The Census Bureau regularly collected statistics on the nation's 'native' and 'foreign' populations, but kept the Irish distinct from even the latter group. Political cartoonists played on the racial ambiguity of the Irish by making their stock 'Paddy' charac-
ter resemble nothing so much as an ape. In short, it was by no means clear that the Irish were white.

There were good reasons – environmental and historical, not biological – for comparing African-Americans and the Irish. The two groups often lived side by side in the teeming slums of American cities of the 1830s. They both did America’s hard work, especially in domestic service and the transportation industry. Both groups were poor and often vilified. Both had experienced oppression and been wrenched from a homeland. Many Northern free Blacks who lived alongside Irish-Americans not only knew that their families had been torn from Africa by the slave trade but had also themselves experienced the profound loneliness, mixed with joy, that Frederick Douglass described as the result of escaping North from slavery, leaving loved ones behind. Longing thus characterized both the Northern Black and Irish-American populations, and members of neither group were likely return home again. When Douglass toured Ireland during the famine of 1845–46 he heard in the “wailing notes” of Irish songs echoes of the “wild notes” of the sorrowful songs he had heard in slavery and was “much affected.” In 1829, Blacks and Irish were the co-victims of a Boston ‘race’ riot.

Shared oppression need not generate solidarity but neither must it necessarily breed contempt of one oppressed group for the other. For some time there were strong signs that the Irish might not fully embrace white supremacy. In cities like Worcester and Philadelphia, Blacks and Irish lived near each other without significant friction into the early 1830s. They often celebrated and socialized together, swapping musical traditions and dance steps. Even as late as the immediate post-Civil War years Lafcadio Hearn described Black and Irish levee workers in Cincinnati as sharing a storehouse of jokes and tales, of jigs and reels and even of dialect words and phrases. Love and sex between Black men and Irish women were not uncommon. In the 1834 anti-Black, antiabolitionist New York City riots, Irish militiamen helped to restore order. Indeed, the antiabolition riots of the 1830s generally drew little Irish participation.

Most promisingly, abolitionists noted little popular racism, and much sympathy for the plight of the slave in Ireland. In 1842, 70,000 Irish in Ireland signed an antislavery address and petition, which called on Irish-Americans to ‘cling by the abolitionists’ in seeking not just the end of slavery but of racial discrimination as well. The address advised: ‘Irishmen and Irishwomen! treat the colored people as your equals, as brethren.’ Though much abolition agitation in Ireland was initiated by the Dublin Quakers, the most celebrated Irish abolitionist was Daniel O’Connell, who also led the massive Repeal campaign for Irish freedom through an

end to union with Britain. Called ‘The Liberator’, O’Connell sponsored the 1842 petition knowing that his words would alienate some Irish-Americans and cut financial contributions to the Repeal struggle. Nonetheless, the very firmness of the politically sophisticated O’Connell’s stance on Irish America and abolition suggests that he was optimistic that many in the US would ultimately stand with him. Another of Ireland’s greatest mass leaders, the temperance organizer Father Theobald Mathew, joined O’Connell in sponsoring the petition drive. Men who knew a great deal about how to move large numbers of Irish people believed it quite possible that Irish-Americans, whom O’Connell saw as having much in common with all colonized people, might become critics of white supremacy.

The radical abolitionist followers of William Lloyd Garrison – including two of the Garrisonians most concerned with the white working class, Wendell Phillips and John A. Collins – busily organized for unity between the supporters of the ‘repeal’ of British colonialism and the ‘repeal’ of American slavery. The Garrisonians could claim a strong record of supporting Irish nationalism and rebuking American nativism, and their campaign began auspiciously when an overflow crowd of more than five thousand packed Boston’s Faneuil Hall to receive the petition and to pass resolutions for Black and Irish freedom.

But it quickly became apparent that the Irish ‘peasants’ who heartily applauded at Faneuil Hall were atypical of Irish-American opinion on slavery and race. The meeting had hardly occurred when a mob of Philadelphia Irish attacked Blacks gathering to celebrate West Indian emancipation – a cause dear to O’Connell – near the hull from which Blacks promoted temperance, Father Mathew’s passion. By 1843, the British O律师事务 traveller John Finch would report to London readers the ‘curious fact’ that ‘the democratic party and particularly the poorer class of Irish emigrants, are greater enemies to the negro population … than any portion of the population in the free states.’

O’Connell’s pleas and threats achieved nothing. Irish-American and Catholic newspapers, some of which had originally argued that the petition and address were fakes, soon began to attack O’Connell. They portrayed him as at best misinformed and at worst a meddler who associated with religious skeptics who threatened the unity of the United States. Irish-American contributions to the Repeal campaign were jeopardized, but O’Connell refused to move from his outspoken abolitionism, though he did distance himself somewhat from the religious unorthodoxy of some of the Garrisonians. Even O’Connell’s pointed threat to read proslavery Irish-Americans out of the nationalist struggle failed to rally his erstwhile
followers to the banner of abolition. 'Dare countenance the system of slavery', he warned, and 'we will recognize you as Irishmen no more.'

But Irish-Americans had already made their reply: they had refused to recognize O'Connell. An important and typical Irish-American answer to O'Connell, written by miners in New York, answered his call with a sharp denial that blacks were 'brethren' of Irish-Americans and an unequivocal statement of their loyalty as Americans who were full 'Citizens of this great and glorious republic.' The statement condemned O'Connell's address as the interference of an outsider, and declared that cooperation with abolitionists would be forthcoming. From 1843 until 1854, Garrisonians and O'Connell's followers separately pushed unsuccessfully against the 'proslavery' position of Irish-Americans. They failed, succeeding only in weakening Repeal forces in both Ireland and the United States. When Father Mathew toured America in 1849, he rejected any cooperation with abolitionists, contending himself with fighting 'slavery' to alcohol.

Nor did the tremendous influx of desperate Irish emigrants fleeing the results of famine after 1845 produce significant amelioration in Irish-American attitudes toward Blacks. If the emigrants had antislavery and antiracist convictions in Ireland—and even there abolition fell on hard times after O'Connell's death in 1847—they did not express those convictions in the New World. Irish-Americans instead treasured their whiteness, as entitling them to both political rights and to jobs. They solidly voted for proslavery Democrats and opposed abolition as 'neggerology.'

Astoundingly, for a group that easily furnished more immigrants to the United States than any other between 1828 and 1854, the Irish in New York City reportedly went to the polls in 1850 shouting not only 'Down with the Niggers!' but also 'Let them go back to Africa, where they belong.' Similarly, Irish immigrants became leaders of anti-Chinese forces in California. Even before taking a leading role in the unprecedentedly murderous attacks on Blacks during the 1863 Draft Riot in New York City, Irishmen had developed a terrible record of mobbing free Blacks on and off the job—so much so that Blacks called the brickbats often hurled at them 'Irish confetti.' In 1865 the British worker James D. Burn observed, 'As a general rule, the people in the North have a lively feeling of dislike to men of colour, but it is in the Irish residents that they have, and will continue to have, their most formidable enemies; between these two races there can exist no bond of union except such as exists between the hind [deer] and the panther.'

Having refused to take the path that O'Connell had charted, Irish-Americans went far in the other direction. Instead of seeing their struggles as bound up with those of colonized and colored people around the world, they came to see their struggles as against such people. Frederick Douglass, the Black abolitionist whose own quest for freedom had been substantially aided by the advice of a 'good Irishman' on Baltimore's wharves in the 1830s, could only wonder 'why a people who so nobly loved and cherished the thought of liberty at home in Ireland could become, willingly, the oppressors of another race here.' Or again he asked how a people 'so relentlessly persecuted and oppressed on account of race and religion' could take the lead among Americans in carrying 'prejudice against color to a point ... extreme and dangerous.'

The making of the Irish worker into a white worker was thus a twosided process. On the one hand, much to the chagrin of George Templeton Strong, Irish immigrants won acceptance as whites among the larger American population. On the other hand, much to the chagrin of Frederick Douglass and Daniel O'Connell, the Irish themselves came to insist on their own whiteness and on white supremacy. The success of the Irish in being recognized as white resulted largely from the political power of Irish and other immigrant voters. The imperative to define themselves as white came but from the particular 'public and psychological wages' whiteness offered to a desperate rural and often preindustrial Irish population coming to labor in industrializing American cities.

Ireland and the Origins of Irish-American Whiteness

'It was not in Ireland,' thundered Daniel O'Connell to proslavery and white supremacist Irish-Americans, 'you learned this cruelty.' He was right. However much the record of abolitionism in Ireland was exaggerated by American abolitionists and subsequent historians—the movement there was short-lived and much connected to O'Connell's own charisma and commitments—the Irish were not race-conscious in the sense that Irish-Americans would be. There was some noting of regional color differences in Ireland though most residents had seen no one of African descent. Ireland probably shared in the longstanding Western European tradition of associating blackness with evil. There is some evidence of folk belief that the devil could turn people black, or turn people inside-out, thus making them black. Irish-American folklore, down to the recent past, includes stories of ancestors who jumped off the boat in horror on arriving in America and seeing a Black person for the first time, thinking it was the devil. But the very fact that these stories survive so tenaciously in the United States should warn us that they may
speak as much of the attitudes of later generations of Irish-Americans as of arriving Irish emigrants. The evil 'race' that plagued the Irish Catholic imagination was white and British, not Black and African.  

Some accounts have suggested that Ireland nonetheless set the stage for Irish-American racism in more indirect ways. Abolitionists complained, with good reason, that the Catholic Church hierarchy offered at best highly muted criticisms, and at worst racist defenses, of slavery. They charged that the Irish were particularly loyal to priests. Modern scholarship has even suggested that religious obedience left the Irish in a state of moral childhood.  

Aside from reminding us of the proximity of anti-Black and anti-Irish stereotypes, such a view fits poorly with the historical facts. The 'devotional revolution' in Ireland took hold rather late, after the onset of the potato famine, and after much emigration had occurred. Between 1815 and 1844, Catholic identity in Ireland had at least as much political as devotional content, and the mass nationalist politics in which Catholics participated had strong secular elements. Many Irish Catholics in the United States, even as late as 1855, were of the 'anonymous' (or nonpracticing) kind traditionally typical of south and west Ireland. They were little exposed to priestly influence on race relations or other matters, though their hatred of Protestant revivalists may have predisposed them to oppose abolitionism.  

More cogent, but still problematic, is the argument that the Irish Catholic past imparted so fierce a hatred of things British that it was natural, and even nationalist, for Irish-Americans to oppose abolitionism for its British connections. The ease with which Irish-Americans denounced 'Benedict Arnold' Garrison as a co-conspirator of the British supports this view, as does their readiness to accept the argument that blame for American slavery lay with the British, who had forced the institution onto the American colonies. However, at least during the period of O'Connell's abolitionist influence, there were alternative nationalist positions that were strongly indicted Britain for creating slavery through its colonialism, but also claimed that much of the credit for British emancipation went to Irish legislators in Britain's Parliament and connected the plight of the Irish with that of other victims of colonialism, including slaves. In denouncing O'Connell, his Irish-American critics somewhat distanced themselves from the nationalist movement, standing as Americans who resented the influence of 'foreigners' on their affairs. The emphasis of Irish-Americans on the common whiteness they wished to be recognized as sharing with other Americans may, as Frank Murray argues, have sped their assimilation.  

What the Irish background surely did impart was a sad and particular context, enshrouded in both gloom and mist, in which Irish-American whiteness took shape. By the early 1830s, when the annual immigration of Irish Catholics passed that of Irish Protestants, agricultural misery, landlordism and dislocation in the handicrafts in Ireland had combined to produce an increasingly poverty-stricken stream of Catholic migrants. Migrants in the decade and a half before the Great Famine began in 1845 tended to have enough resources to exercise a limited but real choice about where to settle and what kind of work to take. Some achieved independence from laboring for others, the goal that had animated their migration. Evidence suggests, according to Kerby Miller, that 'a substantial minority' of those migrating managed to set up as farmers. Local studies show substantially greater opportunities to become skilled workers for those arriving in prefamine years than for migrants coming after the famine. But hard and usually unskilled wage work was nonetheless the typical experience of the prefamine Irish Catholic immigrant, with the group being far poorer, less skilled and more urban compared with native-born Americans or with other European immigrants.  

The Great Famine turned these tendencies almost into iron rules. Between 1845 and 1855, Ireland lost over two million emigrants—a quarter of her population—with famine-associated deaths taking over a million more. The evictions of 1849, 1850 and 1851 alone forced a million Irish from their homes. Roughly three in four Catholic Irish famine-era migrants came to the United States, now seeking only survival. Without savings, they had no choice in where to settle. Without marketable skills, they served, carried and hauled when they could get work and sometimes held 'skilled' but low-paying jobs as journeymen or apprentices. The most decidedly preindustrial and little Anglicized parts of Ireland—the South and the isolated West—came to furnish many migrants. These were often Gaelic speakers who had previously resisted emigration as a kind of deportment, or 'banishment', but now left Ireland dolefully, if perhaps also with an air of release. Although the poorest famine and eviction victims went to Britain, or died, the Irish emigrants to the US were nonetheless destitute and often nearly despairing. Recently peasants, now overwhelmingly laborers and servants, they settled in slums and shantytowns in cities in the United States, where large nativist political movements resented their religion, their poverty and their presence. They often came with only their weakened bodies and their memories, the latter horribly bitter but capable of being kindled into a deeply nostalgic glow. Their numbers afforded them the political possibility to become white. The desperate nature of their labor and their longings ensured that they would embrace that possibility to the fullest.
Irish Votes, Democratic Votes and White Votes

Coming into American society at or near the bottom, the Catholic Irish sorely needed allies, even protectors. They quickly found them in two institutions that did not question their whiteness: the Catholic Church and the Democratic party. Although the former proved more open to promoting Irishmen to positions of power - most bishops in the United States were Irish by the 1850s – the Democratic party was far more powerful as a national institution and more consistently proslavery and white supremacist in its outlook. The church did reflect the racial attitudes of its members, with Kentucky Catholic newspapers carrying advertisements for the return of runaway slaves. New York church publications hinted at, and then spelled out, the view that the ‘negro is what the creator made him – not a rudimentary Caucasian, not a human in the process of development but a negro.’ The official Catholic paper in New York City meanwhile advised that emancipated slaves moving North be ‘driven out, imprisoned or exterminated.’ However, these strong and unpalatable Catholic stances, which existed alongside softer calls for amelioration of the slave’s plight, at most reproduced existing white supremacist attitudes without challenging them. The Democratic party did more.

Jean Baker, a leading historian of the Democrats between the Age of Jackson and the Civil War, has acutely observed that the Democratic party ‘reinvented whiteness in a manner that “refurbished” their party’s traditional links to the People and offered political democracy and an inclusive patriotism to white male Americans.’ This sense of white unity and white entitlement – of white “blood” – served to bind together the Democratic slaveholders and the masses of nonslaveholding whites in the South. It further connected the Southern and Northern wings of the Democracy. But less noticed by scholars has been the way in which an emphasis on a common whiteness smoothed over divisions in the Democratic ranks within mainly Northern cities by emphasizing that immigrants from Europe, and particularly from Ireland, were white and thus unequivocally entitled to equal rights. In areas with virtually no Black voters, the Democrats created a ‘white vote’.

From the earliest days of the American republic, Irish immigration to the United States had caused political division. The ‘wild Irish’, a term that invoked images of both ‘semi-savage’ Catholics and political rebels who were sometimes Protestants, excited particular concern among conservative Federalist politicians. Defense of immigration by the Jeffersonian Democrats helped to create a lasting preference for the

Democracy among newcomers, though party lines blurred considerably. In any case, how immigrants voted was of small importance nationally through 1830, when only one ballot in thirty could come from the foreign-born. By 1845, that figure was to rise to one in seven, with the Great Famine exodus still to produce, between 1845 and 1854, by far the greatest decade of immigration in antebellum American history. Immigration largely meant Irish immigration, with between 43 percent and 47 percent of migrants each year between 1820 and 1855 coming from Ireland.

By the early 1830s, the pattern of a strong Catholic Irish identification with the Democratic party, and with Andrew Jackson specifically, had strongly taken hold in urban centers like New York City. Although the existing urban Democratic political machines took time to inch away from the suspicion of immigrants felt by many of their artisan followers, Irish Catholics were welcomed as voters, party members and political muscle, though not typically as officeholders, by Democrats before the Civil War. The Catholic Irish, the immigrant group most exposed to nativist opposition, accepted protection from Democrats. Lacking a nationalist tradition of agitation for land redistribution in Ireland, too poor to move West and perhaps soured on farm life after the famine, the Catholic Irish were particularly immune to late antebellum Free Soil criticisms of Democratic opposition to homestead laws. Democrats and Irish-American Catholics entered into a lasting marriage that gave birth to new ideologies stressing the importance of whiteness.

From the 1830s, Democrats appreciated the ways in which the idea that all Blacks were unfit for civic participation could be transmitted into the notion that all whites were so fit. Pennsylvania Democrats, for example, solidified white unity by initiating the movement to codify the disfranchisement of the state’s Blacks via constitutional amendment. Conflict with Mexico, and to some extent the rise of Chinese immigration, made it possible in the 1840s and 1850s for leading Democrats to develop racial schemes unequivocally gathering all European settlers together as whites against the “colored” races. At a time when most Democratic theorists were coming to accept polygeneticist ideas regarding the separate creations of the ‘black’ and ‘white’ races, they were also defining ‘white’ in such a way as to include more surely the Irish and other immigrants. Thus, James Buchanan contemptuously branded the Mexicans as a ‘mongrel’ race unfit for freedom but was glad that ‘Americans’ were a ‘mixed’ population of English, Scotch-Irish, French, Welsh, German and Irish ancestry. Missouri’s Thomas Hart Benton wrote of a ‘Celtic-Anglo-Saxon race’, superior to, in descending order, the yellow, brown and red
The Wages of Whiteness

Contrary to popular belief, he was not a Saxon of England or a Celt of Ireland." He added, "I do not admit as my equals either the red man of America, or the yellow man of Asia, or the black man of Africa."  

The most celebrated events of the nineteenth century remain Democratic leader Stephen A. Douglas's stump speeches and the 1858 Lincoln-Douglas debates. The debates played on the heels of the 1856 elections - the first in which the great mass of immigrant voters were white. The debate marked the end of the old Americanism, which embraced the idea of a pure white race uncorrupted by outside influences.  

Douglas sought to make points among Illinois voters but also to speak to the needs of the Democracy as a national, and particularly Northern, party. He decided, in the words of a recent biographer, that Negro inequality made up the platform on which he would stand in the ensuing years.  

For Douglas spoke for preserving not only the purity of [white] blood but the purity of the government from any amalgamation with inferior races.  

He added, drawing lessons from the Mexican conflict, that the results of this amalgamation of white men and Indians and negroes, we have seen in Mexico, in Central America, in South America and in all the Spanish-American states. Douglas promised that Mexican War veterans could back his claims regarding the effects of racial 'impurity'. He further protested that Lincoln's belief that the Declaration of Independence applied to people of color would make the debate's listeners, who sometimes chanted 'White men, White men' during his speeches, the equals of Fiji Islanders.  

Significantly, he meanwhile also argued that Americans' ancestors were 'not all of English origin' but were also of Scotch, Irish, German, French, and Norman descent, indeed 'from every branch of the Caucasian race.'  

Douglas spoke in the highly racialized political language increasingly common among Democrats, and to some extent among their opponents. Since Blacks wielded virtually no political power, to mobilize the white vote it was useful to declare white opponents and their ideas to be Black. Discussing Republican support in Illinois, Douglas found that 'the creed is pretty black in the north end of the State; about the center it is pretty good mulatto and it is almost white when you get down to Egypt [Southern Illinois]. The Republicans became, in Democratic propagan-

da and especially in appeals from or directed at Catholic Irish Democrats, the 'Black Republicans'. Irish Democrats often scored the perfidy of the German 'Black Dutch' or of 'red' Germans in league with 'Black' Republicans.  

Lincoln's studied replies to Douglas's race-baiting stressed that a belief in natural rights applied to Blacks did not imply a desire to intern them, that Republicans better protected the 'white men's interests' than Democrats did, and that slaveholders, not Republicans, practiced racial amalgamation. Other Republican propaganda was much uglier, branding the Democracy a 'nigger party' by virtue of its association with slavery and connecting its proslavery and pro-Irish policies. German opponents of Irish Democrats similarly cast doubts on the race of their adversaries.  

Reginald Horne's careful study of American 'racial Anglo-Saxonism' shows that 'politicians of Irish or Scotch-Irish ancestry' were especially prominent in challenging ideas of Anglo-Saxon superiority and in arguing for the existence of a new and improved 'American race' of white men.  

Catholic Irish immigrants were also the best consumers of Democratic appeals that equated 'white men' and 'workingmen'. As Dale T. Knobel observes in Paddy and the Republic, Irish-Americans were sure to be enthusiastic about any treatment of American nationality that stressed the relevance of 'race' while putting the Irish safely within the Anglo-Celtic racial majority. The aptly named Democratic New York City Caucasian particularly won Irish-born readers to its view that defense of the 'white working class' during the Civil War was best carried forward by attacking abolition.  

Democratic means to whiteness must have seemed a godsend to Irish Catholics, especially amid hardening anti-Irish attitudes after 1845. By the time of the famine, it could be argued - and was argued by Irish-Americans themselves - that longstanding British oppression had kept the Irish in political 'slavery' and brought utter economic dependency. Irish-Americans were deeply offended in the 1856 campaign when a remark by Buchanan implied that England had not made 'slaves' of the Irish. But to make this argument, and to compare Irish and African oppression, forfeited any claim of Irish-Americans to be qualified for freedom by republican criteria. Past and present, their history seemed to be one of degradation. As John Ashworth has perceptively put it, since Irish-Americans were in many cases as economically dependent as free Blacks, no 'empirical' case could be made that the immigrants had shown themselves fit for freedom, and Blacks by comparison had proven themselves unfit to be 'true Americans'.  

Nativists were somewhat constrained by the historic American accep-
tance of Irish immigrants, by the cultural proximity of Irish Catholics with clearly assimilable Celtic Protestants from Ireland, Scotland and Wales, and by the ease with which Irish Catholics could pass as mainstream "white" Americans. Anti-immigrant politicians therefore generally did not dwell on the popular ethnological theories that identified the Celts as genetically inferior. They instead concentrated on Irish subservience to religious authority and Irish degradation, loosely arguing at times that the famine itself had helped produce an Irish 'race' incapable of freedom. Some unfavorably compared the Irish with free Blacks, not so much as racial types as in terms of their alleged records of fitness to function as republican citizens. Black leaders like Frederick Douglass generally avoided anti-Catholicism but charged that the ignorance and intemperance of the Irish and their roles as 'runkeys to our gentry' made it certain that Irish Catholics were not more desirable than Blacks as citizens of a republic.

The Democratic emphasis on natural rights within a government 'made by the white men, for the benefit of the white man' appealed to Irish Catholics in large part because it cut off questions about their qualifications for citizenship. Under other circumstances, Irish-American Catholics might not have accepted so keenly the association of nationality with blood - but not with ethnicity, which racially conflated them with the otherwise hated English. They might not have so readily embraced a view of 'American nationality that stressed the relevance of "race" while putting the Irish safely within an Anglo-Celtic racial majority. But within the constrained choices and high risks of antebellum American politics such a choice was quite logical. The ways in which the Irish competed for work and adjusted to industrial mortality in America made it all but certain that they would adopt and extend the politics of white offers by the Democratic party.

'Slaving like a Nigger': Irish Jobs and Irish Whiteness

In 1856, Henry C. Brokmeyer, then a wage-earning immigrant German molder in St. Louis, wrote in his diary a question posed about one of his German-American friends: "Why doesn't he learn ... a trade; and he wouldn't have to slave like a nigger?" Brokmeyer, who was to become not only independent of wage work but eventually lieutenant governor of Missouri, had picked up a pattern of usage common in American English since the 1830s. Not only was nigger work synonymous with hard, drudging labor but to nigger it meant 'to do hard work', or 'to slave'.

'White niggers' were white workers in arduous unskilled jobs or in subservient positions.

But not all European immigrants had the same prospects to 'learn a trade', let alone to acquire independence from 'slaving like a nigger', by owning a workshop or a farm. English and Scandinavian immigrants were especially likely to achieve such mobility, while the Irish and Germans faced most directly the question of how and whether their labor was different from 'slaving like a nigger'. But the Irish confronted the question much more starkly. Both before and after the famine, they were far more likely than the Germans to be without skills. The famine Irish infrequently achieved rural land ownership. Within large cities Irish-American males were skilled workers perhaps half as often as German-Americans, and were unskilled at least twice as often. Although frontier cities, perhaps attracting Irish migrants with more resources and choices, showed less difference between Irish and German occupational patterns, the Irish stayed at the bottom of white society.

In larger Eastern cities the divergence was great. In Boston in 1850, according to Oscar Handlin, 22 percent of the German-born and 6 percent of the Catholic Irish-born worked in nonmanual jobs. 57 percent of the Germans were in skilled trades, as against 23 percent of the Irish. 47 percent of the Irish and only 12 percent of the Germans were unskilled. In fact, Handlin argued that free Blacks were for a time both economically and socially more secure in ante-bellum Boston than were the Irish. In New York City in 1855, Germans were about twice as likely to do nonmanual labor as the Irish, and the Irish were nearly five times as likely to be without skills. In Jersey City in 1860, over half of Catholic Irish-American workers, and only one German-American in eight, did unskilled labor. In addition, many skilled and 'independent' Irish-Americans were only nominally or precariously so. Concentrated in declining artisanal crafts, often as outworkers or as highly exploited apprentices, Irish artisans and petty employers in some areas experienced significant downward mobility as they aged. Irish stevedores frequently descended into the ranks of employed longshoremen, and small Irish building trades contractors into the ranks of laborers, from year to year.

The prominence of Irish workers, especially women, in jobs involving service in households became especially pronounced. Christine Stansell's work shows a dramatic 'Irishization' of such jobs, so that in New York City by 1850 three serving women in four were Irish-Americans. Faye Dudden's Servant Women details the same trends in a broader study. Travellers took note of the change as one that placed Irish Catholics in servile positions. Thomas Hamilton, writing in 1834, found that Domes-
tic service ... is considered degrading by all [Americans] untainted with the curse of African descent.' He bet that Andrew Jackson could 'not find one of his constituents, who, for any amount of emolument, would consent to brush his coat.' The Scottish and British migrants quickly came to share this republican view, according to Hamilton. The Irish, he added, took servile jobs.  

With the coming of the Irish into dominance in household work, much of the horesework republican practice of avoiding the term 'servant' for whites fell into disuse. From the Age of Jackson, reformers in New York City set out to reshape the behavior of often Irish 'domestic servants'. Thomas Hamilton's account echoed this usage and, as Dudden observes, even when the term domestic came to be used by itself, servant was implied. An 1839 traveller found that native-born Americans still avoided calling domestic workers of the same background servile names but reasoned, 'Let negroes be servants and, if not negroes, let Irishmen ...' 'Help', Dudden comments, 'were likely to deny the name of servant, while domestics usually had to accept that title.'

Irish-American workers also suffered an association with servile labor by virtue of their heralded, and at least sometimes practiced, use as substitutes for slaves within the South. Gangs of Irish immigrants worked ditching and draining plantations, building levees and sometimes clearing land because of the danger of death to valuable slave property (and, as one account put it, to mules) in such pursuits. Frederick Law Olmsted's widely circulated accounts of the South quoted more than one Southerner who explained the use of Irish labor on the ground that 'niggers are worth too much to be risked here; if the Paddies are knocked overboard ... nobody loses anything.'

Irish youths were also likely to be found in the depleted ranks of indentured servants from the early national period through the Civil War. In that position they were sometimes called 'Irish slaves' and more frequently 'bound boys'. The degraded status of apprentices was sometimes little distinguishable from indenture by the 1840s and was likewise increasingly an Irish preserve. In New York City, Irish women comprised the largest group of prostitutes, or, as they were sometimes called in the 1850s, 'white slaves'. Given all this, the tendency to call Irish workers 'Irish niggers' is hardly surprising.

Irish-Americans needed 'nigger work'. As the Southern historian U.B. Phillips put it, the dangerous jobs in which Irishmen substituted for slaves 'attracted those whose labor was their life; the risk repelled those whose labor was their capital.' The same might be said about indentured servitude, domestic service by married women, prostitution and other hard jobs for which Irish-Americans desperately competed. Irish-Americans could not simply say, as many other white Americans could, that Blacks were suited to menial or subservient jobs. They bitterly resented comments by some of the elite that Blacks made better servants. As Hasia Diner has remarked, even after the Civil War Irish anti-Chinese agitation was predicated in large part on the need to defend Irish domestic servant women from competition from Chinese males.

Job competition has often been considered the key to Irish-American racism. From Alphonse B. Bruce Laurie, historians have emphasized that Irish workers, especially in the docks and shipyards in cities like Cincinnati, Philadelphia, Baltimore, and above all New York City, fought to keep away Blacks as job competitors and as strikebreakers. Many such direct incidents of Irish violence to intimidate Black workers did occur, especially during the Civil War, and there is some justification for Laurie's view that in Philadelphia Irish gangs undertaking racist violence were exercising job control. But to go from the fact that Irish workers really fought with Blacks over jobs on occasion to the proposition that Irish racism was really a cover for job competition is an economic determinist misstep that cuts off important parts of the past. Why, for example, when Irish Catholic immigrants said that they feared the amalgamation of labor should historians hearken to their emphasis on labor and not to their emphasis on amalgamation?

Moreover, to say that Irish-Americans acted as militant white supremacists because of job competition only invites the further question: why did they choose to stress competition with Black workers instead of with other whites? In 1844, Philadelphia Irish Catholics who mobbed Blacks to clear them from dockworking jobs had themselves recently been removed from handloom weaving jobs via concerted actions by Protestant weavers. Why did they not mob the Protestants? In most cities, even when we consider only unskilled work, the Irish had far more German-American competitors than Black ones. Why was the animus against working with Blacks so much more intense than that of against working with Germans? Indeed, as Harold Brackman has argued, the main competitors of the Irish for unskilled work were other arriving Irish. Why, given the strength of 'countryism' in Ireland and the patterns of intra-Irish factional fighting for canal-building jobs in the 1830s, did race and not time of emigration or county or even kin network become the identity around which Irish dockworkers in New York City could mobilize most effectively in the 1850s and during the Civil War?

By and large, free Blacks were not effective competitors for jobs with the Irish. A small part of the urban labor force, negligible in most Mid-
immigration with the lowering of wages and the undermining of a promising labor movement of native-born women textile workers. By no means is the case connecting Irish immigration with the degradation of native-born workers the only one that can be made. Edward Everett Hale observed at the time that with the coming of the Irish, 'Natives [were] simply pushed up into Foremen ..., superintendents, ... machinists' and other skilled occupations. Hale's view has some defenders among modern historians, but the important issue here is that many native-born artisans, rightly or wrongly, paired the arrival of the Irish with unfavorable changes in their crafts and wages and participated in both anti-immigrant riots and anti-immigrant political movements. By casting job competition and neighborhood rivalries as racial, rather than ethnic, the Irish argued against such nativist logic.

Thus, the struggle over jobs best explains Irish-Americans' prizing of whiteness if that struggle is considered broadly, to include not only white-Black competition but white-white competition as well. Similarly, we must widen the focus from a struggle over jobs to include an emphasis on the struggle over how jobs were to be defined to understand more fully why the Irish so embraced whiteness. Specifically, the specter of 'slaving like a nigger' hung over the Irish. In Ireland, peasants with small holdings had commonly described loss of a parcel as a descent to 'slavery.' Irish-Americans did not mind referring to Britain's 'enslavement of Ireland.' Sometimes, as in the 1856 presidential campaign, they insisted on it. Would-be friends of Irish-Americans as diverse as Edward Everett Hale, Orestes Brownson and the labor reformers of the Voice of Industry all alluded to the British imposition of slavery or worse on Eire. Irish-Americans were also receptive to appeals from Democratic politicians who emphasized the threat of 'white slavery' in the United States and were cool to Republican attempts to portray talk of 'white slavery' as reckless and demeaning to white workers.

But there were few specific attempts by the Irish or their friends to talk about a specifically Irish-American 'slavery' - a distended metaphor, as Frederick Douglass pointed out, but considerably less so than the generalized concept of 'white slavery,' which was used. Immigrants, so hopeful of escaping slavery in Ireland, were hesitant to acknowledge a specifically ethnic defeat in the Promised Land, and real differences between the suffering in Ireland and that in America discouraged use of 'Irish slavery' to describe both situations.

Most important, Irish-American Catholics did not want to reinforce popular connections of the Blacks and the Irish. If they could live with being called 'white slaves,' it was harder to abide being called 'Irish
niggers'. When Irishmen repeated jokes about slaves complaining that their masters treated them 'like Irishmen', the laughter had a decidedly tense edge. But it was difficult to get out from under the burden of doing unskilled work in a society that identified such work and (some craft jobs) as 'nigger work'. If they were to sever this connection, the Irish could not just achieve a favorable labor market position vis-à-vis Blacks. They had to drive all Blacks, and if possible their memories, from the places where the Irish labored. Frederick Douglass warned the Irish workers of the possibility that 'in assuming our avocation he also assumed our degradation.' Irish workers responded that they wanted an 'all-white waterfront', rid of Blacks altogether, and not to 'jostle with' African-Americans. They thought that, to ensure their own survival, they needed as much.

Industrial Discipline, Sexuality and Irish Whiteness

An analysis centering on Democratic politics and the struggles to secure and redefine the jobs of Irish-American Catholics provides important explanations for that group's embrace of whiteness. But by itself such an analysis makes the unthinking decision to insist on being white seem altogether too utilitarian. Neither political nor psycho-economic calculations can quite explain why some Irish-American Catholics would, for example, mutiny the corpses of the free Blacks they lynched in the 1863 Draft Riot in New York City. Neither can such factors by themselves explain why many other Irish immigrants looked with fascination at these crimes nor why members of the community on subsequent days fought to keep authorities from retrieving the corpses. The psychological wages of Irish whiteness were sometimes of the sort based on rational, if horribly constrained, choices. But as frequently they were the products of what Frantz Fanon called 'the prelogical thought of the phobic' - the fevered thinking in which the racist nurtures his hatred as he 'project[s] his own desires onto the Negro' and behaves 'as if the Negro really had them'.

But what desires? And why should the projections of Irish-American Catholics onto Blacks have been accompanied by such great ferocity? Fanon's further insights are valuable in considering these questions, in that his work is a model of both a refusal to reduce white racism to its sexual dimensions and of a refusal to shrink from discussion of these sexual dimensions. Fanon argues that racism places Blacks within the category of the 'biological', defining them as sexual but also as without history and as natural, erotic, sensual and animal. Whiteness took shape against the corresponding counter-images, shunting anxieties and desires regarding relationships to nature and to sexuality onto Blacks.

For Irish-American Catholics, the anxieties and the desires resulting from a loss of a relationship with nature were particularly acute. Though gang labor, cottage industry and putting-out systems had some substantial currency in mid-century Ireland, no antebellum European immigrant group experienced the wrenching move from the preindustrial countryside to full confrontation with industrial capitalism in an urban setting with anything like the intensity of Irish Catholics. The German-American population, the most comparable group, was one that did develop significant splits within its ranks regarding slavery and white supremacy. German-Americans often came to the United States after experiences as 'wandering' artisans, encountering urban life and wage labor gradually and while still having ties to the countryside. Within the US, German-Americans were far less urbanized than the Irish and more able to preserve familiar work rhythms and measures of craft control on the job, both because of the presence of German-dominated craft union locals and because of the significant numbers of German-American employers using German labor processes.

Irish Catholics, especially but not only during the Great Famine, tended to emigrate directly from rural areas in which place mattered tremendously, contributing to a relationship with the past, to a sense of kinship and even to religious faith. Torn from their homes, they resettled in places remarkably different from Ireland. Not only relocated in cities, but in the most crowded quarters of them, Irish-Americans maintained only the most tenuous of ties to nature. Their efforts to preserve the right to keep pigs in cities - continuing into the 1850s in New York City - and their success in gaining jobs involving butchering and the care of horses should not obscure the general trajectory of Irish-American Catholics - from the Ould Sod to no sod at all in a very short time. One New England factory worker recalled that factory management turned to Irish-American Catholic labor in part because 'not coming from country homes but living as the Irish do, in the town, they take no vacations, and can be relied on at the mill all year round.' It would have been more exact to say 'coming from country homes but not in this country.'

Of course, the time discipline and routinization of work demanded by industrializing America were not uncontested by Irish immigrants. Direct actions influenced by the Irish background - from banshee yelling to terror - shaped working class protest in the United States, especially after the Civil War. Moreover, many Irish migrants defended preindustrial
styles of life through informal actions, refusing or failing to become sober and disciplined workers. As Bruce Laurie has observed, the arrival of so many Irish Catholics ‘changed the ethnic base of traditionalism.’

That is, the antebellum Irish were especially noted for drinking, for promiscuity, for brawling and for irregular work habits at a time when employers, educators and reformers actively attacked such vices as both immoral and inefficient. But it is vitally important to avoid romanticizing such informal resistance. To work – and the Irish desperately needed work – in an urban capitalist environment required conformity with time discipline and work discipline. If to some extent the Irish immigrants were ‘insulated’ from being directly tossed by their tendency to labor as outworkers, they also needed to work in settings very much subject to ‘hurry and push’ styles of management: in construction, in longshoring and carting, in service and in unskilled factory labor. Young Irish indentures, apprentices and child laborers in mills often suffered a psychological battering from Protestant employers bent on reforming the children, sometimes in front of their parents. Contemporary observers stressed not only ‘upstairs’ Irish working-class behavior of the traditionalist sort but also the subservience, loyalty to employers and even the asceticism of the Irish.

Not only were the opportunities for traditionalist resistance on the job circumscribed, but when Irish-American Catholics flouted Protestant and industrial capitalist standards regarding alcohol consumption and sexuality they often did so guiltily, knowing that their own standards were also being violated. If the Irish Catholics drank heavily in the United States and organized politically around a hatred of temperance reformers, they did not do so in mere continuation of preimmigration patterns of life. Though drinking was a central part of social life for males in Ireland, per capita alcohol consumption there in the early nineteenth century trailed that of the United States. Moreover, the Irish who came to the United States in such great numbers came from a society with a tremendous mass temperance movement. Led by the legendary Father Mathew, that movement swept whole counties, inducing the poor as well as middle class Irish to take a temperance pledge and succeeding in reducing at least the visibility of alcohol consumption. Father Mathew enjoyed wide popularity among Irish-American Catholics as well. The connections between temperance and Protestantism, nativism and antislavery in the United States made Catholic Irish immigrants opponents (and targets) of the political movements against alcohol consumption. However, drinking was far from being an unproblematic symbol of Irish-American Catholic resistance to Protestantism or to industrial discipline. Those downing the drinks may well have considered themselves backsliders more often than they considered themselves traditionalist opponents of Protestantism and industrial morality.

More tortured still were Irish-American Catholic expressions of sexuality. The reformer Charles Loring Brace worriedly described Irish immigrants in New York City as experimenters with the doctrines of ‘Free Love.’ But Irish-American sexuality was at least as guilt-ridden as it was adventurous. Gender relations took shape within an immigrant population in which men frequently far outnumbered women. As avoidance of service occupations by single women and of wage work by married women became a badge of American respectability, Irish daughters and wives labored for the family’s survival, often in other people’s homes and – to a degree little noticed by historians – often in the households of native-born skilled workers. Men frequently left their families to look for work and sometimes never came back. Wives and husbands advertised in newspapers for the return of their spouses. Need, not desire, drove immigrant women into prostitution. At the least, sexual experimentation occurred under highly unfavorable conditions. Moreover, the Irish background hardly nurtured a tradition of sexual freedom. Even before the mid-nineteenth-century Devotional Revolution in Ireland, attitudes toward extramarital sexuality were extremely negative, in part because of the importance of family and inherited land. Catholicism in Ireland exposed the inmate and ridiculed them with ‘rough music’ serenades. Such rituals continued in the United States, and newspapers with Irish-American Catholic readerships shared the concerns of Protestant reformers that ‘sin, debauchery and crime [had] destroyed all natural and truthful perceptions’ of the roles of ‘the white woman’. One dance hall and house of prostitution in a largely Irish section of antebellum New York City gave away Bibles to its customers. The same simultaneous defense of ‘traditionalist’ behavior and belief that such behavior was indefensible characterized much of Irish immigrant culture.

George Rawick’s argument that the typical early bourgeois racist constructed whiteness by imagining ‘a pornography of his former life’ and projecting it onto Blacks might be expanded in order to consider the racism of working class Irish-American Catholics who at times created a pornography of their present lives and at other times of their past. The Irish immigrants addressed their own divorce from connections with land and nature’s rhythms in part by attempting to define preindustrial behavior, and even longing for the past itself, as ‘Black’ behavior. When Irish immigrant minstrel entertainers sang ‘Carry Me Back to Old Virginia’, they both expressed feelings of loss and exile and at the same
Irish-American workers and white racial formation. Millennium of Abolition conveys several common features of such propaganda. These include the idea that emancipation would reverse racial positions and enslave poor whites, and that antislavery Germans had broken their ties with the white race. Above all, the passage shows the voyeuristic delight produced by reflection on Black sexuality and eroticism. It is alternately languid and fevered in describing a scene in which

Summer is introducing a snappish ‘colored lady’ to the President. A young woman (white) is being kissed by a big black nigger, while a lady lecturer [Dickinson] sits upon the knee of a sable brother urging him to come to her lectures; while Gleeley, in the very height of ecstatic enjoyment, is eating ice cream with a female African of monstrous physique ... In the background is a carriage, negroes inside, with white drivers and footmen; a white servant girl drawing a nigger baby and a newly arrived German surveying the whole scene exclaiming, ‘Miss Got, not a gun!’

Another fantasy appeared with equal frequency. In it, the goal of the antislavery forces, from Lincoln to Henry Ward Beecher to Hinton Rowan Helper, was to require interracial sex, and particularly Black-Irish sex. In part, this fantasy was used to explain real Black-Irish liaisons. The Day Book, for example, blamed ‘Black Republicans’ for the existence of ‘the sexual confusion of a Negro and a white woman’, a relationship that was ‘lust, but diseased, monstrous, hideous lust’. It reported that in the largely Irish Five Points area ‘whites, negroes and mongrels readily “intermarry”, while blaming such relationships on the influence of the ‘Abolition idea’.

More broadly, the idea of an antislavery plot to force intimacy between the Irish and Blacks enabled political conspiracy theorists to reproduce, in highly sexualized form, the appeal of minstrelsy. It was possible to reflect on Black-Irish similarities, and even on Irish desires to recapture that part of themselves they had defined as ‘Black’, while vigorously denying any affinity to African-Americans. One could imagine anything – as illustrated by the example of a New York World editorial that held that the ‘logical outgrowth of ... extravagant negrophilism’ was the breaking of the incest taboo – and lay all guilt at the door of Blacks and ‘Black Republicans’.

The process by which the word miscegenation entered American usage to become a pivotal issue in the 1864 presidential campaign is most revealing in this connection. Coining the term were the Irish immigrant Democrat D.G. Croly and his coauthor, George Wakeman, who produced a sensational 1863 pamphlet titled Miscegenation: The Theory of the Blending of the Races, Applied to the American White Man and Negro.

time distanced themselves from those same feelings through blackface. Irish immigrants consistently argued that African-American workers were lazy, improvident and irresponsible. The immigrants were used to hearing such characterizations applied to themselves, and not only by political enemies but also by their own newspapers, which fretted over the need to develop a ‘work ethic’ among the newly arrived. When free Blacks dramatically violated the Irish-American view of them as undisciplined and preindustrial – when they mounted temperance parades, for example – immigrant mobs stood ready to attack. But similarly mobbed were places in which Black and Irish people drank, schemed, played, made love and lived together. In part this pattern of crowd behavior reflected the violence of the urban underworld and the fact that crime and vice were areas in which the races mixed with relative freedom. But the riotous Irish-American attacks on the common pleasures of Blacks and of fellow Irishmen – the 1863 New York City mob directed its ire not only in the murdering of African-Americans and the destruction of houses of prostitution but also in the smashing of musical instruments – also suggest how fragile and artificial was the Irish insistence on defining Blacks as preindustrial ‘others’.

But the more frantically that Irish immigrants sought to distance themselves from Blacks, the more it became apparent that fascination mixed with repulsion in their attitudes toward African-Americans. The constant Civil War refrain of pro-Irish, Democratic politicians charged that Republicans and abolitionists had ‘nigger on the brain’. But appeals to and by Irish immigrants betrayed a monomaniacal focus on race, and particularly on race-mixing, that the antislavery forces could not match. The failure to institute color bars to keep free Blacks away from ‘white’ jobs presaged not just integrated workplaces to worried Irish-American Catholics but the sexual ‘amalgamation of labor’. Similarly, any application of natural rights to Blacks or advocacy of freeing the slaves was denounced as ‘political amalgamation’. John H. Van Evrie’s New York Day Book, which appealed to an Irish-American audience as The Cauca-ian and as ‘The White Man’s Paper’, advised readers in the ‘producing classes’ that to cut their children’s throats at once was preferable to handing them over to ‘impartial freedom’ and a consequent ‘amalgamation with negroes’.

Sometimes Democratic biracial sexual fantasies focused on antislavery leaders. Horace Greeley, Charles Sumner, Lincoln and the beautiful young abolitionist orator Anna Dickinson were special objects of fascination to pamphleteers and minstrel performers. An extended advertisement in the New York Day Book for the 1864 pamphlet Miscegenation; or, The
Croly and Wakeman combined the Latin words miscere ("to mix") and genus ("race") in a neologism designed to replace the older term amalgamation. Miscenation's scientific ring gave it advantages, as did its success in conjuring up the "mongrelization" of the United States as a political issue. By racist Democratic logic, Republican policies in 1864 threatened literally to establish a "miscigen" nation. But Croly and Wakeman did not claim credit for this linguistic creativity. They instead anonymously wrote the pamphlet as an elaborate hoax, posing as pro-Republican abolitionists who saw mixing of the races as a "rich blending of blood." Croly then sent copies to prominent antislavery leaders. He hoped to secure their endorsements for theories that could then be used to embarrass the Republicans in the coming elections. As Sidney Kaplan's able discussion of the pamphlet has shown, the specific relationship of the Irish working-people and the Negro formed the core of the hoax. The authors of Miscenation purposed to believe that Black-Irish mixing was already widespread. They especially stressed "communal relations ... between the black men and white Irish women ... pleasant to both parties." When a "mulatto union" of Blacks and Irish took place, they added, it would be of infinite service to the Irish ... a more brutal race and lower in civilization than the Negro.

Miscenation succeeded briefly as a political dirty trick designed to produce a backlash among Irish and other white workers. Its effectiveness rested on Croly and Wakeman's understanding that their audience was not only ready to believe in Republican plots—but was also fascinated by the prospects of Black-Irish sexuality. In a curious twist, Croly attacked his own unsigned pamphlet in a editorial in the New York World, holding that it showed that "any man who chooses can write and cause to be printed whatever freak may come into his head" and that anonymity can protect designing authors. It should be added that in constructing images of Blacks, opportunities abound for Irish immigrants and for whites generally to indulge "whatever freak" desire they imagined or to express perfectly understandable longings, without claiming authorship of those sentiments as their own.

Notes


7. Frederick Douglass, Narrative of the Life of Frederick Douglass, An American Slave, New York 1845. 14 and 106; Douglass, My Bondage and My Freedom, Chicago 1879 (1855), 76: thanks to Sterling Stoecky for the latter reference.


13. Osofsky, 'Romantic Nationalism', 892-901; Joseph M. Heron, Jr., Celts, Catholics


45. *Hornstein, Race and Manfest Destiny, 250-53, including the operations.


53. Indeed, so much of late anti-emulmism politics revolved around proving one’s whiteness that the recent and cogent call by Eric Foner and others for a political history that considers how racism interacts with the other social forces can be supplemented by an appeal for a consideration of how race came to symbolize both ethnic and class positions. Susan Foner, *Causes of the American Civil War: Recent Interpretations and New Directions*, in *Politics and Ideology in the Age of the Civil War*, New York 1980, 17-19; Richard N. Current, *The Political Thought of Abraham Lincoln*, Indianapolis, Ind. 1967, 48-91 and 105; *Hinton R. Helper, The Improvement of the South*, New York, 1857, 169 and 173; *Forman*, *Political Parties*, 318, n.12; Eric Foner, *Racial Attitudes of the New York Free Soldier*, in *Politics and
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54. Horrman, Race and Manifest Destiny, 250.
58. Laurie, Working People, 124.
62. Dudden, Serving Women, 5–6; Hamilton, Men and Minstrelsy, 1:104–7; Charles Mackay, Life and Liberty in America, London 1839, 2:104; Stansell, City of Women, 165; Ernst, Immigrant Life, 65; Hanna,Bowen's Immigrants, 61; Forman, Political Parties, 181.

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69. Laurie, Working People, 124.
74. Miller, 'Green over Black', 18, 35; Bernstein, Draft Riots, 78, 119–20, 191–92 and 318, 888; Foner and Lewis, Black Worker, 1:168.
75. Bernd and Conzen, 'Natives and Immigrants', esp. 1191; Hirsch, Race, 47; Rorsbaugh, Craft Apprentice, 133 and 140; Wilentz, Chains Democratic, 118–19; Lane, Solidarity or Survival, 28.
79. Gibson, New York Irish, 86–87; Edward Everett Hale, Letters on Irish Immigration, Boston 1852; 5. Votes of Industry, 7 May 1847; Thomas Ainge Devoy, The Odd Book of the Nineteenth Century, or 'Omnibus in Modern Days, Greenpoint, N.Y. 1882, 103; Irish American, 21 January 1860; Murphy, Attitudes of American Catholics, 40–41; and Chapter 5 above.
80. Douglas, as reprinted in Herbert Apkarian, ed., A Documentary History of the Negro People in the United States, New York 1951, 1:32; Miller, 'Green over Black', 81–83. However, see also Devoy, Odd Book, 164 and 168.
81. Wilkie, Irish, 125; Rubin, 'Black Nativism', 199; Freeman's Journal (New York), 4 November 1843.
82. Very suggestive in this connection are Paul A. Gilje's comments on antiblack racism as in, a focus for a more general hatred and contempt for unskilled workers. The Irish obviously had an interest in keeping that focus on Blacks. See Gilje, The Road to
Irish-American Workers and White Racial Formation

106. Asher, Gangs, 56-60.
111. Bernstein, Draft Riots, 12-34 and passim.
115. Wood, Black Scar, 59-60 and 73; Kaplan, 'Miscegenation Issue,' 275 and 316; Alexander Saxton, Blackface Minstrelsy and Jacksonian Ideology, American Quarterly 27 (March 1975): 22-23. On the idea that emancipation would utterly reverse roles and even enslave whites, see Baker, Affairs of Party, 251-53; Seaman, What Miscegenation Is 4-5; Porter, Golden Door, 377; Miller, 'Green over Black,' 46, 64 and 99; Wood, Black Scar, 10.
116. Quoted in Kaplan, 'Miscegenation Issue,' 316.
117. Quoted in Miller, 'Green over Black,' 68 and 73; see also Heiney, Ode, Caribou and Copperhead, 65; Democrats Campaign Document No. 11, New York 1864, 2-3; Kaplan, 'Miscegenation Issue,' 320.
118. See Kaplan, 'Miscegenation Issue,' 225 and, for the quote, 309.
119. [Crozy and Wakeman], Miscegenation, ii; Wood, Black Scar, 54-58; Kaplan, 'Miscegenation Issue,' 278 n6.
120. Kaplan, 'Miscegenation Issue,' 278 n6; [Crozy and Wakeman], Miscegenation, 18.
121. [Crozy and Wakeman], Miscegenation, 29-31; Kaplan, 'Miscegenation Issue,' 281.
122. Quoted in Kaplan, 'Miscegenation Issue,' 308.

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89. Frantz Fanon, Black Skin, White Masks, New York 1967, 159 and 165.
90. Ibid., 159-66.
94. Quoted in Herbert Gutman, Work, Culture and Society in Industrializing America, New York 1976, 21; see also p. 63; Bernstein, Draft Riots, 30; Ernst, Immigrant Life, 71.
97. Laurie, Working People, 159; Bernstein, Draft Riots, 78-124 and notes 63-66 above.
On Irish work rhythms, see Miller, Emigrants and Exiles, 270 and 274.
98. Clark, 'Babes in Bondage,' 482; Prole, Censoring, 117-18 and 215.
99. Willems, Chants Democratic, 267; Gutman, Work, Culture and Society, 21; Commons et al., Documentary History, 2183; P. Foster, Life and Writings, 2:240-50; Shugg, Class Struggle, 93-119.
104. Stansell, City of Women, 83 and 178; Miller, 'Green over Black', 72; Hirsch, Rosa, 57; Brace, Dangerous Classes, 41-42; D'Emilio and Freedman, Intimate Matters, 116; Diner, Brown's Daughters, 58; Elizabeth Blackmar, Manhattan for Rent, 1783-1850, Ithaca, N.Y. 1980, 121.