A HISTORY OF MODERN PHILOSOPHY

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everything was to be explained as a means to the furtherance of something outside itself. In accounting for the existence and activity of objects we must look, not for that which might be useful to the thing in question, but for that in it which might be useful to other objects. Man, in his opinion, is the end to which everything else in the universe is the means.

The theory of external uses and the habit of explaining all things as means to human life and happiness pervade his whole system. In nature the inanimate is a means to the animate; the animate is a means for giving the soul a body. Philosophy itself is a means for enlightening the mind, and an enlightened mind is a means to human happiness. The universe is the means by which God reveals himself. Purpose is all pervading. The universe is designed by God and its parts are designed by him to work together. This is the reason why the universe exists and why every minutest event happens as it does. In the divinely regulated order miracles and special revelations may occur; but, if they do, they must be recognizable as part of the order and not as exceptions to it. Such was the philosophy to which Kant was at first addicted.

CHAPTER V

KANT

I. LIFE

Immanuel Kant is the great homebody among philosophers. Of Scotch descent, he was born at Königsberg in 1724. He died at Königsberg in 1804. He lived there all his life. Nor during his whole life did he go more than forty miles from the city. He was even less traveled than Socrates, who, except as a soldier, never set foot outside of Athens. His father was a strap-maker, his family of the Pietistic persuasion. His first education was received at a Pietistic school, from which he went on to the University of Königsberg at the age of sixteen. There he had almost entirely to support himself. By the time he was twenty-two, both parents were dead, and, cut off from even such small help as they could afford to give him, he, with his three sisters and one brother—the survivors of nine children—had to make his own way as best he could. He was equipped with an excellent knowledge of Latin, less Greek, and a thorough training in mathematics and physics.

The next nine years he picked up a living by tutoring. Then he returned to the university, took his doctorate, and became an instructor, lecturing mainly upon physics. Finally, in 1770 he was appointed professor of logic and mathematics. This post he held till his retirement in 1797—an act inspired by the censorship to which the expression of his religious opinions, which had long since broken with his childhood faith, were subjected by the Pietistic and reactionary successor to Frederick the Great. During the last years of his life his mind appreciably failed.

The regularity of his life has become a byword. He never married, and the proverbial setness of a bachelor's ways was reinforced by a methodical temperament. He was awakened at five every morning, and not once in thirty years, his servant testified, did he fail to respond to the call. He worked all the morning and dined promptly at one o'clock at a restaurant, which he varied in order to escape from the sightseers who came to stare at him after he had become the most noteworthy monument of the town. Every after-
noon at four, rain or shine, followed by his manservant carrying an umbrella, he took an hour's walk, so punctually that the citizens of Königsberg, it is said, set their watches by his appearance at the door of his house. On returning, he pattered about till twilight, and then abandoned himself to meditation, gazing abstractedly at the tower of a neighboring church. Once, some fast-growing poplars in the forecourt suddenly blotted the spire from sight, and the construction of the Kantian philosophy, deprived of its ecclesiastical source of inspiration, was temporarily held up till the obliging owner of the trees topped them at Kant's request, and by thus restoring to him his power to think, became the real author of the Critique of Pure Reason. Every night saw Kant in bed before ten o'clock.

Another mainspring of the clock-like ticking of his life was his anxiety about his health. He was not only a bachelor and excessively methodical, he was also a hypochondriac. He stuck to a prescribed and restricted diet. He was afraid of sweating. He always breathed through his nose, under the impression that nothing invited disease like an open mouth. This fussiness was not altogether foolish. He was delicate, undersized, flat-chested, with one slightly deformed shoulder. He was always a little ailing, but never really ill. Like the proverbial New Englander, he "enjoyed" bad health.

Possessed of all the moral virtues, but not in any way a prig, Kant was a man of somewhat cool affections and of nearly stoic-aesthetic sense. He had little eye for natural beauty and no ear at all for poetry and music. He was, however, a great reader, except curiously enough, of philosophy. He knew, to be sure, his Voltaire and his Rousseau, and he was well up in contemporary British literature, secular as well as philosophical. But his knowledge of the history of philosophy in general was meager and spotty.

For all his idiosyncrasies, Kant was no "high-brow," and was not without worldly interests. He was keen on geography, and loved to listen to the stories of those who traveled and to gather information from all sources about the four quarters of the globe. Politically, too, attracted him, and books on politics and the newspapers seduced him from his more serious intellectual activities, just as detective stories are said sometimes to beguile the labors of the justices of the Supreme Court. There was also a certain sprightliness in Kant's make-up that gave a sparkle to his wealth of information and helped make him an agreeable conversationalist, ever welcome in the homes of his friends. It also helped make him an admirable lecturer, able to make dry bones live.

Unfortunately, however, there is no sprightliness in his philosophic writings. They are among the driest in the annals of philosophy and contain the hardest bones to crack. Kant invented a jaw-breaking philosophic vocabulary in which to express ideas that he would have far more clearly set forth in ordinary German. His style is conspicuously bad even for a philosopher—stuffy, wandering, and confused. He repeats himself and contradicts himself. Frequently it is impossible to make out just what he does mean. Frequently it is a question whether he himself knew what he meant. All in all, the perusal of the Critiques of Pure and Practical Reason, and of Judgment is perhaps the most nauseous of the rites of initiation through which the would-be philosopher must pass.

Nevertheless, the Kantian system, for all its bad architecture, its fortuitous planning, its overloaded confusion of detail, and the grotesquely "modernistic" and almost "surrealist" innovations of the vocabulary plastered over its facade, is one of the great monuments of philosophic achievement. No system in the history of philosophy has had so immediately widespread and profound an effect. The next hundred years were almost completely dominated by it. The most significant philosophy of the nineteenth century was inspired by it, and reveals, beneath the superficial alterations suggested by Kant's successors, its essential structure, fundamentally unchanged. It is safe to say that no one can understand philosophy since Kant unless he knows his Kant.

II. EARLY VIEWS

Kant's interest in philosophy, however, developed out of an earlier predilection for science and mathematics. His first writings were concerned with physics and astronomy, and his later philosophical works were interspersed with excursions into the field of the physical sciences. Of his scientific works, A General Natural History and Theory of the Heavens (1755) is perhaps the most important, though, owing to the failure of the publisher and lack of distribution, it remained almost unknown. In it Kant applies Newtonian principles to the fixed stars, develops a mechanical theory of the whole sidereal universe, and suggests for the first time the nebular hypothesis of the origin of planetary systems. His other scientific writings ranged over such subjects as the action of the tides on slowing up the rotation of the earth, the influence of the earth's
rotation upon winds, the causes of earthquakes, the different races of man and the beginnings of human history, the volcanoes on the moon, and the influence of the moon upon the weather. In his discussion of the human race, he had already developed an idea which he never abandoned, that, although the different races of man have developed from a common origin, the human species, like all others, is fixed and has not evolved from lower forms of life. At the same time, he speculates whether in certain circumstances the anthropoid apes might not develop human characteristics, and thus, without change of species, attain a quasi-human level of intelligence and culture.

Kant’s ear, then, though not musical, was attuned to the music of the spheres and to the intricate scales of metaphysical thought. And, as we noted in discussing Wolff, it was Wolff’s variations upon the Leibnizian theme to which he first listened. But into these somewhat banal, though eminently respectable, harmonies there seeped other and discordant notes, just as programs from other stations sometimes, in even the most impeccable radio, intrude their chatter with increasing interruption into the concert, sacred or profane, to which the dial has been turned.

The first of these disturbing broadcasts would seem to have come from the Enlightenment and the Age of Reason, or at least to have been a message transmitted on similar wave-lengths. It insinuated itself into the Pietism of his early training and soon drowned it out almost altogether, converting Kant, as it did, from an evangelical Christian into a rationalistic and a religious free-thinker. Even so, however, we may fancy that we now and then catch snatches of the Pietistic exhortations, now sotto voce, now voiced more loudly, recurring in his philosophy.

But soon the rationalistic program, accompanied and supported by the soothing strains of Wolff’s variations, was in its turn confused and then overpowering by the melodious skepticism of Locke and by the more mendacious, more malicious, and more subtle tones of Hume’s agnosticism. Kant woke with a start from the rationalistic reverie into which the Enlightenment and Wolff had plunged him—aroused, as he himself said, by Hume from his dogmatic slumber.

But he did not leave himself out of his chair still half asleep, so often happens when one is awakened suddenly. He was too thoroughly aroused, too wide awake for that. He sat still and gazed at the church-steeple beyond the poplars. He smiled, not only with Locke and Hume, but at them, critical, not only of the rationalists they criticized, but of their criticisms of it. With Godwin he saw plainly that their so-called empiricism and skepticism were something of a sham. To be sure, they had denied the possibility of knowing the nature and the existence of anything that was not experienced, had proclaimed the non-existence of innate ideas, and had done their best to derive from experience all our intellectual processes and the ideas by which these processes were guided. But in so doing they had unwittingly substituted a new entity, mind, for the spiritual and the material substances they had discarded, which, when all was said and done, underlay and supported experience in the same way as the matter and soul rejected by them supported physical qualities or the activities of thought. Nay more, they had attributed to mind a highly complex organization that forced it to behave in certain ways. It was of the nature of mind to perceive, to remember, to associate its impressions along certain lines, and to establish certain relations between them.

The British empiricists, then, had, in Kant’s opinion, taken back with one hand what they gave with the other. They might deny innate ideas, but they ascribed to the “mind” innate predispositions to react in certain invariable ways to the experience presented to it by the senses. The mind at birth was not the blank sheet of paper they claimed it was; it was water-marked with a complicated pattern that showed through the moment experience began to write upon it. When scrutinized, the pattern looked strangely familiar. It was ingrained with everything that the empiricists denied of the external world,—with substantality, and identity, and power, and necessary connection, and all the rest. This water-mark was not stamped upon the mind by experience; it was simply brought out by experience. It was the preliminary condition, not the result, of knowledge. Knowledge, then, was not derived from experience, except in so far as it depended upon experience for its material. It was an a priori activity of an entity, called mind, which, also, was more than the experience with which it dealt.

We may remember that Godwin’s perception of this inconsistency led him to dose Locke and Hume with their own medicine and to subject their “mind” to the criticism they had leveled against the external world, substance, soul, causation, production, and the like. The result was to reduce experience to a chaotic welter of perceptions of which no necessary or permanent law and order of any sort could be predicated. To Kant, however, the difficulty in which the empiricists had landed themselves suggested a new method of
approach. Suppose that experience really did have an innate structure which necessarily determined it to perceive, to think, and to feel as it did. In that case its inability to represent the nature of what lay outside it—and here Kant was willing to go the whole hog with the skeptics—would not necessarily render all truth relative and the conclusions of all science and all reasoning invalid and uncertain. Truth would still be absolute, and reason would be trustworthy, within the realm of experience. Though deprived of any basis or object outside the mind, they would be firmly established upon the invariable and universal structure of thinking in itself. For, if human thinking had a fixed character, then, in all times and places, whenever and wherever it occurred, and whatever the sense-experience presented to it might be like, it would always obey the same laws, follow the same lines, and construct its world according to the same plan.

Moreover, Kant was inclined to give to our irresistible belief in the existence of a self and an external world, which was admitted by the empiricists, the same weight as Reid had attributed to it. To be sure, the empiricists were right in maintaining that we could never know what stimulated the mind from the outside and what responded from within to that stimulation. But the implication in our thinking that such a stimulus existed, and that there was something which, when stimulated, did the perceiving and the knowing, was as unescapable as the fact of experience itself. The existence of a perceiving and knowing subject, which provided the forms in which experience must appear, and of an object, which provided material to be experienced in those forms, was a necessary presupposition of the existence of experience and thought.

This would seem to be the central idea amplified by Kant and worked out in great detail in the Critique of Pure Reason. His approach to it was gradual, and we can to some extent trace his development from the earlier Wolffian and rationalistic attitude, evinced in his first publications, through the influence of the British School towards his eventual position. This had been partially worked out by 1770, when he published a dissertation on the form and principles of the sensible and intelligible world. The next eleven years were devoted to perfecting it. In 1781 the Critique of Pure Reason was published.

The position at which Kant had by that time arrived was doubly critical. On the one hand, it was a re-examination of the dogmas of faith of the rationalists, discredited by the British empiricists, that truth may be discovered and that a system of valid metaphysics may be worked out by the exercise of reason. On the other, it was a criticism of the skeptical attitude in so far as that attitude denied the possibility, not only of extending knowledge beyond experience, but of establishing within experience itself any necessary and universally valid principles, like those of mathematics and science. Locke, Berkeley, and Hume, when all is said and done, had got themselves into the predicament of saying, like Protagoras, that what feels true to the individual at the particular moment is the only truth his experience can indicate. From this situation, neither the "demonstrations" of Locke nor the "belief" of Hume, nor the God of Berkeley could really extricate them. Kant, however, while agreeing that our knowledge cannot transcend experience, hopes to show that it can transcend the particular moment and the particular individual, and can thus establish "truths" which will hold for all human experience whatsoever. In that case, reason will be able to attain certainty rather than probability in dealing with the data presented to it, and will be able to assert that the content of our consciousness must behave as it does and must have the structure and the relations it exhibits. Upon these "musts" can be securely founded an absolute knowledge and a universally valid science of Reality as it appears to the human mind.

III. TRANSCENDENTAL ESTHETIC

Kant describes his philosophy as "transcendental," and is forever saying the word on the tip of his pen. It has proved a kind of "be-ware the dog" sign, hung at the front gate of his philosophy, and is well calculated to scare the timid student away. But its bark is worse than its bite, and, indeed, if approached boldly, it wags its tail. It is simply Kant's way of saying that he is not concerned with the content of experience but only with the forms or ways in which the human mind, by virtue of its constitution, is obliged to react, in perception and in thought, to any and every content the touch of an external world may stimulate within it. These forms and procedures are no more dependent upon the nature of the stuff upon which they rest than the mechanism and operation of a meat-grinder are dependent upon the kind of meat it is called upon to grind. Beef, lamb, rabbit, poultry, fish—the grinder makes hash of them all. In the same way, Kant feels, whatever the sensible content of an experience might be, it would be dealt with by the mind in a fixed fashion.
Therefore, these *transcendental* forms of mental activity are also *a priori*. That is, they are not built up from experience or influenced by it, as the British empiricists maintained. On the contrary, existing independently of experience and *prior* to it, they are the agents by which experience is influenced and built up into the shape in which it is presented to us.

Our question, then, becomes the problem of enumerating and describing these forms and procedures, and to this task Kant now sets himself. He begins, like Condillac, from the outside. But it is the mouth rather than the nose of the mind that he first unseals. Or, since we have been talking of the mind in terms of a meat-grinder, we should say that he opens up the hopper, which is now ready to receive sensible impressions. Upon the nature of our sense organs depends the kind of meat the machine is called upon to deal with. The sensible stuff, for example, of a person born blind or deaf is different from that of a man born with all five senses. So, too, we can imagine our eyes sensitive, let us say, to infra-red and ultra-violet rays and therefore registering colors beyond our present spectrum, or we cannot even dream; or our ears open to ranges of vibration above or below our present thresholds of audition, and therefore registering sounds of which we can have no conception. Or again, we might acquire new senses which would present us with new and unimaginable kinds of perception. Nevertheless, Kant feels, it would be a matter what our sense experience was like, it would necessarily be smeared over space and drawn out in time by a mind constructed and geared like ours. Its episodes and events, however different they might be from those presented by the sense organs we actually possess, would still co-exist side by side or come one after another.

*Time* and *space*, therefore, are not part of the stuff of experience. Neither are they *ideas* derived from experience. They are *forms of intuition*, or, as we should say, of *perception*. Their study is the study of what Kant calls *transcendental esthetic*, using the term "esthetic" in its original Greek meaning of that which pertains to sensation. Space is the form of the *external sense*, and, in other words, of our perception of outer objects; time, of the *external sense*, or of our perception of the flow of our consciousness.

At the same time Kant is careful to point out that space and time are wholly relative to our type of mind. Conceivably, beings fitted with another type might not "intuit" and perceive space and temporally, but in some other way. Moreover, since these forms are relative to our kind of mind, we have no right to extend beyond our experience and to predicate them of the external world. For that matter, there is nothing in sensible experience that can give us any hint of the nature of things as they are in themselves.

In the contrary we can be certain "that all our intuition is nothing but the representation of phenomena; that things which we see are not by themselves what we see, nor their relations by themselves such as they appear to us, so that, if we drop our subject or the subjective form of our senses, all qualities, all relations of objects in space and time, nay space and time themselves, would vanish. ... It remains completely unknown to us what objects may be by themselves and apart from the receptivity of our senses."  

Although, then, "apart from the receptivity of our senses," these objects may be "completely unknown to us," they nevertheless exist in and by themselves. If the mind went on strike and refused to register, or even if it were destroyed, they would still be there. There must be something external to set the mind working and to provide it with the material upon which to work.

So far, however, we have been talking almost as loosely about the mind as Locke and Hume did. Before we go further we should stop and ask what we mean by this term. Just as Kant feels that experience indicates an external object, so, he thinks, it indicates a perceiving and knowing subject. Moreover, this subject, like the object, transcends experience. Personal identity, the self, is not built up out of experience; it is a necessary presupposition of the occurrence of experience. There must exist a subject to do the knowing. The nature of this subject, as we shall presently see, is no more accessible to knowledge than is the nature of the object. But we can know what the object is and how it acts, and the essential character of its activity is already plain. Already, in the smeared, successive, spatial and temporal manner of "intuiting" or perceiving, we catch it preparing to act and join together and *synthesize* sense data and to make of them a single whole.

To be sure, space and time do not, properly speaking, "synthesize" their content, which, in so far as they are concerned, might remain chaotic and unintelligible. But they do introduce continuity and totality by their all-embracing character. In this way they help make their content ready for further unification. We may, then, suspect from their behavior that the prime function of the perceiving and knowing subject is to make one consistent world out of the many.
manifold of sense impressions. This suspicion will be confirmed, and the nature and conditions of the activity of synthesizing and unifying will be more completely grasped, by an examination of the operations of knowledge to which we now pass.

It is these operations that give significance to the spatio-temporal content of experience. Our sense perceptions would remain meaningless unless they were further worked over. On the other hand, without percepts the mind would have nothing to think about, and there would be no knowledge. "Thoughts without content are empty, intuitions [perceptions] without concepts are blind. Therefore it is equally necessary to make our concepts sensuous, i.e., to add to them their object in intuition, as it is to make our intuitions intelligible i.e., to bring them under concepts. These two powers or faculties cannot exchange their functions. The understanding cannot see. The senses cannot think. By their union only can knowledge be produced."

IV. TRANSCENDENTAL LOGIC

The study of the mechanism and operations of the understanding is called by Kant transcendental logic. Here again, he uses the term transcendental to indicate that he is not concerned with the particular rules that our thinking follows in dealing with its subject matter, or yet with the origin of that subject matter. Whatever we are thinking about, be it sensible representations or intelligible concepts, our thought has an a priori structure of its own which it expresses in its reasoning. Transcendental logic is the investigation of this structure. It is, to use an Aristotelian phrase, just "thinking about thinking." "It treats of nothing but the pure form of thought."

When thinking thus turns upon itself and scrutinizes its own processes, the first thing it discovers is a tendency to regard the structure as the structure not only of thought but of external being. We believe that the categories by which we unify experience, as, for example, substance and accident, unity and plurality, cause and effect, and interaction, apply also to things as they are in themselves. Because we cannot think these things in any other way we conclude that they cannot exist in any other way. To conclude, however, that things cannot exist in themselves except as they exist in thought is to fall into illusion, and is to turn logic into a semblance of metaphysics, or, as Kant calls it, a dialectic.

The ground of this illusion lies perhaps in the fact that the way in which thinking must operate determine in part what shall be true of our experience. Anything that contradicts the laws of logic, or that will not fit into the categories of thought, defies understanding and therefore cannot be regarded by the mind as true. We can say beforehand that the proposition "circles are square" is a false proposition since it runs counter to the form of logical, and therefore of true, thinking. At the same time, Kant hastens to point out that the laws and categories of correct thinking do not force all logically true propositions to hold true of experience as well. They may indeed be contradicted by experience. For example, the proposition "apples are blue" is, formally and logically, a true proposition. It is not self-contradictory. The formal structure of thought does not forbid apples from being blue as it forbids circles from being square. For all logic has to say in the matter, apples might just as well be blue as red. Still, the logical possibility of blue apples does not force us, or even enable us, to grow apples of that color in our orchards. Nay more, blue apples just don't grow, and, if we try to convert the formal truth of our proposition into material truth by arguing that since the proposition is valid in logic it must also hold true of experience, we fall into error.

This error cannot, however, be discovered by logic. There is nothing in the formal structure of thought to determine which of the two equally valid propositions "apples are red," and "apples are blue," shall be given material truth by the content of the sensible manifold. For that matter, neither of them might hold, or both of them might hold, so far as logic is concerned. All apples might be black, some might be red and some blue, just as in fact some are red and some are green.

Although then, the content of experience must be capable of being logically arranged and cannot exhibit logical self-contradictions, we need not exhibit everything that is logically consistent. We may indeed say a priori that if apples are round they cannot be square, or if apples are red they cannot be green. But since one sort of pigmentation is as consistent with logic as another we cannot determine by logic what color they shall be. The stuff of experience is like can be determined only by contemplating experience. For "logic has no test for discovering error with regard to the contents, and not the form of a proposition." But if the mind cannot even use its categories and laws to determine what the sensible manifold of its experience shall be like, how much less can it use them to determine what the things-in-themselves which provoke this sensible manifold are like? Hence to let
logic puff itself up with delusions of dialectical grandeur is to allow it to go insane.

To guard itself against such delusion and to preserve its sanity, “thinking about thinking” must pursue a double course. It has necessarily to search for the a priori structure of the understanding, and the “principles without which no object can be thought.” This search Kant calls transcendental analytic. But the temptation to transform what is true of an object so far as we are concerned into something true of the object as it is apart from us and in itself must be checked by a severely critical attitude towards any so-called “dialectical” pretensions on the part of our knowledge. Since the development of the critical attitude is designed to cure the delusion of metaphysical and dialectical knowledge, we may call it, by a kind of homeopathy, transcendental dialectic; remembering always that its task is not to support but to explain, criticize, and curb the mind’s “sophistical illusion” of ability to extend knowledge beyond experience and to know things as they are in themselves.

V. TRANSCENDENTAL ANALYTIC

Let us now proceed to the analysis of the mind’s structure undertaken by transcendental analytic. We have at once to note that the mind’s mental activity of synthesizing and unifying experience expresses itself in judgments about sense data. These judgments fall into certain fixed lines and assume certain fixed forms. We may assert quantity, quality, relation, and conditions of existence, or modality of everything that occurs in the sensible manifold. Each one of the four forms of judgment is moreover a trinity. For instance, in asserting quantity we state that what we are dealing with is either one or many, or one aggregate or totality of many constituents. In our qualitative judgments we either assert or deny outright a thing of another, or else we “qualify,” as we say, and limit to some degree our affirmation or negation. That is, we make positive (real) statements, or negative statements, or cautious, limited statements about things. Again, our assertions of relation fall under three headings: We say one thing is the property of another, thus putting the one things in the relation of substance and accident; or we say one thing is the cause or the effect of another; or we say that co-existing things act upon and react to one another (reciprocity or community). Finally, we make statements regarding the condition of modality of a thing’s existence. We say “such and such is possible; this exists or this does not exist; this could not be otherwise and is necessary, or this might be otherwise and is therefore contingent.”

These four trinities, making in all twelve fundamental concepts or categories, exhaust the entire machinery of syntheses. Everything that occurs in the sensible manifold falls under some one of them. There are no alternatives to them. Nothing escapes them. We are obliged to think in these terms. But that obligation is not imposed upon us by the content of experience. It expresses a priori and transcendental necessities of thought inherent in the structure of the knowing apparatus. These ways of thinking are then pure categories of the understanding.

At this point Kant recognizes that he has a double difficulty on his hands. He must prove to the British empiricists that the categories really are a priori, and not built up out of the sensible manifold as Locke and Hume maintained. But, having done so, he has then to explain how categories which are not derived from experience, and have nothing to do with experience, can apply to it; and, conversely, how an experience that is under no a priori necessity conforming to these categories does conform to them as a matter of fact. The categories, he tells us, being, not forms of intuition (sense perception) like space and time, but forms of thought, “are not conditions under which objects can be given in intuition, and it is therefore quite possible that objects should appear to us without any necessary reference to the functions of the understanding.” In other words, we might have a chaotic, irrational, and unintelligible sensible world. For that matter, we should have one, if we were not rational and thinking beings endowed with the intellectual equipment of turning the sensible manifold into an intelligible and orderly universe.

We are, then, Kant continues, faced with the difficulty of showing how conditions of thought can have objective validity, that is, be conditions of the possibility of the knowledge of objects.” Take the concept of cause, for instance. Causation, as Hume pointed out, is not experienced. But neither is it, as Hume thought, derived from experience. It is part of the machinery of the mind. At the same time, the existence of that machinery does not guarantee the existence of material for the machine to work over. The mere possession of teeth neither puts food into the mouth for them to chew nor guarantees that the food put into it will be chewable. The teeth may grind empty air or a bit of bone. The category of causation
VI. UNIFYING OPERATIONS OF THE MIND

This connecting up the mind machine with the sensible manifold is called by Kant the Deduction of the Pure Concepts of the Understanding. If, he says, we examine the sensible manifold we discover at once a fact of fundamental significance. Being given in space and time, experience is not presented in isolated bits. It is given in chunks of co-existent and enduring percepts. In other words, there is no datum of experience that is not a manifold, and that therefore is not a conjoining or, we might say, a synthesis of elements. Still, since these perceptual chunks are decomposable into constituent elements and are therefore "constructions" built up on a sensible stuff, they cannot be accounted for by experience itself. They represent a reaching down of the synthetic activity of the mind in experience, and are the results of apprehension working on the level of sense perception.

But the preparation of experience for the understanding has just begun. The chunks of experience we "intuit" are remembered and associated and imaged and their recurrence in sense perception recalls analogous "manifolds" intuited at other times and places. In this way the manifold of sense is transformed into a manifold of "imagination" in which invariable sequences and co-existences of other relations now appear. Stable and enduring "images" are abstracted from the procession of appearing and disappearing percepts. The flux of the sensible manifold is boiled down, as it were, into solids, which remain before the mind and give it a permanent perceptual content to think about and ruminates. Were it not for the preliminary work of the imagination in abstracting and sorting, there could be no concepts. An absolutely fluid experience would be almost as bad as no experience at all. The teeth can chew soup. A liquid manifold of sense would simply swish the categories—in which case they might just as well be grinding on the empty air. In short, experience must be presented to our categories with a fork, not with a spoon—and the fork is provided by our ability to retain images. But the laws of association by which sense is reproduced in imagination are no more derived from the content of experience than is the conglomeration of that content into chips of perceptual qualities. Here again we are dealing with the a priori and transcendental activity of apprehension which expresses itself now on the level, not of sense, but of memory and imagination, or reproduction.

The knife of "apprehension in intuition" has now cut experience into chunks suitable for chewing, and the fork of "reproduction in imagination" has placed these tidbits between the teeth of the categories of the understanding. The teeth begin to chew. Flavors are recognized; names are bestowed; objects, or steady and reliable expressions of experience, are constructed, and are distinguished from hazardous and "subjective" experiences. It is these objects that are interconnected and synthesized by judgments in which the categories are applied. Since this unifying of sense data into objects has to take place within the frame of space and time, physical objects are presented as extended, shaped, impenetrable by one another, etc., in other words, as bodies. Sense experience now becomes a sensible world.

There is, however, more to come. In exercising its various powers, the world of the manifold of sense experience, the knowing subject displays its own oneness. For only a single, unified mind could realize its experience as one and the same coherent content of consciousness. Two thinking subjects would have two different contents of consciousness, as in fact they do. The unity, then, of my world and the unity of your world must have their grounds in a principle binding together my consciousness, and in another such principle binding together yours. Such a principle must be a transcendental and a priori. It is not derived from experience but is a necessary presupposition of our ability to synthesize the manifold of sense into an intelligible whole. Kant calls it the transcendental unity of apperception.

Unifying all the representations of experience by means of the categories, the subject is also conscious of its own unity. In fact, it could not make one experience and one world of the manifold of sense perceptions unless it at the same time were conscious
KANT

of the oneness and the self-identity of the function or activity "of which it unites the manifold synthetically in one knowledge." Nor could it recognize its own self-identity except in the act of uniting phenomena. A fragmentary and disconnected sensible experience would be the sign of a "split personality," so to speak, without an uniting principle to pull it together. Self-consciousness, therefore, and the consciousness of a unified, intelligible world go together. For, if the sensible world were a chaos and did not lend itself to being understood, the activity of knowledge would not be aroused. But, unless it were aroused, there could be no consciousness of it and therefore no consciousness of a knowing self.

Paradoxically enough, however, self-consciousness is not consciousness of that which does the perceiving and the knowing. It is consciousness of that which is known. In the act of self-consciousness, the self becomes an object to itself. The "T" becomes a "me" as try as I may, I can never get behind the "me," the object of knowledge, to the "T" that knows itself as "me." It is hard grammatically to say "I know or am conscious of T," and the grammatical expression reflects a logical impossibility. For whatever is experienced or known, be it myself or the external objects I know, is subject to the laws governing all experience and knowledge. Internal experience stands on the same footing as external experience in this respect. Hence I as I experience and know myself must be presented to the knowing subject, or ego, as we may now call it, under the same conditions as all the other objects I experience and know. I cannot "intuit" myself under the form of time as part of the manifold of experience, enduring, going on, changing like any other part of the manifold. And I can only understand and know myself in terms of the categories by which external objects also are understood and known.

Therefore, just as I know external objects, not as they are in themselves, but as they are presented to me colored and formed by the kind of mental apparatus I possess, so I know myself, not as really am in myself, but as I am presented to my real or transcendental ego, the knowing subject, after being worked over and reformulated by the machinery of that same apparatus. The categories under which the activity of perception and knowledge is bound by its own nature to operate draw the same screen between the "T" and the "me" in the act of self-consciousness, as draw between the knowing ego and the other objects of its knowledge in the act of perceiving and knowing them.

Kant has now roughly reviewed what we may call the table manners of the knowing subject. We see, so far, that it does not eat experience with its fingers, but prepares the food for its thought and the knife of sensible apprehension, and then raises it with the fork of reproduction in imagination to the welcoming jaws of the categories of the understanding. There are, however, further niceties of transcendental etiquette to be considered. For example, there could be many a slip between the fork and the lip, were it not for what Kant calls the transcendental schemata. The necessity and nature of this further refinement may be stated as follows. Even after existence and duration have "synthesized" the sensible manifold into lumps and strings, and after memory, association, and imagination have interrelated these chunks of concomitant and persistent qualities in enduring and recurring patterns and images which socially the sensible manifold and render it capable of being grasped and understood; even then, that knowledge is still stuff and content without intelligible form. It is still on the sensible side of the fence that divides perception from conception. Intuition is still without concepts and therefore blind; thought is still without content and therefore empty. The gap between sense-perception and conception is still to be bridged. How are we to do it?

VII. SCHEMATA AND CATEGORIES

To show how such union is produced by the subject becomes now Kant's chief problem. The sensible manifold exhibited in space and time does not produce the ways in which it is thought about and the ideas into which knowledge casts it. It does not therefore fit them itself. They exist a priori in the mind as part of its mechanism as are imposed upon sensible experience from without. The sensible manifold, therefore, must be fitted to them. And yet, to be fitted to them, that manifold must possess in itself a certain fitness for them in affinity to them. Square pegs will not fit round holes, neither squares be made out of sows' ears. The cogs, then, of the wheels produce the spatio-temporal manifold must be such as to ensnare the cogs of the wheels by which knowledge is ground out.

Obviously, what we need is an intermediate set of cogs which will fall into both the categories and sensible experience. These cogs cannot be mere sensible representations. They cannot be mere images. And yet they must be in contact with sense-experience. In fact, they must be characteristics of perception. Can we
find such intermediates? Kant thinks we can. His solution of the difficulty cannot but remind us of Plato's interposition of a world of mathematical entities between the Ideas of Number and the world of sensible objects. Images, he tells us, like sensible percepts, are presented under the forms of space and time and therefore have a form as well as a content. This purely spatial and temporal form may be abstracted from their particular content. But, taken the other way round, such a form represents the concept of the thing submitted to spatial and temporal conditions.

Take for example a triangle. We have particular triangular sensible objects and we have the general concept of the triangle. But this is not all. We can also “image” triangles in general by moving from particular sensible triangular objects everything except their triangularity, which is a purely spatial, geometrical image without any of the particular characteristics that distinguish one triangular object from another. This image is not a pure concept since it is still outlined in space and is therefore outlined in a particular geometrical way, as right-angled or acute-angled or equilateral, or what not. Nevertheless it is a general representation of the triangle as such, and it refers to the triangle as such and not to any individual triangular thing. It partakes, then, both of the nature of the concept and of the formal conditions under which a percepts must be presented.

Or take again the dog. There are particular dogs and the concept of dog in general. But since dogs are given in space and time, particular dogs may be eviscerated of everything except their form, geometrical features, and the concept of the dog may be “imaged” as a “shape” in purely geometrical terms. Here again we get a spatial outline, or scheme, or schema, good, like the concept, for dogs of whatever breed, and yet represented under the forms of the sensible manifold in which all particular dogs are presented to perceptual experience. It is such representations, conceptual because universal and emptied of all particular content, and yet sensible because still clothed with space and time, that afford a meeting ground for the categories and the sensible manifold, and that, by permitting the application of one to the other, make knowledge possible.

Kant enumerates a few of these schemata by way of illustration. The category of quantity appears under the forms of space and distance; as the schema of number, which represents simply “the successive addition of one to one,” without taking any account of the particular contents or natures of the units so manipulated. The category of quality is “schematized” by the image of filled time, without reference to what fills it; of negation by the image of time thinned out and emptied of content in general, either in part or whole. Substance is represented in the representation of time as always full notwithstanding the changes that occur in the character of its filling. Cause is represented by the invariable successions that occur in the manifold. Reciprocity, or community, by the invariable behavior of the elements of the manifold when occurring together. Possibility and impossibility appear as the inability of opposites to apply simultaneously, and their ability to apply successively, to the same object. The necessary is that which appears at all times.

The general conclusion to be drawn is that all schemata have to do with the nature of the internal sense, time. Quantitative schemata synthesize the successive, serial character of time. Qualitative schemata deal with its filled character. Schemata of relations have to do with situations occurring in time. Schemata of modality refer to the fact and manner of the presence or absence of its content either in whole or in part.

Having thus brought the sensible manifold and the categories of understanding into contact, Kant proceeds to a discussion of the faculty of judgment, the exercise of which with respect to perceptual experience this contact makes possible. Judgments are of two sorts, analytic, which analyze a concept and affirm or deny of it only that which is already contained in or excluded from it; and synthetic, which add to a given concept something that is not given or necessarily implied in it. For instance, if I say “the radii of a circle are equal,” I merely analyze the nature of the circle, and point to something already contained in it. My statement is then an analytic judgment regarding the circle. On the other hand, if I say “planets move in ellipses, not in circles,” I am “synthesizing” two concepts, that of the planet and that of motion in ellipses, which do not imply each other in any way or necessarily go together. And I am denying the planets a concept, “circular motion,” which is not denied and included by the idea of a planet. Nevertheless the synthetic is just as much an analytic judgment. How can this be?

The truth of an analytic judgment is, Kant tells us, easily determined by the law of self-contradiction. Nothing can be part of the concept of a thing that contradicts that concept, and everything must be true of it that is logically implied by its definition. But in synthetic judgments the law of contradiction holds good only negatively, as we have already seen. We cannot “synthesize” the concepts.
of the circle and the square in the proposition “the circle is square,”
and we can say beforehand that any judgment of that sort will be
necessarily false. On the other hand, we cannot be sure that any of
all the concepts that can be synthesized without contradiction
with the concept of the circle are synthesized with it as a matter
of fact. There is nothing in the law of self-contradiction prohibiting
the judgment that circles are the forms of the orbits of the planets.
Nor is there anything in the concept of a planet that forbids
“circling” about the sun. Nevertheless such a judgment, though
formally correct, is not true, or even doubtful. It is out and out false
and misrepresentative of its content. As a matter of fact, the plan-
tary orbits are elliptical not circular.

Absence of self-contradiction, then, does not establish the truth
of synthetic as it does that of analytic propositions. The truth
of synthetic propositions has to be tested by a further requirement
conformity to the content of experience. We have already seen how
Kant used this fact to argue that, since we certainly have no way of
testing the conformity of our propositions to anything outside ex-
erience, we cannot possibly know what things-in-themselves are
like. We also noted that his principal problem was to be that of
showing how synthetic propositions can establish universal truth
even within experience itself, since all positive truth about experi-
ence must apparently be drawn from observation of actual content,
whence the actual content of experience open to our observation is limited and interrupted. No one of us should be
able to argue regarding the nature of even the phenomena wider
than his particular experience of it carries him.

How, then, any universality true synthetic propositions could be
made about experience in general remained for Kant an unsolvable
question, even after he had succeeded, as he thought, in gaining
the concepts and categories of the understanding with the content
of the sensible manifold. The schemata might, to be sure, contain
categories like substance and accident, cause and effect, with much of the sensible manifold as we perceived. But what right had
we to assert that phenomena had always been and could always
be causally connected, or were so connected at present in the
reaches of space inaccessible to our observation? And how could we
maintain that, however far back into the past and forward into the
future, or away into space, we might travel, we should always
find things with sizes and shapes and other qualities, co-existing or
preceding one another? There was as yet no warrant for making such
assumptions a priori true of all experience. Before Kant could
make that, further inquiry into the situation was necessary. But, until
we could do that, Kant was still rowing in the same boat with Locke
and Hume.

Kant attacks the problem as follows. We are agreed that if univer-
sal synthetic propositions about experience are true, they must be
applicable a priori to all possible experience that might be pre-
tended to the mind. Any so-called law of nature, for example, that is
universally valid must be applicable, not only to our particular sec-
ion of space and time, but to all the phenomena our minds could
possibly become acquainted with if they ransacked infinite time and
infinite space. We may say, therefore, that it is the “possibility of
experience” which alone gives objective reality to all our knowledge
a priori.” But only a coherent experience can be a real experience.
It is precisely by its coherency and intelligibility that we distinguish
experience that means a real world to us from which we call
real, dream, and illusion. Deprived of these characteristics, ex-
erience cannot be even called experience. It relapses into a mere
“rhapsody of perceptions,” as Kant calls it, without structure or
meaning. But a “meaningless rhapsody of perceptions” could not
mean anything, much less mean experience which is a “mean-
ingful” term, or name, for a content of consciousness the parts of which
are articulable, recognizable, and nameable. All possible experience,
at any rate, all possible real experience, must be articulated and
intelligible.

But what is it that gives coherency and reality to experience and
therefore makes real experience possible? Precisely the same struc-
ture as determines how the mind shall think. The possibility of ex-
eriencing a world and the possibility of thinking or understanding
worlds are one and the same possibility. Nothing can be conceived
which it is formally impossible to perceive, and conversely nothing
can be perceived which it is impossible to form a concept of.

Since, then, any synthesis of sensations that can be called “ex-
erience” can only be effected by an application of the same rules as
are laid down for knowledge by the transcendental unity of apper-
ception, and since it is possible by means of the schemata to apply
these rules to the manifold of sense, minds like ours can experience
nothing that does not exemplify them. Experience, in order to be
possible, must be so constituted that we are able to assert a
priori the existence of “things” throughout its entire breadth and
length; to know a priori that at all times and places things will be
before or after, below or above, to the right or the left, of one another; to have a priori certainty that they will possess size, shape, number, and sensible qualities which may be predicated of them, that they will have causes and produce effects; and so on and so on. As Kant puts it, “the conditions of the possibility of experience in general are at the same time conditions of the possibility of the objects of experience themselves.” Hence, universal synthetic judgments a priori can be made of all experience, and may therefore be objectively true, in that they give us real knowledge of how the content of experience, whatever it may be like, must be constituted.

If now we turn to that content, what are the characteristics that may be universally predicated of it? In the first place, it is emonic that all experience must be extensive in character. It is totality of co-existent parts or qualities placed side by side, and presented all together at the same moment. Furthermore, any quality of experience may vary in degree. It is capable of presence or absence and of varying from complete presentation to complete negation. It may, as we say, fade away and disappear. Its increase or diminution, however, are in this case not an addition or subtraction of its extension. A patch, for example, of blue may become less or without becoming smaller. Heating up a tin of soup does not increase the amount of soup in the tin. The increase and decrease of intensity, not of spatial magnitude. Now, although we can foresee what experience has in store for us, we can anticipate no perceptual data will occur which are not capable of degree, presence or absence and therefore of intensity. For it is impossible to conceive of any particular quality which might not be also from a given point and which may not be more or less present. We can therefore have a universally true objective knowledge that in all times and places the content of experience will have not an extensive but intensive magnitude.

Furthermore both extensive and intensive experience are continuous, since any space, however large or small, is divisible into nothing but spaces, and any time, however long or short, is divisible into nothing but times. Only space can separate different spaces from one another; only time can intervene between different times. Therefore, what is smeared over adjacent spaces can be no more interrupted than the space over which it is spread. Nor can an interruption be conceived in the content of time. Hence we speak of a flow of events in a time stream, rather than of a hop, skip, and jump of events from rock to rock. So too, intensive quantity is continuous, since it is impossible to have in the gradation from presence to absence any gap in which the quality in question is not present, and present to the degree that fits in between the next higher and the next lower amount of intensity.

It is this continuity in the combinations of the manifold of phenomena that gives us the idea of a whole as contrasted with that of an aggregate. A “whole” is produced by the uninterrupted continuation of synthetic activity. An “aggregate” is the result of momentary, repeated acts of combination. Take, for instance, a heap of bones. Each one of these bones is a separate combination of qualities and, if there is no further combination, each bone remains a disconnected fragment and just one of a heap. But, if by a continuous synthesis I fit them all together to form a skeleton, I turn them into a disconnected aggregate into parts of a connected whole.

Since time is continuous, time itself cannot change. All change takes place in time. Time is a permanent form in which the sensible manifold is presented. But a time without a content, the successive presentation of which ticked off its moments, would be empty and imperceivable. That content, however, must also indicate the permanent character of the temporal form of perceiving things as well as the successive character of the things perceived under that form. The permanence of time is experienced as a certain durability in phenomena underlying their alterations in time, or, we might say, a substance which endures, while its modes or accidents change. In this way, the necessities of thought and the conditions of possible experience unite to display the category of substance and accident in the sensible world.

Again we always apprehend phenomena as successive or co-existent. Phenomena themselves are indifferent to which form they assume. There is nothing in a percept that determines beforehand whether it shall exist before or after another sensation, or cheek by jowl with it. Nor is there any logical reason why we should not refer to ourselves any given succession in reverse order. We may take in the various features of a house from left to right, or right to left, from roof to sill, or from sill to roof. We may place the cart before the horse or run off a moving picture film backward.

As a matter of fact, however, the sensible manifold develops as a sequence before our senses in an irreversible order. It gives the horse before the cart. We cannot turn time backward in its flight and become a boy again. So, too, with all the particular successions it presents. The flame does not precede the striking of the match;
it comes after it. The striking of the match is not followed by a
jet of water but by a flame. The jet of water is preceded by turning
the tap. Nevertheless, for all that experience itself or the logic of
the situation can tell us, it may be that the time-stream and its par-
ticular constituent currents are really reversible and interchangeable
and only happen to be presented in the general direction and the par-
ticular sequences we observe. If that direction and those se-
quences are really or objectively irreversible, they can only be so
by virtue of an a priori necessity of thought. All possible ex-
perience must be so constructed that certain events can only occur in
it after others, and that therefore to reach event B, whatever it is,
I must first pass through event A, whatever it is, and cannot reach
A by first passing through B. In that case, we can say that A is the
necessary condition or cause of the occurrence of B.

But a flow of sensations in which everything occurred without
rhyme or reason, and the cart came, now before, now behind, the
horse, and A, B, and C occurred indifferently in any order, could
not be called even an experience. It would be sheer insanity. There-
fore, conformity to causal sequences in which one event appears as
the necessary condition of another is a necessary condition of all
possible experience. Once more, "the conditions of the possibility
of experience are at the same time conditions of the possibility
of the objects of experience themselves, and thus possess objective
validity in a synthetical judgment a priori." Causality, being a form
in which any sensible manifold must appear to the human mind
will hold true of everything that any human being at any time can
perceive.

Portions of our experience, however, can be apprehended in a re-
versible order and such portions exhibit co-existence. For example,
in looking at a house my eye may run over it from left to right
and then from right to left again. Or in studying its plan it is a
matter of indifference whether I start with the drawing room and
end with the kitchen or vice versa. If this were not the case, the
parts of the house could not be said to co-exist. If, after letting my
attention wander from the roof to the sill, or from the drawing
room to the kitchen, I could not get back to the point I started
from, I should be obliged to say that the house had fallen to piec,
and that its parts no longer co-existed but had become detached
from one another. The condition, then, of co-existence is ability
reverse and alter the order in which its parts are presented; just as
the condition of causation is inability so to do.

But how can we be sure that co-existence is a necessary condition
of all experience and not merely a chance situation in my experi-
ience here and now? To conceive it as a chance situation would be
to conceive the apparently co-existent parts as objectively and in
reality existing in isolation and without influence upon one another.
But parts so existing would be incapable even of empirical com-
binatior, since experience could never pass from one to another.
And an experience that was broken into isolated and disconnected
events could not be experience or constitute a sensible world, but
would be a delirium of meaningless, haphazard sensations.

Therefore it is one of the conditions of all possible experience
that its elements should not merely appear side by side but arm in
arm. To co-exist is to cohere, and to cohere they must interact upon
one another. They must "commune" with one another and exert a
topic or reciprocal influence upon one another. They must in part determine
and be determined by one another. "We can easily perceive in our
experience, that continuous influences only can lead us inside to
all parts of space from one object to another." Light from the stars
produces a mediate communion between us and them and proves
the co-existence of the latter." We determine our position and move-
ment in space in relation to other bodies, and in relation to the
simultaneous existence of other bodies with ourselves, by their in-
fluence upon our own bodies. Were it not for these interconnecting
ties that bind them together, phenomena would fall apart, and our
experience of them would not be a continuous passage from one to
another, but would occur in disconnected flashes which had nothing
to do with one another. Substances, therefore, "must stand in dy-
namical communion, immediately or medially, with each other, if
their co-existence is to be known in any possible experience." With
reciprocity the manifold of sense could not become even stuff of
a sensible world.

There remain only the modal categories of possibility, reality, and
necessity to be considered. To be possible, experience must be, first
of all, free from self-contradiction. Secondly, it must be consistent
with the construction of space, which is a form under which all
objective reality and possible things must appear. It is this neces-
ry conformity with space and its determinations that keeps the
fruit of the possible on earth and guards us against confusing purely
metaphysical concepts, which may or may not be enacted by ex-
perience, with the concepts on which all experience depends and which
therefore must be enacted by it. As examples of imaginary concepts
Kant cites clairvoyance and telepathy, “the possibility of which has nothing to rest on because it is not founded on experience and its known laws.” Without such foundation, imaginary concepts “are and can only be arbitrary combinations of thought which, though they contain nothing contradictory in themselves, have no claim to objective reality,” or even to objective possibility.

To assert objective reality of a phenomenon, the phenomenon must be perceptible as well as conceivable, since “perception, which supplies the material of a concept, is the only characteristic of reality.” At the same time, reality may be attributed to things as yet unperceived, provided these possible perceptions “hang together with some other perceptions according to the principles of their empirical connection.” For example, since experience, as contrasted with a mere higgledy-piggledy “rhapsody of perceptions,” must hang together according to the categories of substance and accident, causality, reciprocity, etc., we can assert that any present phenomenon has its cause in some other phenomenon, whether or not the other phenomenon be perceived or unperceived. So, too, we can be sure that it will have a perceptible effect, whether or not that effect falls under our observation. Furthermore, we can rest assured that those unperceived causes and effects will, like perceived ones, be substances possessed of accidents. Or again, we can be sure that the other side of the moon, which we never perceive, real, or other words, perceptible, features co-exist in reciprocal communion as they do on the side presented to our view.

Nay more, Kant says, speaking in terms of the science of his day, “we know the existence of some magnetic matter pervading the bodies from the perception of the attracted iron filings, though the organs are so constituted as to render an immediate perception that matter impossible.” That matter, if it exists, must be perceptible and therefore would be accessible to our senses if only they were sufficiently sharpened. In a word, any object of possible perception that an extension of actual perception, according to rules governing experience, would bring under our observation, real. “Wherever, therefore, perception and its train can reach, according to empirical laws, there our knowledge also of the existence of things can reach.” Hence “it is possible... even before the perception of a thing and... in a certain sense, a priori, to know existence.” On this fact rests our ability to make valid predictions regarding the future.

The phenomena that we regard as real objects owe, as we have seen, a portion of their reality to their conformity with the necessary conditions of all possible experience. These conditions do not determine what shall exist, nor can they determine how things shall exist, except in one respect. There is no a priori reason either in the nature of the categories or of the content of experience why qualities should be combined in substances as they are, or why substances should co-exist as they do. There is nothing in logic or in the manifold of sense to prevent beforehand apples from being blue or planets from being square. Nor is there anything in the forms of thought or in the nature of perceptions to forbid planets moving in circles instead of ellipses, or apples from rising in the air like balloons when shaken from the tree, instead of falling to the ground. Detach a balloon from a tree and it does rise. Why, then, should the apple fall?

The little word “why” puts its finger squarely on the one necessity of material existence. However experience arranges itself, there must be a reason for its particular arrangement. There must be a reason why balloons rise and apples fall; why apples are red and not blue; why planets are round and not square, and move in ellipses rather than circles. It is then the law of causality, not the laws of logic or the exigencies of the sensible content, that forces experience to behave as it does and occur in the sequences and connections we perceive. But what is the cause of what, and what the effect of what, can only be ascertained by observation. Confronted with a wholly novel phenomenon, we cannot say beforehand what its cause was, or what its effect will be. But we can know it had a cause and will have an effect, for, if things happened without causes or did not produce effects, and if their changes were not subject to law and to the conditions of necessary existence, “there would not even be such a thing as nature.”

We can, therefore, rule out a priori the occurrence both of chance and “blind” necessity in the world. Everything that happens is necessary and that necessity is the condition of intelligibility. Taken in connection with the spatial and temporal impossibilities of gaps occurring in the sensible manifold, and of hops, skips and jumps appearing in its changes, the “causal” impossibility of chance and we exclude from experience everything “that would in any way counter to the understanding and to the continuous cohesion of all phenomena.”

The fact that “everything is necessarily subject to rules, because, without such, phenomena would never become objects correspond-
Although its categories receive all their content from perceptual experience and cannot be extended beyond experience, nevertheless the mind persists in constructing out of experience an order of objects of thought and knowledge which transcends the objects of sense, and is possessed of an intelligible content. The mind regards them, not as its thoughts about sensible phenomena, but as non-sensible, intelligible things about which it is thinking and to which its concepts apply. Indeed, some philosophers claim that the intellect has an immediate intuition or perception of such objects, as direct and close as our perceptual intuition and awareness of sensible experience. The Platonic Ideas, as Plato is supposed to have conceived them, are good examples of such intelligible entities. Moreover, Plato maintained that they were "intuited" by the soul. The soul and so-called "spiritual substance" in general are mentioned by Kant as instances of these objects. Since these intelligible things are not presented to empirical or sense experience, he calls them noumena, which is the Greek equivalent for intelligible object, as opposed to phenomena, which are given in sense perception. We have now to ask what is their status and how the mind happens to construct them.

We can rule out at once any possibility of their existing independently of the mind. All knowledge is confined to the contents of the mind. We can also rule out the possibility of their really possessing an intelligible content of their own about which the mind thinks. The only mental content is sense experience, and sense experience alone provides thought with its objects. All knowledge is about perceptions. All our concepts are concepts of sensible things. Furthermore, an a sensitive intuition or perception of a non-sensitive intelligible object would be "a process of which we could not understand even the bare possibility." There may, indeed, be such a process, but it never occur in human experience. Therefore, there can be no intelligible content with which our ideas are concerned, and these so-called supra-sensible objects of thought, or noumena, which the intellect is supposed to "intuit" have no objective existence.

At the same time, they are not fictions pure and simple. They have a basis in the operations of the understanding, which Kant proceeds to investigate. Sense experience must have something objective corresponding to it, since it is a representation by the mind, of the mind's nature, which is expressed in the forms under which we intuit and think, but of something different from and out-

In addition to the information provided, the text continues to discuss the nature of knowledge, the role of the mind, and the relationship between sense experience and intelligible content. Kant's philosophical framework is explored, with particular emphasis on the concepts of noumena and phenomena, and the distinction between sensuous and a sensitive intuition. The text delves into the nature of existence and the limits of human understanding, addressing the question of how the mind constructs order out of experience and the implications of this process for the nature of reality.
side the mind. Since, then, sensible objects are not spun out of ourselves but are given us from without, the phenomenon "must be something by itself, that is, an object independent of our sensibility." It is this reference of sensible experience to something outside us, we cannot know what, this "thinking of something, without taking any account of the form of sensuous intuition," which is responsible for the noumena.

Between phenomena, then, whose nature it is to represent, or rather to misrepresent external objects, and the external objects, which cannot be perceived or known as they are in themselves, there intervenes the concept of a bare something, underlying phenomena.

This something is an object of knowledge in so far as its existence is concerned, but is without intelligible content of any sort, since its real content is unknowable, and its content for the mind is a content of sense experience. We can attribute existence to this bare something, because we can predicate existence of anything to which we can attribute a perceptible character, even though it be not perceptible to our human type and form of intuition. Now, "we cannot maintain that sensibility is the only form of intuition," simply because it is the only form of human intuition. Hence "the concept of the noumenon, that is, of a thing which can never be thought as an object of the senses, but only as a thing in itself [by the pure understanding] is not self-contradictory." We therefore can think of the noumenon as existent, in spite of its being unknowable and unperceivable by us.

The upshot of the whole matter is that a real division of objects into phenomena and noumena and of the world into a sensible and intelligible world is . . . quite inadmissible," since noumena are not objects for thought, and an intelligible world without a sensible content is meaningless. Noumenal and intelligible objects, empty of their sensible content, are stop-signs, not go-signs, for our mental trafficking. They do not extend our knowledge. They set the limit to which our thinking can proceed in dealing with Reality. We can know no more of things-in-themselves than that they exist. Such knowledge in a sense goes beyond experience, since it asserts something of experience which is not given in experience itself; that is, the unknowable character of things-in-themselves. Here knowledge is not limited by experience, but the limits of experience are set thought. But in limiting experience, the understanding also limits its own powers by admitting that noumena can no more be known by the categories than they can be perceived by the senses, and therefore can only be thought of "under the name of something unknown."

VIII. PARALOGISMS AND ANTINOMIES

Kant has analyzed the content and established the limits of the legitimate operations of the human understanding and has described its proper scope and use. He has posted all the roads along which thinking can progress without accident or obstacle, and set up warning signs to designate the blind alleys, where passing is dangerous and leads to dead-ends. He has now to explain why the mind, in spite of the "no thoroughfare" signs, is forever turning into these blind-alleys andidealizing the dead-ends into desirable destinations. This investigation he undertakes in the second part of the Critique, under the name of Transcendental Dialectic, which he now defines as "a logic of illusion."

"Illusion," he further states, must not be confused with "appearance" or "phenomenon." The distinction between the "real" and the "illusory" appearance is not founded on any criticism provided by sense experience, since all experiences are equally given and there. Illusion, error, truth, arise in connection with judgments about sense data, that is, "in the relation of an object to our understanding." Illusions and errors of this sort, which arise from a misapplication of the categories to their proper, sensible objects, are overcome by observing the logical rules of correct thinking. But besides such illusions, the understanding is subject to a general delusion of metaphysical grandeur which incites it to extend the categories beyond their proper sphere of sense to "illusory" objects existing outside of experience, and to "demonstrate," by means of the laws of logic, the "truth" or "error" of the conclusions to which this unwarranted use of "reasoning" leads. This lands the intellect in transcendental illusions, which it is the business of transcendental dialectic to expose.

Transcendental illusions are not removed by showing them up, as errors are that occur within the proper field of human knowledge. The mind, as we shall see in a moment, is forced by its nature to dream these metaphysical dreams. All that we can do is to make the mind aware that these excursions of reason beyond experience are dreams, and to make it conscious, so to speak, of its own madness. Thus we can destroy, at any rate, the sort of super-illusion that metaphysical illusions have objective validity.
We begin by pointing out to ourselves how it is that such illusions arise. At this point a new principle or faculty enters the scene. We distinguish “pure reason” from the understanding. Just as the understanding synthesizes sensible phenomena under concepts and categories, and thus renders universal scientific knowledge possible, so it is the function of reason to unite the concepts and categories, and incidentally their content, into a higher all-embracing unity. As rational beings, we must seek to reduce the varied content of knowledge “to the smallest number of principles [general conditions] and thereby to produce in it the highest unity.” We must follow the principle of economy and apply Occam’s razor. The goal of reason is, then, to find a single least common denominator of all the categories, which will knit together the concepts of the understanding in such wise that they will constitute an absolute and unconditioned unity explanatory of all things, and itself standing in need of further explanation. Only in such an absolute can reason come last to rest. The search for an absolute gives rise to the idea of pure reason. These ideas must not be confused with the category of the understanding. The categories fit experience. They are forms in which the mind must arrange the material presented to the senses. The ultimate unities sought by reason have no immediate connection with experience. They are not realized by the sensible world, as the categories are. They are merely the points upon which our attempts to unify the world converge. They add, as were, a third dimension of metaphysical depth to the dimensions of sense and of scientific understanding. They represent what we think we should find if we could penetrate behind the scene designed by the categories and painted by experience and beard Reality in its dressing-room.

Here the first danger-sign appears. The fact that reason can seek the highest unity is no guarantee that a complete synthesis and unity actually exist. That reason strives after such a synthesis gives us no “right to demand of the objects themselves such a formality as might conduce to the comfort and extension of our understanding, or to ascribe to that maxim [the law of economy] an objective validity.” The amount of unity that can be introduced into the world must be determined, not by what reason aims to find, but by its capacity for realizing its aim. As a matter of fact, the world never lives up to and realizes such an absolute unity. It is not self-explanatory. It does not pacify reason, it irritates reason. The ideas, then, of pure reason remain ideas. As ideas they are logically intelligible rational activity in its work of synthesizing the categories into a single intelligible whole, these ideas are justifiable and fruitful. But, as ideals supposed to be realized outside the sphere of the understanding and of experience in a world of things-in-themselves, they are unjustifiable and unfruitful.

Since our world displays three aspects—a thinking and perceiving subject, which perceives and thinks under certain a priori forms of intuition and categories of thought; a world of phenomena intuited and known under these forms and categories; and, finally, the existence of objects of thought in general—reason will strive to introduce absolute unity into each of these factors. So it is that we find reason in search of a soul, as the unifying ground of the activities of the mind; of a universe of simple indivisible substances mutually and reciprocally interconnected, as the unifying ground of phenomena; and of a Supreme Being or First Cause as the unifying ground of all thinking subjects and all objects of thought. But such unifying grounds and explanations cannot be found within the activities of thought, in the manifold of phenomena or the field of objects in general, of which they are supposed to be the least common denominators. Hence reason, in its work of higher synthesis, tends to project into the realm of things-in-themselves the ultimate unities it tries to produce in experience and to regard them as ideas corresponding to ultimate entities existing outside the realm of experience altogether. Needless to say, this projection is illegitimate and the concepts to which it gives rise are illusions.

In dealing with the thinking subject, this illusion but inevitable particularization of regulatory ideas lands us in what Kant calls the paralogisms, or faulty conclusions, of pure reason. All our thinking, irrespective of what we happen to be thinking about, is accompanied by the judgment “I think.” In other words, consciousness, no matter what, is also self-consciousness. The situation is very curious. We have an internal sense of my own being as something different from and therefore external to myself. The content of my external experience of myself I call my body. The internal sense of myself, the present when I am thinking about the external world, I call awareness of my soul. But this “I think” also accompanies experiences like pleasures and pains, emotions, thoughts, etc., and all other subjective, empirical and sensory content, with which ordinary psychology busies itself. Therefore, the purely formal nature of the

"I think" can be studied in itself, without reference to how or what the soul happens to be thinking at the time.

But the moment we enter upon such a study we run across a snag. As we have already seen, I can only understand myself in terms of the same categories as enable me to understand all other things. Self-consciousness is subject to the \textit{a priori} and necessary conditions of all possible experience. Therefore, I can only know myself as a substance, as simple, as self-identical and personal—a knowledge which suggests to me that I may be immaterial and immortal, and that, as Berkeley maintained, the stuff of the sensible manifold originates \textit{within} the mind. Unfortunately, however, as we also know, such knowledge does not catch the "I" that does the thinking. It only catches a "me," which is not the "T" as it is in itself, but merely as it must represent itself to itself.

It follows that the soul eludes all description. None of the categories can be applied to it as it is in itself. This is substantiated by the fact that we try to apply them to it. The soul is not a \textit{substance} since "substances" are organizations of "intuited" or perceived sensations. Even if it could be so described, we could come to no conclusions regarding its immortality, since there is nothing in the notion of substance to guarantee permanence and indestructibility. Objects are only verifiably permanent and indestructible for the length of time they happen to endure and survive in the sensible manifold.

In the same way, the \textit{simplicity} of the soul, which some philosophers have triumphantly flouted as evidence of its immaterial and spiritual nature, will not hold water. Simplicity is not self-evident; it is not found by analysis. It cannot be inferred, since inference cannot carry us beyond the realm of experience. To be sure, there is the "transcendental unity of apperception" in which the "I" represents itself to itself as a single thinker knowing single and simple "substances." But the "unity of apperception" can no more assure us that the soul in itself is simple, than that the external substance apprehended as one and single are so in themselves.

Nor would the "simplicity" of the soul differentiate it in any way from matter. For all we know, matter in itself may be simple, it may be even conscious. All we can say is that the soul is not a phenomenon of the external but of the internal sense, and is, therefore, not a body and not spatial. That any distinction exists between soul and body, or between the spatial and the non-spatial, in the world of things-in-themselves we have no right to assume.

The attempt to predicate self-identity and personality of the soul also goes on the rocks. Self-identity is implied in the "unity of apperception," which makes my experience hang together in time, and makes it \textit{my} experience. But I can no more transfer the coherence and identity of my \textit{experience} to the soul than I can transfer it to other experienced qualities. Moreover, such self-identity would be a purely private affair. I could not communicate or prove it to other people, since to do so I should have to make it \textit{felt} and \textit{experienced} by them, which would involve merging my consciousness with the consciousness of those whom I desired to convince, and would thus destroy the separate identity I was attempting to make known. And yet, unless I could make you immediately aware of the self-identical experience my stream of consciousness is to me, I could never \textit{demonstrate} it to you or anyone else. For you, my identity can never be more than it \textit{appears to you} to be. But what cannot be demonstrated to anybody else's satisfaction can scarcely be said to be known as true even of all \textit{experience}. There is, then, no way of proving the soul to be self-identical.

Nor is there any way of knowing that the soul is a single person. To be sure, I represent myself to myself as one and the same person from moment to moment. But this representation might conceivably be passed on from one thinking subject to another. There might be momentary thinking subjects, each one of which remembered what the other had experienced. In that case, the content of consciousness might be handed from one to another of a plurality of perceivers, and any one personal self-consciousness might be the mind of many fathers.

The idealistic argument that the existence of an external world is doubtful is also faulty. True, I can only know phenomena, but these phenomena are presented by the external sense as outside me, just as certainly as I am presented to myself from within by the internal sense. The existence of outer objects, then, is no more doubtful than my own existence. Both I myself and the external world are known only as phenomena, not as things-in-themselves. What their existence as things-in-themselves is like we have no means of knowing. Idealism and realism are equally illegitimate as descriptions of things-in-themselves.

Nor can we ever solve the problem of the dependence or independence of the mind on the body, since such a solution would necessitate an extension of knowledge beyond the sphere in which knowledge is possible. For the same reason, we cannot dogmatically
deny any of the solutions offered, or even urge against them as conclusive the self-contradictions they contain. These contradictions, though valid enough within the field of experience, may be meaningless outside it. All we can do is to point out that the premises and proofs pro and con, used in dealing, say, with the question of immortality, all rest upon unwarranted assumptions of knowledge where knowledge is not possible, and can, therefore, be neither dogmatically affirmed nor dogmatically denied. This leaves the answer we give to them matters of unsupported faith, but of a faith that conversely cannot be disproved.

So far as the interaction of mind and matter is concerned, the same criticisms hold good. Here, too, the pro and con are equally invalid if asserted dogmatically. They both treat of matter in terms of a phenomenon, but of a thing-in-itself. Of the nature of the relations of the “I” to other things-in-themselves we can know nothing, assert nothing, and deny nothing. In a word, we have no right to extend to the realm of things-in-themselves the distinction between the ego’s representation of itself as a soul and its representation of its other experiences as external bodies. In that realm there may be no dualism. We may indeed legitimately inquire how it is that we happen to have an “external sense” and to regard as something outside ourselves the sensible manifold with which it presents itself. But we cannot answer that query. We can only ascribe the external sensible manifold to an unknown ground, whose relation to ourselves is equally unknown and unknowable.

To sum up. All the paralogisms, or faulty conclusions regarding the soul, rest upon a confusion of the “I,” which is an a priori transcendental condition of knowing anything at all, with the “me,” which is an object of knowledge, on a par with all other objects. No matter how deeply we think we know ourselves, there is always residual “I know” that slips through our fingers and refuses to be caught in the net of the known “me.” I can say, “I know myself. But that knowledge turns out to be an object of a further act of knowing expressed in the phrase “I know that I know myself.” The process can go on ad infinitum, with the “I,” the knowing subject always just beyond our reach. The “I,” or soul, Kant concludes, representing itself as substance, simple, numerically identical all time, and as the correlate of all existence, from which it all existence must be concluded... does not know itself through the categories, but knows the categories only, and through them objects, in the absolute unity of apperception, that is, through...
plies contrast with a previous state, and this contrast could not be provided by a blank time in which nothing was occurring. The concept, then, of a beginning preceded by nothing at all is self-contradictory. In the same way, limiting the extent of the universe by absolutely empty space outside it would be unthinkable. Absolutely empty space is not an object; it is nothing. Limiting the universe by it would be limiting it by nothing, and could not be conceived as limitation. Therefore, the universe must be conceived as unlimited, both in spatial extent and in duration.

These difficulties constitute the first antinomy. The second, dealing with the question of divisibility, is like unto it. On the one hand, we have to conceive every compound substance as absolutely divisible. For whatever is not simple and indivisible is compound and demands further analysis. Unless, therefore, these indivisible units exist, the compound cannot exist. On the other hand, such indivisible units can never be reached, since everything that has spatial magnitude must be conceived as capable of division. Hence, simple, indivisible substances can never be discovered. Therefore, nothing indivisible exists. We are led, then, with equally logical necessity to the diametrically opposed conclusions that physical objects both are and are not infinitely divisible.

If now we take up the question of the causation and necessary connection exhibited by phenomena, we are confronted with perplexities, set forth in the third antinomy. Every event is caused by an antecedent event, which in its turn is the effect of a preceding cause. In that case, no beginning can be found for the chain of causes and effects, and no first cause of the causal series can be found. If no first cause exists, there is no sufficient reason for the causal series, which is left without any ground for occurring as it does. Hence we are forced to think of the flow of causation in phenomena as springing from some first cause which is not the effect of anything antecedent to itself. A cause, however, that is not also an effect will be uncaused or causeless. It will not be determined by anything, even by itself, to act as it does, or to act at all. It will occur spontaneously. Its activity will be an absolutely free act, as the choices of a free, undetermined will are supposed to be.

And yet, although we are irresistibly driven to assert the existence of such a cause, in order to ground the causal series somewhere and to find some explanation for it, the concept of an uncaused cause simply will not work. A causeless cause cannot account for itself, any more than it can be accounted for by anything outside itself. But how can an event that is absolutely unaccountable and inexplicable in itself be invoked with any consistency to account for other things? An inexplicable explanation is no explanation. It follows that we cannot conceive a causeless or first cause standing at the beginning of the series of causes and effects. It is, then, as logically impossible as it is logically necessary to assert its existence.

Still, we say, there surely must be some necessity for the phenomenal world's existing, and for its being what it is. Otherwise, why should there be a physical universe, and why should it have the nature it has rather than some other? You are quite right, Kant replies. There is no object, no event, in experience that, so far as logic is concerned, might not be non-existent and might not be other than it is. Therefore, there must be some compelling reason for the presence of our particular world. This reason, moreover, cannot itself be conditioned to be what it is by anything beyond itself, since in that case we might go on ad infinitum demanding reasons for reasons. Hence the reason why there is a universe, and why the universe is what it is, cannot itself be conditioned. It must be unconditioned. It cannot be other than it is. For, if it could be different, it would not be unconditioned, and could not be the ultimate ground of the universe. It would depend upon some further principle, which preferred it to its alternatives. It is, therefore, necessarily what it is.

So far so good. But we now find ourselves in the midst of a fourth antinomy. Driven as we are to suppose the existence of a necessary being, we are equally driven to assert the impossibility of its existence. How, we ask, are we to conceive of this necessary being? Are we to suppose that it is a part of the physical world which conditions other things to exist and to be what they are? In that case, it is open to all the objections just urged against the possibility of there being a first, causeless link in the causal chain. Or shall we suppose that, though each event and object is contingent, and might not occur at all, or might occur differently, the whole series of events, totality of phenomenal existence, cannot be other than it is, and thus necessitates causes and effects to occur as they do. But, Kant says, how can a whole composed of parts, no one of which is necessarily what it is, be itself necessary? If there is no logical reason for particular events and things in the world might not be different, there can be no reason why the sum total, also, of these events might not be different.
Finally, if we try to think of the necessary condition of the existence of a physical world as itself outside the world, we are trying to think the impossible. For, unless the phenomenal universe had been created at a given time, the creative principle could never have been outside the world-process. It would have been always a part of the world-process, on a par with our old friend, the causeless first link of the causal chain. Still, if we suppose the physical universe to have been called into being at some time by an outside factor, then this factor must have existed before the world was, and again becomes a first cause, subject to all the disabilities thereof. Coming or going, taken internally or externally, the result is the same. A necessary object or event is inconceivable. Hence, with equally good reason, the physical universe must have and cannot have a reason why it exists and is what it is.

Both horns of these dilemmas have their advantages and disadvantages. A phenomenal order conceived as limited in space and time, as composed of indivisible and simple units, as containing free and spontaneous causes, and as grounded on a necessary being, supports religion and morality by inculcating belief in a creator and in free-will and moral responsibility. It quiets doubts and gives the man in the street a final and positive ideas and stable principles upon which to act. It also reassures the speculative thinker: the philosopher finds something absolute and unconditioned. The other horn, sharpened by the notions of a universe infinite in space and time and divisibility, absolutely determined in its behavior by the linkage of physical cause and effect, and absolutely undetermined by any necessary underlying ground within it or without it, is the most efficient instrument for puncturing dreams and wild hypotheses and pinning reason and understanding to the solid ground of experience. It holds our investigations and definitions to what is knowable, and it forces us to suspend judgment regarding things that lie beyond the scope of the reason. But we should not forget that in so doing it also goes the dogmatic denials of the empiricism as completely as it does the dogmatic assertions of the rationalists.

The antinomies, Kant continues, spring from an improper extension of the term “totality” beyond the limits set to its meaning in experience. Totality is not a concept applicable to the phenomenal world. It is one of the guiding ideals into complete conformity with which reason, for all its efforts, can never bring experience. We must to be sure, abstract the world-process from time, and conceive that was, all that is, and all that shall be, as a single, completed whole, seen all at once, or synoptically, in a bird’s-eye vision “under the aspect of eternity.” But we cannot effect an actual, all-embracing synthesis of past, present, and future, since the content of time is a process of accretion which rolls onward like a snowball, and to the end of which we never come. Therefore, although we can have an idea of totality, we cannot predicate an existent wholeness even of the phenomenal order, not to speak of predicating it of things-in-themselves.

Once rid of this mistaken attribution of totality to experience, the antinomies are easily solved. Since the phenomenal world is never complete, and never presents us with a whole, we cannot determine whether its totality is limited or unlimited. Nor can we determine from experience whether the parts which go to make up that totality are or are not infinitely divisible. The sensible world is neither finite nor infinite but merely indefinite in extent and duration. It is divisible neither into a finite nor an infinite number of parts but simply into an indeterminable number of constituents. It exhibits causal connections which determine the time and place of its component events, but its order is also an expression of things as they are in themselves, which is not governed by the category of physical causation, and may therefore be an expression of a free causality interpenetrating the necessary order of physical causation. So, too, the contingent character of the events of experience, one of which is logically implied or necessitated by its antecedents, might go hand-in-hand with a necessary logical determination in the nature and order of these events by the things-in-themselves.

His solution of the third antinomy has, Kant believes, an important bearing upon the problem of human free-will. Man has not only an empirical character; he is also a thing-in-itself. In so far as he is a member of the phenomenal order, his acts, like all natural events, are subject to the laws of causation. But his acts, like all natural events, are also freely determined by his nature as a thing-in-itself, or as Kant calls it, by his intelligible character.

We can see this free causation at work in the way reason deals with the universe. The activities of reason are not determined by the natural order. On the contrary, they seek to conform the natural order to an ideal order which we, as rational beings, feel ought to exist. We are forever trying to turn the unity we discover in ourselves and in the objective world into absolute units existing beyond experience. This ceaseless attempt to superimpose our rational
ideals on experience does actually modify experience. Without it the phenomenal world could not have the significance it has.

Reason does, then, seem to introduce something extra and not into the temporal series. But it does not introduce it in the way that the striking of a match, for example, introduces a flame into the succession of events. The causality of reason is exerted not from within the time stream, as ordinary causality is, but from without. The modifications it brings about in experience have no antecedent causes in foregoing occurrences. They appear in experience as we caused events, introduced from the outside into the temporal and causal sequence of phenomena, and determined by the nature of reason alone. Hence the causality of reason appears, in its relation to the temporal and necessary connection of events, as free and de determined causation. Why reason determines itself as it does, and has the nature and the ideals it has, is an insoluble problem.

IX. IDEALS OF PURE REASON

So far, we have been discussing the attempts of reason to apply the idea of unity, on the one hand to the activities of the thinking subject, on the other to the objective content of that subject's thinking. We have seen how these attempts converge upon the ideas of the soul and of a completed physical universe, all of whose events are interlocked by the necessary connections of cause and effect. And we have noted the contradictory results that spring from asserting the absolute existence, outside experience, of entities not only unrealized within experience itself, but at the best incompletely realized within experience itself, but at the best incompletely and confusedly suggested by it. But this is not all. Reason flies on higher and wider in its quest for unity. It looks for a single necessary ground of all existence whatsoever, subjective as well as objective, which shall account for the fact that there are souls who think and a phenomenal universe which is thought about. In short reason seeks to demonstrate the existence and to determine the nature of an ultimate Reality from which all things spring and to which all things depend. Its ideal is to attain and to comprehend the Supreme Being, a God.

The idea of God Kant calls the transcendental ideal of pure reason, which he fossilizes still further with the name of proto transcendentals—a term whose first suggestion to the modern ear is that of a prehistoric monster. He calls it an ideal rather than a

because it transcends ideas like the soul and the universe, just as they transcend the categories of the understanding. The categories are mere forms of thought, which get their content from sense experience. Ideas are confessedly incapable of concrete representation in experience. The soul and the universe stand for a degree of unity in the thinking subject and in the objective world that experience never realizes.

The transcendental ideal withdraws reason even further from experience. The object of which it dreams is not only beyond experience, but its existence, unlike the existence of the soul and the universe, is not even thought of in terms suggested by experience. On the contrary, it is supposed to exist independently of the conditions under which experience exists, and in no wise describable by them. Space and time are not forms of its existence; nor can we confine it within the categories. It is conceived as the ground of all possible being, and therefore cannot be conceived, as the soul or the universe might be conceived, as capable of non-existence. Any particular portion or aspect of the existence may indeed be conceived as absent. But to think of existence in any and every form as absent is also to affirm the idea of a completely existent being, since in order to deny there must be something to deny. I cannot even say that the cat is not there, or that the soul does not exist, unless I have the notion of a cat or of the soul in my mind. How much less can I make an absolute negation of what I conceive to be the ground of all existence whatsoever, unless I have in my mind the idea of such an absolutely existing being, or ens realissimum, whose very essence is to exist.

So far so good. But there is a great difference between asserting that the ens realissimum cannot be conceived except as existing and asserting that because we must think of it as existent it must therefore exist independent of our conception of it. The logical necessities of a self-consistent idea cannot be translated into the "ontological" necessity of the existence of an object corresponding to that idea. Once more, we are dealing with an illusion, the greatest of all illusions entertained by pure reason, that the existence of God is demonstrable.

How illusory such a hope is may be shown by an examination of the arguments used by the theologians. Take, for example, the arguments for the existence of being. The "ontological argument" that since the concept of an ens realissimum, or all-perfect being, involves the notion of necessary existence, such a being must exist. To this Kant replies that, in the

first place, we cannot predicate necessity of anything, even of Reality itself. The existence of any and every subject together with its predicates can be denied without self-contradiction. The only necessity is logical necessity, which governs analytic judgments alone. Certain predicates are implied in a concept, as, for example, the equality of the radii in the concept of the circle, and such properties are necessarily predicated of the circle. But the logical implications inherent in a concept do not prove the existence of the object of which they are predicated. The chimera necessarily has three heads, but that does not mean that the chimera exists.

All judgments involving existence, Kant continues, are synthetic and add to the concept something not logically necessitated by it. Hence the opposite of any synthetic judgment is logically possible, and any synthetic judgment can be denied without logical self-contradiction. There is nothing in the logic of the situation to prevent my saying the “apples are not red,” or “planets do not move in ellipses.” In the same way, the proposition “God exists” may be denied without contradiction. The idea of God may, indeed, be the idea of an existent being, in which the idea of existence is as necessarily implied as the equality of the radii is implied in the idea of the circle. But just as the proposition “there are circles” states something of the circle not necessarily implied in its definition, the statement “there is a God” adds something extraneous to the idea of a being who by definition must be thought of as existing. Just, then, as there is nothing in the logic of the situation to prevent my saying “circles, although their nature necessarily implies the equality of their radii, do not necessarily exist,” so there is nothing self-contradictory in saying “God, who must be defined a necessarily existent being, does not necessarily exist.”

Furthermore, existence is not a predicate or a property. It adds nothing to any concept. It merely determines the relation of a concept to experience. Concepts enacted in the world of experience are concepts of existent objects. The conceived dollar has as many pennies in it as the dollar in my pocket. In or out of circulation, its definition is the same. If putting the dollar in my pocket changes the value of the dollar, then either my idea of the possible doll is defective and does not define the real dollar, or else the dollar in my pocket is not what I thought a dollar was. In a word, existence is not conceived; it is not an idea. It is perceived; it is an experienced fact.

The so-called cosmological proof of God’s existence, which from the existence of the world to a necessary cause of the world, is merely a re-entrance of the ontological proof thinly disguised. It improperly argues that the cause necessarily exists, and thus identifies it with the ens realissimum and exposes it to the objections we have just noted. Moreover, the argument assumes that an infinite regress is impossible, and that therefore a First Cause must exist. But experience is non-committal on this point, presenting us, as it does, with neither a finite nor an infinite series, but simply with an indefinite sequence of causes and effects. Nor, for that matter, do concepts of a completed universe ever give us an actual synthesis of all it contains. Again, contingency and necessity are valid concepts only within the universe. They can be applied to particular objects and events, but not to the existence of the universe as a whole. The fact that there is a world is neither necessary nor contingent. The universe does not have to exist, but neither does it have to have a reason for its existence rather than its non-existence, or for being this world rather than that. It is simply there, and is what it is.

Finally, we have the argument from design, which infers from so-called evidences of design the necessity of a supreme designer. As the best, this argument can lead us, not to the concept of an ens realissimum, but only to the notion of a kind of architect constructing the world out of matter already on hand. To make God the creator of the matter, as well as of the design, we have to invoke the cosmological proof—with what consequences, we already have seen. Again, we could not even infer from the evidences of design that God was perfectly good at his job, but only that he was good. Hence the argument would not even establish his perfection as an architect, let alone his existence.

The theologians, Kant concludes, are no better off than the metaphysicians. Experience is only of the conditioned, never of the absolute. It can never give us knowledge of an absolutely necessary being. Such knowledge, if it existed, would have to be a priori. It would have to rely upon something in the category of causation rather than upon observed causes and effects. But the category of causation is applicable only to experience. An absolutely necessary cause, the First Cause of the theologians, is therefore a meaningless phrase and a contradiction in terms.

Since neither experience nor the category of causation presents with a first cause, the existence of God is implied neither by the a priori nature of causation nor by our experience of cause and
Effect. Even if we could assert the existence of a first cause outside experience, we could never tell whether or not that cause was the supreme explanation of all experience, since all experience is an empirical phenomenon. At the most, we could only say that it was sufficient for our experience here and now. Even then, however, we should be extending synthetic propositions beyond the realm of experience, where alone they are valid, and should be pretending knowledge about things-in-themselves which are unknowable.

At the same time, ideas like the soul, the objective universe, or God are not mere pipe-dreams. They are ways in which the mind is obliged to introduce system into the world. It can no more escape them than it can evade the categories of the understanding. They are, therefore, of great value in correcting and regulating human speculation. As long as we regard them as ideals by which reason is guided in dealing with problems raised by the existence and constitution of the world, they are highly desirable. It is only when the mind regards them as ideas somehow already realized and existing in and for themselves that they become illegitimate and turn into transcendental illusions.

It is interesting to observe how we fall into these illusions. We tend to objectify both ourselves and our experience through the categories, and to unify those objectifications still further through the ideas of pure reason. The process of further unification proceeds along certain set lines. It follows the principle of economy and applies Occam's razor to the complexity of the universe. At the same time, it divides and subdivides objects into as many kinds of things as it can. And it endeavors to fill in the jumps and gaps, of which experience is full, with mediating concepts, so that a perfect continuity can be established between the sumnum genus, or all-embracing concept of the nature of Reality as a whole and the specific or most specialized kinds of things in which the nature of the Real is manifested.

Although these principles have no more validity outside experience than have the categories, and although the ideas to which they give rise are not applicable to things-in-themselves, they serve nevertheless as fundamental hypotheses upon whose presupposed correspondence to things-in-themselves all our thinking is based, dealing with the world we act as if they were ultimate truths, except on that assumption all our attempts to introduce unity into the world are meaningless; just, to take a modern example, as search for the "missing link" would be meaningless unless we assumed the truth of the evolutionary hypothesis. We study our psychological activities, Kant feels, on the supposition that the perceiving subject is a simple entity or soul; we base our physical sciences on the assumptions that nature is a single, interconnected, uniform whole; and we endeavor to make sense of the presence of both thinking subjects and objects of thought and of the relations between them on the hypothesis that they have their ground in some deeper, all-explaining, necessary Reality which accounts for them both.

But to act as if these suppositions were true is to act as if the ideas of pure reason were ideas of existing objects. Still, even these assumptions cannot go further than the supposition that such objects exist. It does not presume to tell us what they are like. In a word, its objects stand in exactly the same relation to reason as things-in-themselves stand to sense. The ideas refer to them, just as perceptual experience refers to something outside itself. But the nature of God or the soul or the universe is no more indicated by the assumption of their existence, than the nature of things-in-themselves is indicated by the forms in which they are perceived. Nor, the soul, the universe, remain for reason mere things-in-general, I know not what, in which psychological, physical, and theological ideas are grounded. However, just as the things-in-themselves which sensible phenomena are perceived as sensible data, so the blank spaces-in-themselves, I know not what, corresponding to the ideas of pure reason, can only be conceived and given intelligible content in terms of the entities presented by the categories of the understanding.

At this point we are confronted with the same problem as arose when we were discussing the relation of the categories to the sensible manifold. We may remember that we then found it necessary to suppose that the content of perceptual experience must already be compliant, not recalcitrant, to being "categorized," since otherwise it would not fit into the forms of the understanding and could remain unintelligible. Hence it had to have something in common with the categories, which partook of the nature of both thought and acted as a go-between. This we found in the notion. The manifold nature of sense which enabled us to enumerate its parts and to subject them to arithmetical processes, made it possible to think of perceptions as being compliant to the category of quantity. The permanent and enduring character of perceptions gave substance to them, and

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the invariability of their observed sequences lent itself to the application of the category of causality.

Kant’s task is now to find similar go-betweens connecting the ideas of pure reason with the categories. For, if the world produced by the union of the categories with sense perception was such as to leave the ideas of pure reason hanging in mid-air, we could never achieve a final unification of the universe through the concepts of the soul, the universe, and God. Sensible phenomena would indeed be reduced to a world of orderly objects, and the activities of thought would be organized in terms of the self, but the less common denominators for both physical and psychological phenomena would be lacking, and there would be no explanation of the co-existence and interrelation of the thinking subject and its objects of its thought.

However, the difficulty of finding schemata connecting the categories and the ideas is quickly overcome. These schemata are found in the nature of the categories themselves, just as the schemata of sense perception were found in the nature of experience itself. The categories, by virtue of their unifying and systematizing power, lead themselves to the further work of unification carried on by the ideas of pure reason. Substance, causality, necessity, and the other categories are as ingrained in metaphysical speculation as they are in scientific understanding. Not only must we think about sense perception in terms of substance and attribute, causation, and the like, but we must think about supra-sensible entities like God, the soul, and the things-in-themselves behind physical phenomena in precisely the same terms, and we must prefigure God’s relation to the world as a causal relation similar to that subsisting between one physical phenomenon and another. In a word, the categories can serve two masters. They can be used by the understanding on the one hand, to introduce order into sense experience, and by reason on the other, to reduce to still more complete unity the order produced.

Hence we find reason in its turn producing a final world of transcendental objects, or things-in-themselves conceived in terms of categories, just as in the schemata the categories are perceived only as general characteristics of sense experience, but as necessary forms of thinking about sense experience. These transcendental objects in which God, the soul, and the universe are thought of as substances with properties, and as substances in causal relation, are the schemata of the ideas.

For instance, between the idea of the soul as an unknowable thing-in-itself underlying our conscious activity and the soul as the ordinary, everyday, “empirical” self given in self-consciousness there intervenes the soul as a transcendental object, or schema, freed from any particular content of consciousness, and regarded as an unknown substance possessed of unknown qualities. Between the idea of the collection of things-in-themselves that underlie the physical universe and the physical objects constructed by the categories out of sense experience, there hovers the schema of the universe, a transcendental object, thought of in terms of substance and causation. Finally, God himself is “schematized” as a substance with properties, whose existence is necessary and whose relations to both soul and universe are causal. Nay, more, reason represents to itself the nature of the divine substance in terms of its own activities, and thinks of God as a supreme mind upon which the rational order imputed to things-in-themselves depend, just as the rationality and order of our particular experience depend upon the synthesizing activity of our particular minds.

We cannot, however, reiterate too strongly the warning that we have no rational proof that the soul, the physical universe, and God are more than ideas and ideals of thought, and that they refer independently existing objects. The relation of these transcendental objects to our thinking is the same as the relation of physical objects to our perceiving. There may or may not be things-themselves corresponding to them. To assert dogmatically the existence of such things lands us in the difficulties we have already hinted.

Moreover, there are additional difficulties which are connected with the attributing of reason to God. The moment that we regard the notion of a divine reason or mind as more than the schema, or presentation in terms of our own minds, of the idea of a supreme being, we fall into two characteristic errors. Imputing unlimited power to God tends to make us mentally lazy and prone to refer everything we cannot understand to the deep and secret counsels of the Most High without further attempting to ferret it out by ourselves. Furthermore, turning the ways in which we are obliged to receive God into attributes of God himself breeds a perverted, anthropomorphic notion of God as a quasi-human person, whose arbitrary purposes govern the course of natural events. So, instead
of investigating the course of phenomena to find out by observation what the aims, if any, of nature are, we judge a priori what God's aims are from our own prejudices and preferences, and then twist natural events into conformity with them. Under such circumstances, the ideas of pure reason become hindrances rather than helps to the enlargement of our understanding.

X. DISCIPLINE OF PURE REASON

After pointing out the inevitable accidents which result from turning blind alleys into thoroughfares and dead-ends into main physical destinations, Kant gives philosophy a final word of warning, and admonishes her to submit to the discipline of pure reason. Her unruliness, he finds, is due in part to her desire to emulate mathematics, which can make a priori synthetic judgments with absolute certainty and can argue from the particular and the contingent to the universal and the necessary in a way that cannot be refuted. For example, we can demonstrate from any old triangle that we may happen to draw on the blackboard truths like the equality of the interior angles to the sum of two right angles, which hold for all actual and possible triangles we could ever come across.

We do not have to keep testing the correctness of this proposition with respect to each new triangle we meet. We know it beforehand. In other words, we have a priori knowledge of it. Why, then, do we not do the same with regard to cats and dogs and human beings and physical objects? Why should we not be able to infer the nature of all experience from our experience, and demonstrate from it an absolute certainty universally valid a priori propositions regarding the nature of the universe? Many philosophers and theologians, indeed, have supposed that it could be done.

The trouble is, Kant replies, that philosophy forgets that mathematics is a privileged character. To be sure, mathematical concepts like philosophic concepts, are exemplified by particular instances and mathematical demonstration is subject to the rule that all valid synthetic propositions which require verification by experience. They and the relations between them can be sensuously represented in figures and numbers, and whatever combination of the mind can work out in synthetic propositions must be capable of being worked out and demonstrated visibly with mind and pencil. But—and here the special privilege of mathematics—mathematical axioms and demonstrations rest, not upon the variable and contingent content of our experience, but upon the unchanging forms of space and time in which all human experience is given. To "mathematics", an object is precisely to empty it of all content and to leave only its purely spatial outlines, which are determined, not by the nature of what fills them, but by the shape of the space they fill. For instance, an apple, a balloon, a billiard-ball, and the moon are all alike spheres. Or again, four dogs, four fuses, four planets, four gods, are all alike four.

Dealing, then, with particulars whose nature is determined, not by their changeable and contingent content, but by the universal and invariable constitution of time and space, mathematics is able to regard each individual representation of its concepts as wholly representative of the concept in question. Thus, every individual triangle illustrates the entire nature of triangularity. Any instance of $3 + 3 = 6$, or $3 - 2 = 1$, or $3 \times 3 = 9$, or $\frac{9}{3} = 1 \frac{1}{2}$, is symbolic of something that will necessarily be true in all times and places. Because of this peculiar character of the particulars in which mathematics deals, all its birds of a feather can be killed with one stone. Whatever has been once demonstrated to be true of one of these particulars is necessarily true of all of them forever. Therefore, mathematics can make a priori synthetic propositions with certainty—can, for example, be cocksure in asserting as a universal truth that, given any right-angled triangle, whatever kind of stuff it may have and object it may be, the square of its hypotenuse will be equal to the sum of the squares of its two other legs.

Philosophy, however, has no such luck. Her concepts have to take account of the stuff that fills in mathematical particulars, and this stuff is variable and contingent and presents individually different ways in shifting relations to one another. No one stone can kill all birds. No one physical object or thinking subject is exhaustively representative of all objects or all minds, as one triangle is exhaustively representative of all triangles. In dealing with her stuff, she has nothing a priori, nothing in the way of necessarily universal characteristics, to rely upon. She does, indeed, abstract from particular data such general features as she happens to find in them, and she constructs out of these features a world of things—general like the soul, and the universe, and God. But how she shall construct them is determined, not a priori, but a posteriori, by what she actually finds going on in an experience of which no particular item can be regarded as an adequate representation of a
general concept. Though one triangle may stand for all triangles, no one man is wholly representative of the human species. To know the whole truth about all mankind, every individual man that ever was, or is now, or ever shall be, would have to be examined and compared with all others. So, too, to have an adequate general concept of the universe in general, and to be able to say the world beyond all doubt such and such, all that ever happened in space and time would have first to be observed.

Hence our philosophic estimates have no demonstrable or apodictic certainty, like those of mathematics. The concepts of philosophic restings as they do upon a changing and growing mass of empirical observation, are never exhaustive and complete. There can be no such things as philosophic axioms, since axioms are synthetic principles a priori, and philosophy has always to argue a posteriori in experience to her so-called principles. Nor can any of her arguments be demonstrations, since reasoning founded on a changing and cumulating content of experience can never arrive at certainty. Reasoning can that is based upon the unchanging forms in which changing content presents itself. Reason would do well, then, to walk more humbly with her soul, her universe, and her God, as mathematics does with its $2 + 2$ and its Pythagorean propositions.

So much for the rationalists. The empiricists, too, should try more carefully. Hume, for example, fails to distinguish between synthetic judgments and concepts that rest upon the content of actual experience, on the one hand, and those, on the other, that are based upon the a priori conditions and forms of all possible human experience. His criticism of the pretensions of knowledge to extend beyond experience is well-founded, but he is wrong in denying to experience an a priori structure, displayed in the categories, which enables us to make a priori assertions about the sensible world with absolute certainty. He does not see that the concepts of instance, and causality, for example, are not built up out of experience like the concepts of the cat or the dog, but are ways in which the human mind by its very nature is forced to think of all the experience that may be presented to it. A similar confusion exists in Hume's mind between the provinces of reason and of the understanding. He mixes up the proper claim of the categories, valid for all possible human experience with the unjustifiable pretensions of the ideas of pure reason, like the soul and God, objective counterparts existing outside the world of experience in the realm of things-in-themselves.

The upshot of it all is that the concepts of philosophy are hypotheses pure and simple, whose function is to explain experience and whose propriety is estimated by their relevance to experience. If they do not stick to the conditions of all possible human experience in their conjectures about possible objects, they become mere fancies, and we call them wild. Thus in our conjectures about the physical world we should not invoke non-physical and transcendental explanations. Such explanations are not sound, although, of course, we have no means of disproving them. Finally, from any sound hypothesis the facts on which it rests must be also deducible a priori. The consequences we should expect from it must agree with the data from which it is inferred. Using supplementary hypotheses to cover up discrepancies between the consequences and the observed facts will not work. By such conjectures we only weaken what we are trying to support.

We may, however, set a thief to catch a thief, and oppose hypotheses extending beyond experience to other hypotheses of the same sort. I am as much and as little entitled to make sweeping transcendental hypotheses as you are entitled to make sweeping transcendental denials of them. Let, then, the skeptic beware no less trying to disprove, than the rationalist of trying to prove, what can neither be certainly affirmed nor certainly denied. Dogmatic fanaticism can be legitimately countered with dogmatic affirmation. Legitimate proofs, however, can be made of concepts whose concept is given in experience. These proofs do not rest upon the logical induction of one concept by another, but upon the fact that experienced instances of the one concept are always such that I cannot think of them without reference to the other concept as well. For example, the concept of an "event" does not logically imply the concept of cause, since causeless events are conceivable. But experienced events always have to be thought of as originating in precedent occurrences. There therefore must be a causal connection between experienced events. Hence causation is a demonstrable fact.

Take again the concepts of substance and attribute. The concept of one does not imply the other. Indeed, in a sense the concepts coincide each other. A substance is conceived as that which remains when all the attributes have been removed, an attribute is conceived as something non-substantial—as an adjective, not a noun. But in experience, we cannot find things without qualities, or qualities detached from things. Hence we can demonstrate that substances do have attributes, that attributes must inhere in substances.
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Herein lies the fallacy of the so-called demonstrations of the existence of God. In “proving” his existence, we are seeking to establish a necessary connection between the concepts of a most real or perfect being and a necessarily existent being. As we have seen, the one concept does not logically imply the other. To demonstrate God’s existence, as in demonstrating the existence of anything, we must show that an experienced instance of the concept of a most real being cannot be thought of except as necessarily existing. But experience presents us with no instance of the idea of either necessary or a most real being. Therefore, it is impossible to say beforehand whether or not a perceived instance of the concept of a perfect being, i.e., God, would exist necessarily or not, just as would be impossible to deduce beforehand from the mere concept an “event” whether perceived events would necessarily have caused

It will be noted, Kant continues, that in proving that certain characteristics go together in experience we are not concerned with particular objects or events. Neither do our proofs depend upon them. In the case of causation, for example, we are concerned with demonstrating, not what the cause of a particular event is, but simply that all events, whatever they may be, must have cause.

Again, these proofs do not rest upon circumstantial evidence. The truths they establish are not demonstrated provisionally from accumulating observation of particular events, and subject to the possibility of our finding, either now or in the future, events to contradict them. Causation, for instance, is not a tentative hypothesis which some uncaused occurrence may some day upset. To prove its truth we do not have to wait till we have noted a large number of invariable sequences. Our minds are so constituted that a cause must be demanded for the very first event we experience. The proof that causation exists is, then, drawn immediately from the constitution of the mind. It is direct, it is necessary and it leaves nothing further to be learned or known about the subject. Since all human experience must fall within the category of causation, no experience could ever occur that would disprove the necessary connection between the events that it presents.

One last word of caution is necessary, before we leave the subject of proof. We are prone to believe that proving the impossibility of demonstrating the truth of a proposition is proof that the proposition itself is false. For example, we have seen that it is possible to prove the existence of God. Therefore, the skeptic

we have disproved his existence. This, however, is an unwarranted assumption. The impossibility of demonstrating that a proposition is true does not disprove the truth of the proposition in question. God’s existence is not disproved by our inability to prove it. Nor do the contradictions involved in the necessity of thinking of the universe as both finite and infinite, and our ability to prove that both conclusions are equally false, disprove the existence of the universe. They merely disprove our ability to attain a consistent and true concept of it.

It is important to keep this point in mind since “the transcendental endeavors of pure reason are all made within the very sphere of dialectical illusion, where what is subjective presents itself, nay, forces itself upon reason in its premises as objective. Here, therefore, it can never be allowed to justify one’s assertions by refuting their opposite.” Though we cannot prove the existence of the soul, of an objective physical world, and of God, we are just as unable to demonstrate their non-existence.

XI. “CRITIQUE OF PRACTICAL REASON”

Had Kant rested upon his laurels at this point—and his laurels were already abundant, and the point a not illogical destination—we might feel that, though awakened by Hume from his dogmatic sleep, he was now snoring again with stertorous skepticism upon Hume’s shoulder. But, once awakened from his dogmatism, he did not relapse into skeptical slumbers. Like Locke and Berkeley, he found it necessary to take back with his left hand what he had given with his right, and to find some way of restoring the eternal certitudes the certainty of which he had so completely demolished. So it is that we find him at the end of the Critique of Pure Reason suddenly reversing himself. After all, he tells us, man’s relation to the universe is not wholly intellectual. The world is a stage upon which we act as well as scenery which we observe and about which we think. It arouses desires, hopes, and expectations. Our behavior and our expectations, as well as our thinking, must be reasonable. Here, then, is another fertile field for the exercise of reason.

As we have seen, the ideas of God and the universe and the soul are regulative ideas of our thinking. They represent the final principles of unification we are always seeking to find for subjective and objective phenomena and for the co-existence and interrelation of
the mind and the external world. Moreover, they and ideas connected with them are regulative ideas not only of our thinking but of our conduct. The man who acts rationally is the man who acts as if there were a God, as if he were an immortal soul, as if his soul were free and morally responsible for its choices. In other words, reason imposes upon us obligations with respect to how we shall behave. It not only shows us how we do behave, and what does take place; it also tells us how we ought to behave, and what Reality ought to be like.

All our activity as rational beings, Kant continues, is focused upon three questions—What can I know? What should I do? What may I hope? The first question, which deals with the powers and limitations of the mind, has already been answered. The second, which is the practical problem of ethics, is about to engage our attention. The third is both practical and theoretical. We hope for what ought to be, just as we know what is. And just as our knowledge of what is leads us to the conclusion that there is an ultimate ground of all existence, so our knowledge of what ought to be leads us to the conclusion that there is an ultimate justification of our hopes.

We hope for happiness. Reason tells us that in order to realize this hope, we must deserve happiness. It would be irrational to expect happiness without meriting it. The reasonable conditions of attaining happiness are, then, what we call moral conditions. They are not derived empirically from an observation of experience. They are a priori. They are a presupposition of moral experience and action. They flow from the nature of reason itself. They remold us moral beings inhabiting a moral world.

But why should it be irrational to expect happiness without desiring it? Why should reason impose upon us a precept like "it is that which will render thee deserving of happiness"? Such a precept is not a reasonable inference from the natural world, where happiness is pursued with no thought as to whether it is deserved or not; and where the connection between reward and merit is imperfect. If the moral law is to be reasonable, and rewards are to be linked with deserts, there must be a moral and rational government of the world. Furthermore, since we do not get what we deserve in this world, there must be another life in which rewards are apportioned to our merits. In short, moral obligation is rational and explicit only on the assumption that we are immortal as well as free, and that there is a God who sees to it that our deserts bear their proper fruits, if not in this world, then beyond the grave.

We begin now to catch the immense significance of the fact that our ability to disprove the possibility of a rational demonstration of God's existence does not disprove that he exists. So far as theoretic reason is concerned, we cannot prove that there is a God and that we are free and immortal souls, but neither can we disprove it. The situation is a stalemate. But, since moral obligation implies God, freedom and immortality, whose existence reason cannot deny, we may feel morally, if not intellectually, certain of the being of God and of our own free and deathless nature.

These propositions set forth by Kant at the end of the Critique of Pure Reason were amplified and developed, after some years of further reflection, in the Metaphysics of Morals, published in 1785, and in the Critique of Practical Reason, published in 1788. In the Metaphysics, Kant discusses first what he calls the morality of common sense. He points out that nothing can be called absolutely good, except a good will. Unless the motive behind our action is pure, we cannot be said to make good use of the talents we possess, nor can our behavior be called meritorious and deserving of the reward of happiness. Furthermore, the good will is the only thing that can be called good in itself, and not because of its consequences. Its goodness is not the goodness of a means to some further end, but an end in itself.

To be truly meritorious, Kant goes on, we must act not from inclination but from duty. Moral action must be guided not by what we want to do, but by what we ought to do. What, then, is duty? We can say at once that a dutiful action derives its worth, not from its consequences, but from some general law or principle. It is done because it is right in itself, not because it leads to something beyond itself. Can we, then, state without more ado the law of right behavior? We can, Kant replies. The rule of right behavior is always to act in a manner in which we should wish all other people to act. In a word, strictly moral behavior is always founded on a universally applicable maxim.

So much for what we may call the morality empirically discovered by common sense and derived from an observation of moral conduct. We have now to discuss the nature and source of the universal maxim by which the goodness of an act is tested. This maxim, Kant feels, is not itself empirical. It is not derived from experience.
As a matter of experience, we find that we are always falling short of our duty. Interest and inclination interfere with it. Still, we feel that our duty ought not to be interfered with. Although we do not live up to our ideals, we nevertheless have them. The presence of the ideal, and the sense of ought and duty, are, therefore, not the product of experience which is not in itself ideal and as we would have it. The ideal is rather an a priori standard, by which we are somehow able to judge events and our reactions to them immediately, and to estimate the moral worth of what we do. We have a sense of right and wrong, which we apply to events, as it were, from above, when they occur.

The seat of this sense must be, not in the empirical content of volition, but in the a priori structure of the will. We have already seen that to act morally is to act as a man motivated by reason would act. In short, the will actuated by considerations simply of right and wrong, is nothing but reason in action, or, as we might call it, practical reason. Since, however, right and rational behavior is hindered by immediate desires and interests in such wise that human conduct is never wholly reasonable and meritorious, the good will is never a realized fact, but appears in experience as an unrealized ideal, accompanied by a sense of the necessity or obligation of realizing it. Were the will not hindered in the expression of its rational character, its volitions would be spontaneously right. In that case, it would not have to aim at right and reasonable conduct, and such conduct, being an accomplished fact, would not impose upon the will an obligation to attain it.

As matters stand, however, unrealized rightness and rationality of behavior constitute a duty, which commands the will as imperatively as the ideals of pure reason coerce our thinking. Given, however, the imperfect nature of the stage upon which the rational will must act, these imperative commands are of two sorts. They enjoin certain behavior as the necessary means to some further end, which, however, they do not set forth; or they order us to behave in a certain way because such behavior is an end in itself. We feel that it is imperative to perform certain kinds of acts, in order to carry out this or that purpose we have in mind. Or we do what we do, not with any ulterior motive, but simply because we feel that what we do is in itself right, quite apart from anything it may lead to. In the latter case, we are acting according to what Kant calls the categorical imperative, and, since we feel it to be incumbent on everyone to do what is right, come what may, simply because...
of so acting "as to treat humanity, whether in thine own person or in that of any other, in every case as an end withal, never as it means only." This is the concrete content of ethical action. This is what we should do, and how we should act in dealing with our fellow-men, if our behavior is to have a universal and absolute moral value and to be truly good.

In so acting, we transcend everything that is partial and individual in ourselves and act as the representatives of all humanity. Our rule of action is, therefore, not prescribed by our particular preferences, desires, and ends. It is not empirical. It is derived, like the categories, from the nature of reason, and is, therefore, a priori. To put it in terms of volition, the truly moral or rational will prescribes its own law and its own imperative, with no other end in view than to express its own nature. Its obligation is self-imposed. Hence the moral will is self-determined and self-legislating, or, as Kant calls it, autonomous.

Moral action, however, does not stand over against the concern of our daily life as a thing apart. It embraces and directs all the manifold values and ends of ordinary living. It is a synthesis, systematizing of all our activities. In every department of life, in the pursuit of every goal, in the fulfillment of every purpose, we may act either with or without consideration for others, either with an eye to what is expedient for us, or in the light of what is good for humanity as a whole. When we act morally, we are not only citizens of the world, to which, incidentally, considerations of prudence and expediency might better adapt us, but we are citizens of an ideal order, or "kingdom of ends" of which we are both the subjects and the monarchs, obedient in our actions to a law laid down by our own will.

In the kingdom of ends, again, we must distinguish between those aims for which an equivalent can be found, and those to which nothing else can be substituted. The general inclinations and wants and tastes of mankind give certain objects and acts an extrinsic value which depends upon their ability to satisfy human desires. But moral action has an intrinsic worth which "is above all value and therefore admits of no equivalent." It cannot be gained away for anything else. It has no price. Nothing else can do in its place. It and it alone has dignity. To set a price upon it, be willing to trade it for a consideration, as we may properly do in the case of values "for value received," is to lose our self-respect.

Since the autonomous will is self-legislating, and exercises its causality un influenced by anything except itself, it is free. Freedom, we should note, is not lawlessness or caprice but the ability of the will to be a law unto itself. Moreover, the law that the will is unto itself is expressed in the categorical imperative. The free will is always the moral will. In so far, then, as we act reasonably and morally, we act at least under the idea that we are free. We cannot feel otherwise about such action, since our reason cannot regard a rational and moral judgment as inspired by anything except itself. Deterministic acts, we feel, are an interference with reason on the part of impulse.

Since the free will is determined by nothing except itself, its acts can have no basis in the phenomenal world. They occur independently of the causation we find there. Its law of action, the categorical imperative, and the moral behavior inspired by that law, originate rather in the world of noumena that underlie phenomena, and are, in a sense, interruptions of the causal connection between sensible events. Thus, when I will do some act simply and solely because that act is right, without regard to the personal advantages or disadvantages it may have for me, then my transcendental or intelligible self, the "I," issuing from its dwelling place in the world of things-in-themselves, is descending into the phenomenal order, and determining my empirical response to the situation with which I am confronted. How this practical activity of reason—this intervention of the intelligible self in the current of sensible currents and this introduction of free acts into the linkage of physical cause and effect—is possible we cannot know. But we are always behaving as if our wills were free and could dictate their choices. Moreover, though we cannot explain how freedom is possible and why man is a moral being, we can at least defend the hypothesis on rational grounds against dogmatic skepticism. Human freedom is one of those things that can be neither proved nor disproved by argument.

Three years later Kant returned to the charge in the Critique of Practical Reason, in which he reiterated and expanded the views advanced in the Metaphysics of Morals. The will, he points out, may be determined either by the matter presented to it, or by a formal a priori nature. Determination by external objects arouses desire, the satisfaction of which gives pleasure. Determination by its own inner nature incites the will to organize the satisfactions of desire in a rational ideal of happiness in general. Each individual, in a word, naturally pursues his own private happiness. Since the private happiness of individuals differs, we cannot infer from their
different ways of pursuing the same end any general law of how all individuals should act in order to be happy. We must, therefore, look for such a law in the form or nature of the will itself, which is necessarily present in all individuals. Thus we are brought once more to the categorical imperative, and to the autonomy and freedom the will possesses when expressing itself in accordance with this general rule of conduct.9

God himself, Kant now adds, is subject to the moral law. But God is not harassed by alternative courses of action and the necessity of choosing between them. Since he cannot will other than the good, the moral law does not present itself to him as an obligation or duty but as a spontaneous rule of action— as, indeed, it would to us, were it not for the conflict between our transcendental and empirical selves. God’s will is therefore above obligation and duty. It is holy. We may remark in passing that this holiness of God bears some analogy to dignity in man for which no equivalent can be found in the values of this world and upon which no price can be set.10

Human will, however, is heteronomous, as Kant now calls it, subject to motivation by an object other than the expression of its own nature. Still, no goal save self-expression can command the will and put it under an imperative obligation. It is not our duty to be happy, but it is our duty to be good. Nay more, it is always within our power to be good, though it is not always within our power to be happy. And, once again, we do not deserve to be happy unless we are good.11

So much by way of recapitulation. Now Kant pushes forward into territory hitherto unexplored. The first thing he discovers is that practical reason is really broader than speculative reason. Speculative reason, though it assumed the existence of things-in-themselves, did not presume to tell us anything of their nature. The necessity under which it labored of using guiding ideas like God the universe, and the soul, as hypotheses for explaining the world, did, indeed, involve a belief that entities corresponding to the ideas really existed. But it left their nature entirely in the dark, since they remained wholly inaccessible to our experience. Practical reason, however, from which moral activity flows, not only assumes the existence of a thing-in-itself, or soul, behind the empirical

9 Critique of Practical Reason, pp. 126-143 (A. pp. 105-120).
to intervene in time from outside time. Can we make any sense of such a situation?

Kant thinks we can.²⁴ My present, he says, must indeed be the necessary outcome of my past. My acts are as completely determined by antecedent causes as any other natural events are. But it must be remembered that the natural order as a whole, and the nature of the entire succession of events appearing in the relation of cause and effect, rest upon a world of things-in-themselves, which condition the sensible world to be the kind of world it is. Therefore every natural event is really placed where it is and given the character it possesses, not by preceding events, but by the thing-in-itself that underlies it. In my own case, therefore, my entire career in time, although each of its moments is the outcome of what has gone before, is also conditioned to be what it is by the intelligible character I possess as a thing-in-itself, which expresses itself freely in all my actions.

Every decision and choice, then, is the child of two fathers. It is to be sure, made with respect to external circumstances, and under the pressure of external motives of one sort or another. But my act is also determined by myself, and not merely by my empirical self, which has been built up by heredity and environment, but by the transcendental self—the "I" existing outside of the sensible world in the realm of things-in-themselves. This "I" takes a hand in determining all my volitions, and, in so far as it determines that my will is said to be free, since my volition is not forced upon me by something not myself.

Hence my everyday self is not entirely the creation of antecedent conditions; it is built along lines also laid down by the way which my real, intelligible character has dealt with the world presented by sensible experience. If the nature of my real character laid up among the things-in-themselves, could be known, then all actions in all circumstances could be absolutely foretold. It should be none the less free, since my behavior, although absolutely predictable, would still be determined by myself, and would be foretold from a knowledge of my nature.

Suppose, however, we object that if we are created by a God, freedom and moral responsibility are thereby destroyed, since the God has made us what we are. To this Kant replies that the question of who made us has no bearing on freedom.²⁵ Freedom lies in


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power I have of determining my own actions. Behind that power it does not go. Although God may be responsible for my existence, it is I who am responsible for how I behave, and it is the latter responsibility alone that has moral significance.

So far, then, there is nothing self-contradictory or contrary to reason in the idea of a free will expressing itself efficaciously in the deterministic stream of empirical causation and modifying the course of events. Moreover, there is nothing in the concept or category of causation that necessarily restricts its application to phenomena alone. To be sure, only sensible events can be understood in terms of causation, and we cannot therefore understand how the will, standing outside the sensible world, nevertheless modifies it. But our inability to know how the free will operates does not warrant us in saying that it cannot be efficacious.

Now, practical reason does not pretend to any knowledge of how it will exercise its free causation. It simply asserts that such an exercise does take place. This cannot be denied on speculative grounds. As we saw, in discussing the antinomies of the understanding, there was as much and as little reason for asserting freedom as for denying it, and *vice versa*. Hence reason, since it cannot discourse freedom, cannot render the existence of moral responsibility and a moral order nonsensical. It follows that our consciousness of freedom and of the moral law is not necessarily an illusion, even from the point of view of pure reason.

In this coincidence of the actual feeling of being free and responsible with the undeniable logical possibility that we may actually be that we feel we are we find the "practical" equivalent of the deducing of the categories. Just as sense perception comes already prepared for utilization by the categories, so the experience of freedom and moral responsibility, once shown to be not necessarily an illusion, can be linked up with a universal and categorically imperative moral law.

In "deducing" the categories we had to have a *schema*. The amenability of sense experience to being thought in terms of substance, quantity, causation, and the other categories lies in certain general characteristics of continuity, persistence, invariable sequence, and the like. Evidently the *morality* of an act does not in any way depend upon temporal characteristics of this sort. Hence a moral law and moral behavior cannot be brought together by a "schema," properly speaking. Nevertheless there must be something corresponding to the *schema*; some go-between linking moral con-
The necessary go-between Kant finds in a certain *typical* form common to all our moral questionings about how to act in specific circumstances. Since this way of reaction to sensible and particular situations involving moral decisions is universal, we may call it such a law of *nature* as the temporal continuities, persistences, and sequences of sensible experience. When we ask ourselves off-hand whether an act is good or bad, we are asking whether the act is something we are willing to do, irrespective of the number of other people who are doing it. If, for instance, we found ourselves in a society or world where everyone else was committing suicide whatever would we, too, feel it right to commit suicide? If we found ourselves among people who all were given to lying when they found it to their advantage to do so, would we feel justified in following their example? Inability to acquiesce in their behavior and run with the crowd, would mean that their customs and habits were not universally applicable to all mankind. In other words, their deeds would be regarded as wrong by some people.

The empirical test, then, of the absolute *rightness* of an act would be its universal applicability to all people in all situations. "If the maxim of the action is not such as to stand the test of a form of a universal law of nature, then it is morally impossible. Such a test is completely naive. It is instinctively applied by persons who have never reflected upon moral problems, and who have no inkling of a categorical imperative or of an *a priori* universal moral law.

Here is a universal empirical test of concrete moral behavior in the everyday world, akin to the universal *sensible* characteristics, *schemata*, of sense experience. And here is a common mental ground between experience and the *a priori* moral law, akin to a *schema* linking the categories of the understanding to their sense content.

The performances of practical reason are also analogous to that of speculative reason in that they have a transcendental object. Just as our thinking about the world is governed by the idea of God, the soul, and the universe, so our moral behavior in the is governed by the idea of the good. Again, just as God, and the and the real universe underlying phenomena, cannot be known

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action, is a good feeling, it is a feeling that can be desired and loved. Hence duty is not grim. Respect for the moral law may also be love of the moral law. In fact, if we are not to be merely and grimly virtuous, we must love the moral law as well as respect and obey it. If we love the good with all our mind and heart and strength, then we are not only virtuous but holy, even as God is holy.

Still, to fallible beings like ourselves such love is a counsel of perfection. No human being can be expected to love doing right universally and under all circumstances. Any human being who pretends that all his actions proceed from pure goodness of heart and are dictated by sheer love of humanity is a hypocrite and a fanatic. A similar hypocrisy and fanaticism is shown by anyone who applauds in others behavior accompanied by such hysterical protestations.

Finally, to complete the analogy between the active and moral side of our nature and its intellectual, thinking aspect, we discover that practical reason, like pure reason, has its antinomies. The moral good contains two elements. It involves virtue, or action in accordance with the moral law, on the one hand, and happiness, on the other. Virtue and happiness do not logically involve one another. The Epicureans and the Stoics to the contrary notwithstanding. To be happy is not to be virtuous, as the Epicureans held; neither the Stoic teaching correct that to be virtuous is to be happy. In short, the relation between the two concepts is not analytic. It is rather synthetic, and it introduces the category of causation. We regard virtue as the cause of happiness, happiness the effect of virtue.

Furthermore, consistently with the category of causation, we demand a necessary connection between reward and merit. We feel that it is morally obligatory that virtue should be rewarded with happiness and that the reward and degree of happiness should proportionate to merit. This demand is not based upon experience, which displays no such connection. Only too obviously the righteous are cast down and the wicked flourish. We are, therefore, dealing with an a priori claim of our moral nature quite as transcendental as the category of causation itself.

Here it is that the antinomy puts in an appearance. Morally speaking, happiness cannot be the motive of right or virtuous action, since action inspired by any motive except the pure right is or wrongness of the deed in question is not completely moral. On the other hand, happiness is not an unfailing result of virtuous action, as we have just noted. Still, it happiness is neither the cause of the effect of virtuous behavior, and virtuous behavior is neither the cause nor the effect of happiness, then our moral demand that there shall be a necessary connection between the two is incomprehensible and irrational, and the moral law, of which that demand is a part, is self-contradictory and false.

To overcome this apparent self-contradiction in the moral order we must investigate the situation more carefully with a view to detecting some possibility, hitherto overlooked, of establishing a necessary, causal connection between virtue and happiness. We have already seen that, though virtuous behavior does not result in pleasure but often in the reverse, it is nevertheless accompanied by a feeling of self-approbation, or contentment, which motivates behavior such as prospective pleasure does. This contentment, however, is largely negative in content. It lies in a sense of independence on sensible desires and pleasures. Moreover, it is not unbroken. It is troubled by the solicitations of the senses and is maintained only by the moral struggle. It does not arise from a continuous and complete satisfaction of the will with the moral law.

In God, however, we can conceive a contentment which is positive in character, which does not lie in a feeling of independence on sensible desires and pleasures (since God is without them), and which accompanies the complete and undisturbed union of the moral law with the divine will. Such a state we call bliss, and we find a foreshadowing of it in the peace that right action bestows on us. That we can conceive of such a condition shows us that, although the idea of virtue does not logically imply the idea of happiness vice versa, the two ideas do not exclude one another. It is not contrary to reason to imagine a state of human affairs in which virtue and happiness go hand-in-hand. When we dream of an ideal world, we picture to ourselves such a connection. And the consummation of our moral demands, so devoutly wished for, is not logically impossible, even though it is not accomplished in this world.

By showing that there is nothing illogical or impossible in the moral demand that virtue shall be rewarded, we have taken our first step towards solving the antinomy of practical reason. The second last step Kant accomplishes with the aid of our old friends, God, freedom, and immortality. He invokes their aid as moral justificatives because, though their existence cannot be proved on rational grounds, it cannot be disproved. Practical reason, therefore,
has a right to accept them on practical grounds, and not only do this right become a necessity if we are to solve the antinomy, but the assumption of their existence proves to be the solution.

We have already seen how morality is impossible unless freedom is real. We have now to discuss the role played by immortality. Perfect happiness is only deserved by perfect holiness; that is, it will unreservedly and spontaneously in love with the moral law of whose volitions proceed from pure goodness of heart unclouded by ulterior motives of any sort. For human beings to attain the complete accord between the will and the moral law an inward progress towards perfection is necessary, and such progress requires an endless duration of our moral personality. No one in the framework of this life can possibly prepare himself to deserve happiness and therefore cannot be justly rewarded with it. A God who has bestowed it upon us in recompense for our earthly labors only would be not just but indulgent.

Provided, then, that we can assume immortality, we can see in the identification of virtue with happiness, necessary to the solution of the antinomy, is not only logically but empirically possible, besides being a conceivable state of being, it is also a state that we conceivably might actually attain, given sufficient time to do so. But to convert this possibility into an actuality something more than ourselves is necessary. Since observance and love of the moral law are plainly not rewarded by happiness in this world, we are obviously incapable by our own efforts of creating a world in which this blessed event occurs. We can only do our best to further the moral order, and, indeed, it is part of the moral order that we should endeavor to promote it. But if the moral ideal is to be practical, and if our effort to attain it is to have any chance of success, any meaning, there must be a principle that guarantees the possibility of our realizing it and that provides us with the infinite necessary for its realization. In other words, there must be a being in whom the ideal after which we strive has an existence, a being who is able to create a universe in which we, also, in due time, will be able to attain it and to partake of his holiness and bliss as just reward of our merits.

We may now sum up the situation. Just as we should be confronted with a world that could not be made intelligible if we were unable to solve the antinomies of pure reason, so, unless we can overcome the practical antinomy of being forced by the moral obligation both to assert and to deny a moral government of the world we should be confronted with a universe that could not be moralized. Without God, freedom, and immortality, the practical antinomy cannot be solved, and the universe eternally defeats our ideals and aspirations. On the assumption that they exist, the difficulty is overcome, and the universe becomes an order in which the moral law has meaning, and the attainment of the goal of our moral striving is guaranteed. In the conclusions to which we are driven by logic and reason there is nothing to disprove or discredit the validity of these postulates or assumptions, which are indispensable to moral action. Indeed, the very same postulates are also the guiding ideals of our metaphysical speculation, which is always seeking, though unsuccessfully, to prove that they rest upon actual facts. In a word, the possible existence of God, freedom and immortality is admitted and indicated by pure reason, by which rational thinking is directed; their real existence is demanded by practical reason, by which rational conduct is governed. Hence we are entitled to believe that they exist.

Kant, however, hastens to point out that it is not our duty to postulate their existence. In other words, there is nothing immoral about disbelieving in God, freedom, and immortality. Here, perhaps, we are hitting at the popular superstition, of which he must have had his fill in his Nietzschean childhood, that atheism and a denial of freedom and immortality are wrong and a sign of moral turpitude. Nor can he have failed to see that intolerance and persecution, from which he himself had suffered, have their true root in the propensity of human beings to condemn as immoral opinions with which they disagree. Duty and morality, Kant continues, oblige us only to do our best to promote a connection between happiness and virtue and to deal justly with our fellow-men, even though we feel that in the universe in which we find ourselves our efforts can never be crowned with complete success. The assumption that, thanks to God, freedom, and immortality, our obedience to the moral law, imposed alike upon believers and disbelievers, the religious and the irreligious, has a cosmic meaning and justification, can never be more than a matter of individual faith.

We are now able to see wherein the ancient systems of ethics failed. The Greeks were in error in that they felt that man by his own unaided efforts and within the span of his earthly life could attain happiness through the practice of virtue. The Stoics laid too much stress on virtue to the exclusion of happiness. Christianity, 18 Op. cit., pp. 290 ff. (A. pp. 242 ff.).
however, gives us an adequate morality, stressing as it does the dependence of happiness on moral worth, and prescribing holiness as an end in itself, to be sought disinterestedly without eye to a possible reward. That reward is something for which we can only hope. Ethics first and foremost teaches us, not how to make ourselves happy, but how to act in such a way that we may deserve happiness. Nor is any ethics sound in which the element of worth and merit does not play the leading and determining part.\(^\text{15}\)

Kant brings his Critique of Practical Reason to an end with a warning that we must not regard the practical necessity of assuming God, freedom, and immortality as in any way a theoretic or metaphysical argument in favor of their existence. From the point of view of metaphysics the question remains wide-open. All the speculative philosopher can learn from an observation of moral conduct is that these entities, which for him are purely conceptual, are treated in our moral practice as concrete objects; nay more, that moral conduct is without sufficient sanction unless they have concrete existence.

The philosopher, however, learns nothing more than he already knew—or did not know—about the nature of God, freedom, and immortality, from the fact that their existence is a necessary moral postulate. To be sure, conceived in the interests of practical reason, God is thought of as an omniscient, omnipotent, and beneficent willing and thinking being, but these notions of the divine nature which fit our moral needs, in no way constitute a knowledge of what God is really like. Our sensible experience goes on just the same as ever. The categories continue to function as usual. The universe created by their interaction still veils forever from our knowledge the face of things as they are in themselves.

**XII. "CRITIQUE OF JUDGMENT"**

The true and the good are now disposed of. The beautiful also remains to be considered. Kant tackles it in the *Critique of Judgment*, published in 1790.\(^\text{20}\) Our judgments of taste, which distinguish the beautiful from the non-beautiful, are not, Kant tells us, logical or objective in character. They do not add to our understanding or enlarge our knowledge of objects. Nor have they anything to do with the moral judgments we pass upon things. They deal merely with a certain sort of interest and satisfaction my representations arouse within me. That is, their content is subjective. Furthermore, no interest that provokes them is distinguishable from every other interest, and, if they are to be valid, must be kept unadulterated. The moment that I allow moral prejudices, or practical needs, or intellectual considerations, to influence my estimate of a work of art, my judgment is not a purely esthetic judgment, but is clouded by irrelevant elements. “Everyone must admit that a judgment about beauty, in which the least interest mingles, is very partial and is not a pure judgment of taste. We must not be in the least prejudiced in favor of the existence of things, but be quite indifferent in this respect, in order to play the judge in things of taste.”

In short, the satisfaction we take in beauty is a disinterested satisfaction. We like the beautiful object, not because it procures us further sensuous gratifications, or excites moral approbation, or increases our knowledge, but simply because its immediate presence pleases us in itself.

At the same time, although esthetic satisfaction is subjective, we attribute to it a universality that we do not attribute to other purely subjective feelings. The pleasure, for example, that we take in a certain dish or in a certain wine we should not dream of imputing to everybody. That I prefer a cocktail made with gin is no reason why you should not prefer one made with rum or whiskey. But if I consider a picture or a statue beautiful, I expect you to share the pleasure I take in it, and to agree with me as to its beauty. And yet I cannot exactly say that you ought to agree with me, as I could, were I inviting your attention to some scientific concept I considered true, or to some moral concept I considered good. Here, then, we have something very strange, something that is at once purely subjective and yet universal, and something that is universal and yet not a concept or general idea of anything, but a feeling pure and simple. How can this be?

We can best answer this question by further examining the nature of the universal “feel” of beauty common to all those who experience it. In the presence of the beautiful object we have a sense of purposiveness, as Kant calls it. We feel that some aim or purpose has been satisfied. Our will comes to rest just as it does when we have finished a good dinner or have accomplished something we wished to do. Beauty is, therefore, a satisfaction and fulfillment of the will. Nevertheless, and this is highly paradoxical, it is impossible
to discover any sense of unfulfilled desire or specific and conscious purpose that the sense of beauty satisfies. When we come upon lovelyness, the vision is not an answer to some question, not the object of some quest. It does not represent the realization of some aim or the attainment of some goal which we have deliberately set before ourselves. We have not wished or willed anything, in spite of our feeling that a demand of our will has been pacified. Our state of mind, then, is a consciousness of "purposiveness" without consciousness of purpose; a state associated with willing, and yet a state to which volition has not contributed, and in which desire and aim have played no part. It is the smile without the Cheshire cat.

This paradoxical feeling of fulfilled purpose in which no purpose has been fulfilled constitutes the universal element in beauty. We do not expect everyone at a dinner party to find the same dishes delicious, and we do not reproach them with want of taste for preferring a red wine to a white, or a still wine to champagne. But we do expect everyone to respond in the same way to the beauty of the china or the glass or the linen, and to catch his breath with the same sense of satisfying desire without feeling it, and of "purposiveness without purpose," that we felt when we first spied and bought these lovely things. And if our guests fail to respond, we do reproach them with lack of esthetic taste.

Furthermore, the disinterested, impractical, contemplative sense of beauty is not built up out of repeated experiences of beautiful objects, any more than the category of causation is derived from repeated sequences of events. It is a priori. Unless it were so, we could never judge any object to be beautiful; just as without the a priori category of causation we could never judge events, no matter how often repeated in the same sequence, to be causally connected. Again, the charm and the emotional appeal of objects adjudged beautiful are not part of their beauty and vitiate any esthetic judgment they are allowed to influence. Nor has beauty anything to do with the perfection of an object. Perfection in an object implies realization by it of a specific form or ideal, and our judgment of its perfection means a recognition on our part of the ideal to which it should or does conform. The feeling of perfection, arising as it does from the object's fulfilling specifications laid down beforehand, is not the same as the feeling of beauty which "presupposes no concept of what the object ought to be."

At the same time, judgments of perfection may be accompanied by judgments of beauty that in a way depend upon them. The appeal, for example, of a human being or a building makes to the esthetic sense is inseparable from our concept of the specific form or purpose a man or a church or a house ought to embody. Beauty so conditioned is called by Kant "dependent beauty." Such beauty is not "free," and our appreciation of it is not entirely and strictly esthetic. "Free beauty" is unadulterated with awareness of any purpose whatever. An instance of it is the beauty of flowers. "Hardly anyone but a botanist knows what sort of thing a flower ought to be; and even he, though recognizing in the flower the reproductive organ of the plant, pays no regard to this natural purpose, if he is passing judgment on the flower by taste." So also "foliage for borders or wall-papers mean nothing in themselves; they represent nothing—a no object under a definite concept—and are free beauties." The judgment that they are beautiful is a pure esthetic judgment into which no extraneous considerations enter.

Again, the moment we try to construct a standard or ideal of beauty by which to judge, we are fettering our esthetic judgments with non-esthetic conditions. "An ideal of beautiful flowers, of a beautiful piece of furniture, of a beautiful view," or, in other words, of free beauty, "is inconceivable." No less so is an ideal of a beauty dependent on definite purposes, e.g., of a beautiful dwelling-house, a beautiful tree, a beautiful garden," whose justification and therefore whose "dependent beauty" lie in subservience to some external end. Man, however, who is an end in and for himself, is "susceptible to an ideal of beauty," and he "alone of all objects in the world" is so. But this ideal is not purely esthetic, since the beauty of the human being is not only an expression of the norm and idea of his species, but involves also a transmission of high moral qualities—"goodness of heart, purity, strength, peace, etc.—visible, as it were, in bodily manifestation." The fact, therefore, that we can have an ideal of human beauty only goes to prove "that a judgment in accordance with an Ideal of beauty is not a mere judgment of taste."

To return, however, to beauty in itself. Another mark of its universal and a priori character is the sense of necessity connected with it. The pleasant actually and as a matter of fact excites pleasure. But the beautiful we think of as having a necessary reference to satisfaction." It must satisfy. This necessity, however, is not grounded either in the sensible content or in the intelligible form of experience. It is not inferred from complete agreements as to the
beauty of this or that object—agreements which simply do not exist. Neither is it imposed by any general rule which we can recognize and state. We have no concept of the beautiful but only a feeling which we call taste. It must, then, be a purely subjective necessity, which we can only describe and talk about by saying that we all possess a common sense or sensibility to whose authority we can appeal in judging that this or that object is beautiful and that this sense is, therefore, a possible source of aesthetic pleasure to all men in all times and places. That some people do not get aesthetic satisfaction from an object we feel to be beautiful is, we say, a reflection, not upon its beauty, but upon their sensibility.

The sublime is like the beautiful in that it is pleasant in itself and that the satisfaction it brings is neither intellectual, moral, nor sensual, but sui generis. The feeling of sublimity, however, is connected with boundlessness, whereas the feeling of beauty is connected with proportion. The sense of beauty, Kant adds, stands to sublimity as the formal and definite concepts of the understanding stand to the more abstract and transcendent ideas of pure reason. Again, whereas the sense of beauty is disinterested, the feeling of sublimity positively defies and violates our sensible and imaginative interests. It overwhelms us with a size and might that neither our senses nor our imaginations can cope with. It agitates the will instead of pacifying it, as beauty does.

If we seek further to describe the sublime, we can say “the sublime is that in comparison with which everything else is small.” It is that which defies and exceeds sensible and intelligible representation. It is a sort of imaginative transcription of the idea of infinity. Since nature does not present us with experiences of infinity, she, with definite and orderly events, natural objects cannot be said to be in themselves sublime. In themselves they are only beautiful. Their sublimity is imparted to them by the notion of infinity also aroused in us by the more terrible, the more ineradicable, and the more chaotic and the more desolate aspects of the natural scene.

Again, in the presence of the sublime we experience both pain and pleasure at the same time. The sublime makes us feel at once big and little. It impresses us with our smallness and our helplessness and reveals the inability of our imagination to compass the immensity of the totality of existence. It fills us with awe at the vanity of our attempts to withstand the irresistible forces of nature. In a word, it humilates our sensible and finite nature. Nevertheless, we should not feel this sense of abasement and of awe unless our reason was able to entertain the idea of the totality of existence, to contemplate the infinite, and to recognize that it itself dwells in the secret place of the Most High, whence all this immensity and all this power flows. If we did not possess a rational as well as a sensible nature, we should feel merely crushed and terrified.

But since we are rational beings, the humiliation of our sensible nature is also an exaltation of our rational nature, and brings us a feeling of self-respect and satisfaction. In this way our pain at the powerlessness of the imagination to picture the ideas entertained by reason is transmuted into a pleasure engendered by the feeling of the power and the majesty of our higher selves. Reason is at home with infinity. It is not deafened by the voice speaking from the whirlwind and thundering “Where wast thou, when I laid the foundations of the world?” In their presence it feels, not terror but awe, not littleness but greatness, not humiliation but pride. The very essence of the sublime lies in its contrasting the inability of sense and imagination with the ability of reason to cope with existence.

Incidentally Kant attacks Burke’s work On the Sublime and Beautiful. Burke’s physiology and psychology of esthetic experience, he feels, are indeed a penetrating and beautiful analysis of the subject. But they are too empirical, and they fail altogether to account for the universality of the sense of beauty and for the feeling that there is a common standard of taste to which men ought to conform. Without a priori principles we “could not possibly pass sentence on the [esthetic] judgments of others,” nor could we “approve or blame them with any appearance of right.” In aesthetics, as in gastronomics, it would be a case of “chacun à son goût.”

We now begin to hear the familiar clicking of the Kantian machine. The feelings of beauty and sublimity, being a priori, must, like the ideas, the categories, and the categorical imperative, have an inductive that finds something in the nature of experience itself already congenial to their universal and necessary application to sensible phenomena. For the sublime no such deduction is possible; since sublimity is, properly speaking, not referable to natural objects in themselves, which are always formed and finite, but arises rather from our power to entertain ideas that the sensible world is inadequate to represent. Still, this inability of the sense and the imagination to picture ideas that the mind can entertain is as universal as the schema of sense experience. Therefore, it affords the same support to universal and necessary judgments of sublimity, as,
say, the invariable sequences of events afford universal and necessary judgments of causation.

Beauty, however, which, unlike sublimity, is referred to external objects and not merely to our feelings, requires a real and more complicated deduction. In it's case, we have to find something in the positive content of experience corresponding to the universal a priori validity and necessity of our esthetic judgments. To discover this characteristic, let us first review the peculiarities of these judgments. We begin by noting that when we judge an object to be beautiful we “assert its proper claim to satisfy everyone.” Here it differs from judgment of pleasurableness, which makes no such claim, since what is pleasurable to one man may be distasteful to another. At the same time, we can never prove empirically the validity of esthetic judgments. If you do not see beauty where I see it, I cannot demonstrate that I am right and you are wrong. Nevertheless, in spite of your disagreement, I still persist in thinking the object in question beautiful in itself.

Finally, esthetic judgments always refer to particular objects, not to classes of things. I say that such and such a flower is beautiful, not that all flowers are beautiful. If I assert the beauty of all flowers, then I am making a logical judgment, which is founded on a host of prior esthetic judgments that each individual member of the class is a thing of beauty. But even so, such a judgment does not guarantee that every flower I run across in the future will be beautiful, as the judgment that all things have causes guarantees causal connection in all things to come.

In a word, there is no objective principle of beauty in the sense that there is an objective principle of causation. The principle of beauty is subjective. It lies not in any claim that I can make upon all objects, but upon a claim I can make of all subjects in the presence of a given particular object. I cannot demand of all flowers that they shall be beautiful, but I can demand of all men that they shall find beauty in this individual flower.

What, then, is there in a particular flower that supports this demand? How “merely from our own feeling of pleasure in an object independently of its concept,” can “we judge that this pleasure attaches to the representation of the same object in every other subject, and that a priori without waiting for the accordance of others”? To answer these questions we must return to the “purposiveness without purpose” that lurks at the heart of everything beautiful.

This “purposiveness,” this ability of the beautiful object to satisfy the will without having aroused any previous desire or purpose calling for satisfaction, indicates that sense and imagination are able to present their content spontaneously and freely, already conforming to the law and order which the mind, deliberately and with conscious purpose, seeks through the categories to impose upon the possible manifold. In short, the beauty of sense experience is a kind of spontaneous and innate rationality exhibited without the aid or intervention of the categories of the understanding. Since every rational being is capable of recognizing and deriving pleasure from this “free,” “uncategorized” exhibition of rationality in sensible representations, we may properly demand of him that he feel it when we feel it. Even if he does not feel it, we may still maintain the universal validity of this pleasure, perceived as mentally and up with the mere judgment upon an object,” and we may assert that judgments of taste express universal rules of judgment and are valid for everyone.

In order to “rightly impute to everyone the pleasure or the subjective purposiveness of the representation,” we must, to be sure, assume a uniformity in human nature which enables us to communicate our judgments to others, and to expect that others will assent to them. And in our communications and expectations we must not go beyond purely esthetic judgments and confuse them by the introduction of logical concepts, as we should do if we ourselves judged, demanded that others should judge, all flowers to be beautiful. We can confuse them by the introduction of particular sensa-
tions, as we should if we judged and expected others to judge that a taste of garlic was universally pleasurable. Subject to these two conditions, a deduction of esthetic judgments is even easier than that of the categories of the understanding, “because it has no need to justify the objective reality of any concept, . . . but only maintains that we are justified in presupposing universally in every one of those subjective conditions of the judgment which we find in ourselves, and further, that we have rightly subsumed the given object under those conditions.”

We are entitled, Kant thinks, to assume the existence of a comparable, common esthetic sensibility as part of the common sensibility, or “common sense,” which enables us to communicate sensations of any sort to one another. It is as much a part of the a priori structure of the mind as the categories or the ideas, and the judgments founded upon it have the same authority as those pro-
nounced by the understanding or by reason. Only, whereas the under-
standing and the reason create a common and communicative
world by imputing objectivity to phenomena, esthetic taste creates
it by imputing to each one of us the common subjective thrill and
satisfaction felt by all of us in their presence.

As a matter of fact, esthetic satisfaction is rarely experienced in
a pure state. Ordinarily it is mixed up with the social feeling of
necessity of actually communicating it to other people. A beauty
that we cannot make other people feel is cold comfort, how-
ever it may thrill us. Again, esthetic judgment is prejudiced by the
considerations of propriety, as, for example, by the discovery that
we took to be a natural flower is an artificial one, or by moral or
intellectual interests, or by charm.

So far, Kant has been only considering the beauty of nature. Now
he takes up the beauty of artificial objects and the subject of art.
Art, to be true art, must avoid all appearance of purpose, and as
at giving the same sense of "purposiveness without purpose
pleases us in the natural object. This is paradoxical, since art may
deliberately purpose this avoidance, and we on our part demand
"beautiful art must look like nature, although we are conscious
it as art." To be able to do this and avoid the appearance of such
a mark of genius on the part of the artist. Artistic genius is an
original capacity, "not a mere aptitude for what can be learnt by rule.
It produces spontaneously, and without consciousness of the orig-
inal ideas. Its works, while sufficiently true to nature as not to
nonsense, are not merely imitative of nature, but set up standards
taste and rules of esthetic judgment valid for other people. Artistic
genius is, then, the creative counterpart of the receptive faculty of
esthetic taste. It can produce what people with a sense of beauty
are able to appreciate.

Kant sums up the difference between natural and artificial beauty
by saying that the one "is a beautiful thing," the other "a beautiful
representation of a thing." It follows that, whereas in order to judge
of natural beauty I need not have beforehand a concept of what
of thing the object is to be, "in judging of artificial beauty the re-
ception of the thing" or "concept of what the thing is to be must be
taken into account." I must know, that is, what the artist is trying
to portray.

In the production of beauty art has one paradoxical advantage over
nature. Nature cannot make a thing both beautiful and good
at the same time. But "beautiful art shows its superiority in this
that it describes as beautiful things which may be in nature ugly
or displeasing. The Furies, diseases, the devastations of war, etc.,
may [even regarded as calamitous] be described as very beautiful,
they are represented in a picture. There is only one kind of ugliness
which cannot be represented in accordance with nature, without
destroying all esthetical satisfaction and consequently artificial
beauty; viz., that which excites disgust." Sculpture, moreover, "be-
cause in its products art is almost interchangeable with nature, ex-
cludes from its creations the immediate representation of ugly ob-
jects . . . and permits [all such things] to be represented only by
an allegory or attribute that has a pleasing effect."

The creative genius of the artist has always to be checked by the
esthetic taste he shares with his public, if the beauty of his work
is to be communicable to others. He must, so to speak, keep
holding off from his work, as he produces it, and keep appraising
with his own esthetic judgment. He must be a spectator as well as
a creator. He must also combine imagination with understanding.
It gives to concepts and ideas, which the understanding uses only
as means of knowledge, an added aura and iridescent character of
esthetic value common to all men possessed of taste. It is his business
to express the ineftable element in the state of mind implied by a
star representation and to make it universally communicable—
whether the expression be in speech or painting or statuary."

In doing this, the artist, in so far as he is a genius, sees something
new in things, which has never been seen before. He has "a faculty
of seizing the quickly passing play of imagination and of unifying
it in a concept" that is "original and discloses a new rule that could
not have been inferred from any preceding principles or examples."
His vision is free and spontaneous, undetermined by anything ex-
cept himself, and its result is unique and not to be reduplicated. His
work cannot be successfully copied or imitated by other geniuses,
but it may be an inspiration to the exercise of their originality.

Of all the arts, Kant ranks poetry highest because of its superior
power of expanding "the mind by setting the Imagination at lib-
erty," and of strengthening the mind "by making it feel its facul-
ties, spontaneous, and independent of natural determination—of
considering and judging nature as a phenomenon" in other ways
than those founded on sense and understanding. After poetry comes
music. "For, although it speaks by means of mere sensations without
concepts, and so does not, like poetry, leave anything over for reflec-
tion, it yet moves the mind in a greater variety of ways and more
intensely, though only transitorarily.” It is the language of the heart. Its mathematical structure is, as it were, its grammar, but “in its charm and mental movement produced by music, mathematics has certainly not the slightest share.” For this reason, from a cultural point of view, in which appeal to the understanding is dominant, music occupies a low rank “because it merely plays with sensations.

Furthermore, music has the disadvantage of obtruding itself upon us whether we like it or not. We can turn our eyes away from a picture we do not like, but we cannot stop our ears against noise. The musician is like a man who by pulling “his perfumed handkerchief out of his pocket attracts the attention of all around him, even against their will and ... forces them, if they are to breathe at all, to enjoy the scent”—a habit, Kant adds drily, which for the reason “has gone out of fashion,” and, we might say, with the advent of radio is now-a-days once again all the rage. Among the fine arts, Kant gives the palm to painting, partly because in the art of delineation it lies at the root of all the other fine arts, and partly because it can penetrate much further into the region of Ideas, and can extend the field of intuition [sensible representation] in conformity with them further than the others can.

At this point, the Kantian machine begins once more to whirl and turns out an antinomy. We do, and yet we cannot, dispute about taste. We do, and yet we cannot, claim for our aesthetic judgment the necessary assent of others. For, to impose our aesthetic views on others, we must convince others that we are correct, and to convince we must bring forward “objective concepts as grounds of the judgment.” But the very fact that others do not share our aesthetic views and that they need to be convinced arises from the absence of any objective concepts that we can bring forward. The antinomy resolves itself, therefore, into the following dilemma: On the one hand, aesthetic judgments do not imply objective standards, since, if they did, any dispute about them could be settled by argument and proof. On the other hand, they do imply objective standards, since, if they did not, we should never even think of disputing about them or of expecting others to share our views.

This antinomy, however, like the antinomies of pure and practical reason, can be solved. Esthetic judgments do imply the existence of a standard, and do involve a general concept—the concept of a subjective feeling of purposiveness experienced in the presence of a beautiful object. This subjective attitude we may, therefore, reasonably expect of others. Moreover, since we feel it to be a universal characteristic of all esthetically sensitive minds, we deny taste to those who do not evince it, and dispute the taste of those who do not feel as we do.

At the same time, this concept or standard does not acquaint us with any quality in things that can be known or proved. My feeling that a thing is beautiful does not demonstrate that the thing is beautiful in itself. Therefore, if we do not find it beautiful, I cannot convince you that it is beautiful by logical argument or by any definition of beauty in general to which the object conforms. I cannot dispute, I can only deplore your absence of taste and regret your inability to find beautiful what I find beautiful.

In short, the general concept of the feeling of purposiveness affords sufficient ground for asserting the validity of aesthetic judgments, but insufficient ground for proving, though not for feeling, that some display better taste than others. We may then quarrel over taste, although we cannot effectively dispute about particular tastes. The only way I can bring you to share my point of view is not by argument, but by educating your taste till it agrees with mine.

XIII. “CRITIQUE OF JUDGMENT” (CONTINUED)

Purposiveness plays so central a part in Kant’s esthetics that it is not surprising that he should devote the latter half of the Critique of Judgment to a discussion of teleology and purpose in general. He begins to veer in that direction towards the end of the first division of the work. The beauties of nature, he tells us, suggest that “beyond the production of the beautiful there is an Idea of the beautiful in the producing cause; viz., a purpose in respect to our Imagination,” just as the existence and order of nature suggest the Idea of a God as a reason for the presence of the universe. Still, there is much in nature that suggests, not a teleological, but a mechanical explanation of the occurrence of beautiful forms. This, taken in connection with the principle of not multiplying principles beyond necessity and with the purely subjective character of esthetic judgments, precludes us from using esthetic experience as an argument for the teleological constitution of the universe.

There is, however, reason for believing that in the supersensible world, esthetic, logical, and moral judgments have a common, though unknown, ground. The beautiful is closely allied to the good and the true. Beauty ennobles and elevates the mind above the pleasures of the senses. It is intelligible. It brings an immediate
satisfaction which is an end in itself. The satisfaction it bestows
like moral satisfaction, disinterested. It betokens freedom of im-
mentation. It is universal. All these characteristics point, like the
moral law and the activities of pure reason, to a transcendent source
numbered among the phenomena of themselves in the things-in-themselves in glory everlasting.

We pass now to Kant’s critique of teleological judgment, which
deals with the scope and validity of purpose as a principle of ex-
planation. Kant warns us at once against an undue extension of our
explanation to everything and anything. There is nothing, he tells
us, in “the universal Idea of nature, as the complex of objects or
sense” to warrant our jumping to an all-embracing teleological con-
clusion. And, of course, it is quite out of the question to intro-
volute purposes into the world of phenomena, as we know nothing. Still, the purposive and teleological arrangement
phenomena is a valuable and fruitful method of approach to an under-
standing of them, and therefore deserves a careful analysis.

We have already noted the “purposiveness without purpose”,
characteristic of esthetic pleasure. The unthought satisfaction gained
the will by beauty suggests, as we have just said, that perhaps beau-
tiful objects are produced by nature in order to please us. Or are
we find certain things in nature useful means to attaining our con-
scious purposes. Even mathematical principles and figures are very
handy for helping us solve many problems both theoretic and prac-
tical. Such pleasurable and usefulness are, however, entirely sub-
jective and purely formal and relative to ourselves. “It is I that intro-
duce the purposiveness.” We could not possibly argue from pur-
posiveness of this sort that the explanation of the beauty of a
flower is the esthetic satisfaction it produces in me, or that the rea-
son for mathematics is its usefulness to a bank-teller or an
accountant. If we are to take teleology seriously, we must suppose
to be objective and material and to rest upon ends which are not
determined by our particular conveniences and pleasures, but are
part of nature herself.

It is possible to conceive such ends, and to conceive them in
of two ways. We may either think of natural processes and even
as means to the attainment of ends external to themselves, or
may regard natural products as possessed of an inner purposiveness
of their own, by which the organization of their parts is explained.
Such products would have the reason for their existence and na-
in themselves. Their parts would exist and be what they are in or
minister to each other and to the whole of which they are the
parts.

External purposes we may dismiss at once. There is no evidence
at “the things of nature serve one another as means and purpose” and that “their possibility is only completely intelligible
through this kind of causality.” On the contrary, “nature considered
as mere mechanism can produce its forms in a thousand different ways, without stumbling upon unity in accordance with such a
principle.” Out, then, goes the argument from design, at least in its
usual form.

The case, however, is different with internal purposes. It looks
as much as if in organic beings “every part” were “reciprocally
purpose [end] and means”; and as if all the parts were “only possible
through their reference to the whole.” My heart, for example,
keeps my blood circulating, and the circulation of my blood, by
nourishing my heart, keeps it beating, and both together keep my
body going, which is in its turn the reason for the reciprocal rela-
tion between the heart and the blood stream. This interdependence
the natures and functions of the parts of an organism on each other, and their dependence on the character of the whole of which
the parts are, cannot be satisfactorily explained by our minds
mechanical grounds. They cannot be regarded as the blind effect
preconditions, but must find their reason in some influence exer-
cised by the form of the body as a whole upon the formation
of its parts. In an organism “nothing is vain, nothing without
purpose, or to be ascribed to the blind mechanism of nature.”

Still, the fact that we seem to be driven to teleological explana-
tions and must invoke purposes as causes in dealing with biological
phenomena does not entitle the scientist to draw teleological conclu-
sions about the behavior of nature as a whole. It may inspire
him, indeed, to dramatize the purely mechanical and physical in
terms of the biological and the purposive, and to speak of “the wis-
dom, the economy, the foresight and the beneficence of nature.”
but these are mere figurative expressions. By using them the scien-
tist is not asserting that nature is really an intelligent being and not
mechanism, or even that she is the work of a divine intelligence.
It is merely saying that so much of nature as he regards as ma-
ner in substance and mechanical in operation—and it is his duty
for the scientist to reduce everything he possibly can to terms of mat-
and mechanism—happens to work in a way that works out very
well for us. We get on very well with the machine. It grinds out,
not only ourselves, but quite tolerable and often very advantageous living conditions for us. Hence it can be apostrophized by the scientist as wise and good.

The philosopher, however, may take up the tale at the point at which the scientist lets it drop. He may estimate the relative values of the teleological and the mechanical as principles of explanation. He may argue, if he likes, that teleological explanations go deeper than mechanical. He may assert that the inner purposiveness of nature manifested in living organisms "infinitely surpasses all our faculty of presenting the same by art," and that the possibility of explaining mechanically the external contrivances of nature regarded as purposive does not dispose of the question whether the mechanism itself may not have a final cause or purpose. But, whatever his conclusions may be, he has also on his hands a problem with which the scientist need not bother. He has got to explain how it is that the mind comes by two contradictory methods of explaining events. In short, he is confronted with an antinomy. On the one hand, a human mind is obliged to judge that "all production of material things is possible according to merely mechanical laws." On the other, it is equally obliged to judge that "some production of material things is not possible according to merely mechanical laws." 21

Before we consider this antinomy, we should remind ourselves that there is no a priori impossibility of producing organic bodies mechanically and by efficient causation. In an organic body the whole produces and determines the nature and interrelation of its parts. From the moment of conception an organism develops as a whole. In an inorganic body the nature and interrelation of the parts produce and determine the nature of the whole composed of them. We build up a machine by assembling parts already in hand. Our minds are so constituted that in explaining things we must begin with the constituent elements and, by means of synthetic judgments, combine them into wholes. They cannot begin with the synthesis and causally derive its elements from it. To the whole is, as Kant puts it, "the effect of the concurrent, motive power of the parts." 22 Our minds cannot reverse the process of explanation and understand how a body can be the efficient cause and motive power of the concurrence of the factors that enter into its constitution. The completed product comes after the process has built it up, and the whole appears after its parts have been combined. And our category of causation demands that causes should precede their effects. It is beyond the power of human minds, then, to apply the category of causation to a process in which the completed product, before it is completed, influences and directs the process of its own completion, or in which a whole, resulting from a combination of parts, nevertheless causes the parts to combine as they do.

Still, a mind differently constituted from ours might conceivably be able to understand, in terms of efficient causation alone, how an organic body determines the nature and directs the activities of its various organs, and how these organs reciprocally support and determine one another's functions. It is because a mechanical explanation of organic phenomena is not a priori impossible that our minds go on trying to understand them in terms of efficient causation, in spite of the fact that for minds like ours efficient causation will not work as an explanation.

We are, however, able to understand that the representation of a completed product does, as a matter of fact, cause and determine the process of completion, and that the representation of a whole may influence the nature and arrangement of its constituent parts. To take an example of our own, my career goes on building itself day by day in conformity with my idea of what my life as a whole should be like. The behavior that goes to complete my career, and the different episodes of which my life is composed, are indeed antecedent causes of the finished product, since they go to make it up. Different behavior and different episodes would cause a different career and a different life. Nevertheless, the very acts and episodes that cause my life to be what it is result from the way in which I represent my life as a whole. I am the producer of the history of which I am the product.

We find, then, that it is a commonplace of daily living to represent the products and effects of antecedent, efficient causes as themselves the causes of the factors by which they are produced, although we cannot possibly understand the manner in which such causation takes place. Furthermore, we find that when we do represent a product as the cause of its own production, we are talking in terms of what we call purpose, and asserting the efficacy of purposes. Since this efficacy, which is undoubtedly, cannot be reduced by our minds in terms of mechanical causation, we have simply to call it final causation, or causation exerted from the end rather than the be-

ginning—by the pull of the future rather than by the push of the past.

We return now to the antinomy. As matters stand, Kant feels, it is rooted in a confusion of the operations of the mind expressed in the guiding and regulative ideas of pure reason, such as God, the universe, etc., with those expressed in the application of the categories of the understanding to the sensible world. Judgments of the understanding that phenomena are causally connected demand that all objects and events be regarded as the necessary products of antecedent causes, and therefore as all mechanically produced. But judgments guided by the ideas of pure reason no less imperative demand that we seek a transcendent cause for the existence of the universe, whose relation to the world cannot be regarded as mechanical, since mechanical causation holds only of the relation of events occurring within the universe and capable of being understo. Final causation, however, which involves a determination of its parts by the whole, comes nearer to expressing the possible nature of the relation of the universe to its ground. Hence the reason for the existence of the world may more properly be described as purpose or final cause than as a mechanical or efficient cause.

Needless to say, reason can neither prove nor disprove the existence of a final cause for the universe. But, supposing that things themselves really were purposively connected, there would be contradiction in their appearing, under spatial, temporal, and sensible conditions, as also mechanically connected by the category of efficient cause. For, as we have just seen, efficient and final cause are so cheek by jowl with each other that it might be regarded as merely a consequence of the particular constitution of our understanding "that we have to represent some products of nature as possible according to a different kind of causality from those of the natural laws of matter, namely, that of purposes and final causes." If, then, the really mechanical might underlie the apparently teleological, the really teleological might underlie the apparently mechanical.

Again, there is no contradiction in an object's being both mechanically and teleologically produced, if we say that its mechanical structure and behavior have the same relation to its purpose as the mechanical constitution of the universe has to the reason why there is a universe and why the universe is what it is. In short, we "judge nature according to two different kinds of principles with the mechanical way of explanation being shut out by the teleological, as if they contradicted one another," and we also "can see that the principle of a mechanical derivation of purposive natural products is consistent with the teleological, but in no way enables us to dispence with it."

We can go even further. We are not forced to content ourselves with showing that mechanism and purpose do not contradict and exclude each other as principles of explanation. We are entitled to regard them as twin expressions of one and the same supersensible explanatory principle which transcends them both. The nature of this principle, we might say, is refracted and broken in two by our minds, like white light passing through a crystal, just as the nature of things-in-themselves is colored and distorted by the forms of sense experience and the categories. Once it is so refracted, its two aspects cannot be fused again by our finite and limited understandings, and used "in the explanation of the same product of nature." Hence some production appears mechanical in character, some purposive, and we seemingly have two kinds of causation, final and efficient, on our hands. But in reality there is only one principle and one kind of production, though what the nature of that principle we cannot know, any more than we can know the nature of things-in-themselves. The antinomy is, therefore, easily solved.

In an appendix to the above discussion, added in the second edition of the Critique of Judgment, Kant pursues further the question of teleology, particularly in its relation to theology. He reiterates that the scientist can gain nothing by employing the teleological method, and that it is his business "to pursue natural mechanism, with respect to the explanation of natural products, so far as it can be done with probability." Where mechanical explanations fail, the nature should be laid to our peculiar type of mind, and should not be supposed to indicate that "it is impossible in itself" to express the efficacy of purpose in terms of efficient causation.

Since, however, minds like ours are obliged to use not only efficient but final causes in explaining the behavior of phenomena, we must introduce method into teleology, just as we do into mechanical science, and ask what a phenomenal world run on purposive lines would be like. In the first place, we see that in such an order the mechanical aspects will be regarded as means to the expression of purposes. For example, although in the realm of biology the origin and development of life in all its various species may be capable of a mechanical explanation, we cannot dodge the fact that in that mechanism has been producing organic and purposive beings...
in which the whole determines the constitution of its parts, instead of the parts determining the constitution of the whole.

Again, since the principle of economy governs teleological as well as mechanical explanation, final like efficient causes are not to be multiplied beyond what is necessary, and supernatural explanations are to be reduced to a minimum. For this reason, as well as on the ground of empirical observation, Kant rejects the traditional formation theory of heredity, according to which the whole animal is completely formed, exists in miniature in the spermatozoon. He favors, rather, the new theory of epigenesis, or gradual building up of the structure of the organism from the original fertilized ovum which is now generally accepted. "This theory regards nature as self-producing and so with the least expenditure of supernatural leaves to nature all that follows after the first beginning.

Passing now to external purpose Kant asks whether nature suggests the existence of any final purpose, at which she aims as answers that she does not. We are accustomed to say that vegetables exist for the purpose of being eaten by animals, animals for the purpose of being eaten by man, and ergo man is the purpose for which everything is a means. But, Kant points out, we can argue with Linnaeus in just the opposite way. Grazing animals exist in order to keep vegetables from being killed each other off, carnivorous animals to keep the herbivorous animals from killing off vegetables, and finally man, by killing off lions and tigers, helps keep them from eating up the cows and goats that by theirbrowse help keep the vegetables from crowding out each other. "And man, although in a certain reference he might be esteemed a purpose, yet in another has only the rank of a means."

Still, in spite of Linnaeus, and in spite of the seeming indifference and even hostility of nature to man in many respects, Kant feels that man in one sense is "not merely, like all organized bodies, a natural purpose, but also the ultimate purpose of nature here on earth; in reference to whom all other natural things constitute system of purposes." Plainly, however, nature in producing him has not aimed at his worldly happiness. She has endowed him externally with perpetual discontent and dissatisfaction, and subjected him externally to all her destructive operations. Therefore, an animal man has no prior claim over the other animals to nature's darling. It is only if we regard man's earthly vicissitude as a discipline for cultivating his higher, rational nature that we can regard him as the blessed event the whole creation groaned and travailed to bring forth. But even so, his higher nature can only be regarded as the final end of creation if we can describe it as self-justifying and a means to nothing beyond itself. Now, man actually has such a nature. He alone, in his subservience to the moral law and in the expression of his freedom in accordance with it, proves to be a self-legisiting, self-determining being whose purpose is wholly set by its own nature, and wholly realized by the free exercise of its own essential activity, altogether independent of natural conditions. He, therefore, may be regarded as the "final purpose, to which the whole of nature is teleologically subordinated."

From freedom we pass naturally to God and to such suggestions of his existence as a teleologically constituted universe may afford. On the whole, Kant agrees with Descartes, that though the order of nature justifies the concept of an intelligent cause of the world, it cannot in itself "disclose to us nothing of a final purpose of creation." But data are merely empirical, and here, as everywhere, conclusions drawn from experience are not valid beyond experience. Although, then, teleology "impels us to seek a theology, it cannot produce one." I can only suggest the existence of a supreme being as the ground of the universe, but "with all our knowledge of nature it remains undecided whether that Supreme Cause is its original ground according to a final purpose," or produces events by a "mere necessity of its nature," without our having "to ascribe to it even wisdom, much less the highest wisdom combined with all other properties requisite for the perfection of its product." Natural theology may, then, be dismissed from consideration.

The only workable theology, Kant concludes, must be founded on moral grounds. As we have just seen, we are entitled to regard man as the final purpose of a teleologically constituted universe, only because he has a moral nature. And the self-determining, self-legisiting, and self-justifying character of a moral nature is applicable to a supreme being. Attached to it such a character becomes omnipotence, omniscience, and infinite goodness and justice.

Furthermore, the supposition that the ground of all existence is moral is a necessary presupposition of the validity of our own moral activities. If it were not, the authority of the categorical imperative, the sacrifice of happiness, which is our highest natural good, purpose, to duty, and the demand that reward should be appropriated according to merit, would all be irrational, rather than expressions of reason. "Consequently we must assume a moral World-
Cause... in order to set before ourselves a final purpose consistently with the moral law; i.e., we must admit that there is a God."

However, once more it must be remembered that the necessity of admitting on moral grounds that there is a God, is not a demonstration of his existence. "The activity of a highest morally-legislating Author is, therefore, sufficiently established merely for the practical use of our Reason, without determining anything theoretically as regards its being." Moreover, we apply moral qualities to God from the analogy of our own finite experience. Nor do the thinking about God in certain ways give us any knowledge of his nature. For pure reason God still remains an idea, and an idea that is limited in its practical employment by logical restrictions. The moral argument cannot float rational self-contradictions and absurdities. It can never warrant us, for instance, in even thinking of God as a mystical being that confounds reason, or as a magnifying human being, or as a being who can be experienced and influenced, and who can influence us, or as a being who can be pleased and placated "by other means than by a moral sentiment."

The same restrictions are laid by pure reason upon practical reason's necessary assumption that we are immortal. Our liberty to go beyond reason in our belief in a future life is not license to go contrary to reason and the law of self-contradiction in our thought of what such a life may be like.

Can, then, the implications of teleology convince us of the existence of God, freedom, and immortality? On theoretical grounds and by rational arguments, no. "For the existence of the original Being, as a Godhead, or of the soul as an immortal spirit, absolutely no proof in a theoretical point of view is possible for the human Reason, which can bring about even the least degree of belief." Our religious convictions have to do with how things must appear to us, not with what they are in themselves. With regard to things as they appear to us, we may have either opinions, which are founded on empirical experience; or knowledge, which is founded on the categories of the understanding and on the objects or facts their union with sense experience creates; or faith, which for practical reason believes in objects whose existence can neither be experienced nor demonstrated. God and immortality are matters of this sort. Although we cannot be convinced on theoretical grounds of their existence, we can in a sense be convinced on practical grounds, if by conviction we mean acting as if such objects existed. Our moral life is action of this sort, and it is a permanent principle of the mind to assume as true such objects as make moral action rational and obligatory, even though they do not make knowledge of themselves obligatory or even rationally possible.

Curiously enough, freedom, the other supersensible postulate of moral behavior, is an objective reality as well, whose activity is actually displayed under the category of causation, and whose effects are empirical and observable. Although we cannot demonstrate the existence of freedom, we can experience it in ourselves. In one sense the veil separating things-in-themselves from things as they are experienced and known by the mind is rent in twain, and we can see through into the Holy of holies elsewhere forever hidden from the mind of man. "Consequently the concept of freedom... can extend Reason beyond those bounds, within which every natural [theoretical] concept must remain hopelessly limited."

Whatever we may think of the moral argument for God and immortality, it is the nearest thing to a proof we have—far nearer, for example, than the ontological and cosmological proofs and the more respectable teleological argument for the necessity of a final cause as an explanation of the natural world. At least, it lays the foundations for a theology with its "determinate concept of the supreme Cause" as moral, and for religion, with its "recognition of our duties as divine commands." For this reason alone the moral argument renders us a great service. Theology may not have any objective validity. It may not give us knowledge of any sort. Nevertheless it is useful in that it systematizes our thinking about God. Finally, although we cannot compass God with the categories of the understanding, which apply only to objects of possible experience, we may yet regard the qualities we have to attribute to him as our moral life is also to be a rational life as a kind of "cognition of God and of His Being." An ethical theology is, therefore, possible, founded on "properties and determinations of His causality merely thought in Him according to analogy." Such a theology has all the reality requisite for giving a supersensible and rational foundation to ethics and to right behavior. Conversely, ethics needs a theology, for, though the moral law can be observed without the aid of theology, we cannot see any rhyme or reason in ethical rules without invoking the final design theology contributes. To renounce theology is to renounce reason in conduct.
XIV. SUMMARY OF KANT

In taking leave of Kant we may well cast a backward look at the huge, impressionistic, complicated, rambling edifice we have just been exploring. In spite of its disjointedness, its repetitions, its waste space, its plethora of rooms and stories and staircases, its outlines are fairly simple. We have a human mind in contact with an external world of some sort. That mind is so constructed as to impress spatial and a temporal form upon the impressions it receives, and to transform those impressions into an orderly, understandable world by means of certain categories or forms of thinking. It is also able to view its own nature through these forms of sense and thought, and to conceive that nature, like the nature of the external world in terms afforded by those forms; just as a pair of colored glass imprints to our view of our own body the same tints that it gives external objects.

Furthermore, the mind is so constructed as to be forever asking and trying to answer the question "why?" and to be forever looking for reasons. The reason for the existence of the universe it finds in the supposition of an external world of things-in-themselves. The reason for the nature of the universe it finds in its own structure, by which those things are perceived and conceived. The reason for its own existence it finds in the supposition that underlying it there is a subjective thing-in-itself, just as underlying its experience there is an objective thing-in-itself. The reason for there being a world of things-in-themselves, including itself, it finds in the supposition that there is a supreme and final thing-in-itself responsible for the existence and nature of the others.

Because of the peculiar form and color imparted to experience by the particular structure of our minds, we can never know what things-in-themselves are really like. We can only know them as they appear to us and are conceived by us. For the purpose of understanding experience we can construct a system of concepts absolutely valid for all possible human experience. We can therefore have absolute scientific knowledge. But we cannot extend the concepts beyond experience, and know through what we, the world, and the reason for ourselves and for the world, are really like. We cannot have absolute metaphysical knowledge of the nature of the Real.

We are, however, not only thinking and speculating beings, looking on at the world-drama, understanding its structure, and speculating as to its final meaning and the reason for its composition. We are also actors in it, possessed of interests, and drives, and ideals, and purposes. We are wills as well as intellects. As active wills, we are the originators of our own behavior, determined by nothing except ourselves to conduct ourselves as we do, though the cues for our responses are given us by the external world. We are, therefore, not slaves of the sensible world in which we find ourselves, but free agents, able to modify our environment and to resist modification by it. Being free, we are responsible for what we do.

However, since our free-will is exercised under sensible conditions that hamper its complete and spontaneous exercise, that exercise appears as an ideal, an end to be pursued, a purpose to be fulfilled, rather than as a realized, actual fact. The necessity under which we find ourselves of pursuing and realizing it is felt by us as an obligation to free ourselves from determination by external circumstances and to do only what we will to do.

Furthermore, in so far as we are free and responsible, our activity originates not in the sensible world, each event in which has its basis outside itself in antecedent conditions, but in the unknown and unknowable world of things-in-themselves. Free-will, then, is a penetration by Reality of the veil woven across its face by the human mind. And free action is acting as if we were supersensible beings or souls, seated not in our bodies, which are parts of the sensible world, but in the supersensible realm of things as they are.

The chief and most significant theater of human behavior is human society. Our dealings with our fellow-men constitute moral action, and the attainment of the ideal way of dealing with them presents itself as a moral obligation. The ideal, or right, way of behaving towards our fellow-men is plainly indicated. Our neighbors, like ourselves, are free, self-legislating and self-determining wills that set their own purposes and seek the same liberty of self-determination and freedom from external circumstances as we do. They are ends in themselves, just as we are. Hence in dealing with them we ought to treat them as such, and not seek to make them means to the accomplishment of our ends. This obligation we may express in a supreme and universal law of action, the categorical imperative, which bids us always act in a way that we would will every other human being to act.

In other words, moral behavior proceeds not from what is personal and prejudiced and parochial in our nature; it is actuated by the voice of our universal humanity, and expresses the one thing
each one of us has in common with everyone else, the one purpose that does not clash with the purposes of others, the one end all men without exception can set before themselves. When our conduct is motivated solely by this rule, it is disinterested, without ulterior motive, and governed only by the idea of what is right. Then and only then is our will completely free, self-legislating, and self-fulfilled.

In the universe as it stands, however, action according to this rule is irrational. It is part of our moral nature to feel that we deserve to be happy if we act in accordance with the moral law, since such action is self-fulfilment, and self-fulfilment is synonymous with happiness. But in the phenomenal world moral behavior often brings us sorrow and misfortune, and self-fulfilment looks like self-defeat. To be sure, we gain self-respect by right behavior, and of self-respect nothing in this world can deprive us. Still, the fact remains that the wicked prosper and the righteous are cast down, and that the course of human affairs does not suggest that moral behavior is imperative.

Moreover, even apart from the temptations to deviate from disinterested, right action that nature places in our way, nature has given us a life too brief in duration to enable us to deserve or to attain happiness and self-realization. If, then, it is to be reasonable for us still to obey the moral law in the face of these discouraging circumstances, we must assume that our lives continue after death, and that eventually in the course of everlasting time our merit will be rewarded and we shall attain the happiness we deserve. To act morally is, therefore, to act as if we were immortal.

But even so, there is no guarantee that the same discouragement to moral action as we find in this world may not beset us in the next. Then, as now, we may find that we cannot work out our own salvation. Hence, to give point to immortality, we must assume it to be ultimately so constructed that moral action is worthwhile, and that the self-fulfilment and happiness our free and right-directed activities fail to attain in this life are attained hereafter. In other words, we must assume that there is a God. Moral action is behaving as if God exists.

Therefore, although thinking rationally can never prove the existence of God, freedom, and immortality, acting rationally or, in other words, morally, is impossible unless we presuppose that they exist. Furthermore, the impossibility of demonstrating their existence is not a demonstration of their non-existence. We have no more reason for supposing the one than the other. Hence, with the mind unable either to prove or to disprove an assumption that the will has to make, we are entitled at least to a faith, a practical certainty, that there is a God and that we are immortal. But this faith is not knowledge, is not absolute certainty. For all we can know, there may be no God, we may not be immortal, the moral law may not be binding, and action in accordance with it may not be rational.

Our sense of beauty, like the ideas of pure reason, the categories of the understanding, and the moral law, is part of our subjective structure. Unlike them, however, it does not impose objective conditions corresponding to it upon experience, or seek to impose objective conditions justifying its claims upon the world of things-in-themselves. It remains a purely subjective attitude. At the same time, it does claim a subjective universality which entitles us to expect the same thrill in all men, when confronted with an object we feel to be beautiful, as we ourselves experience. Hence we are justified in reproaching those who do not feel that thrill for their lack of taste, much as we should be justified in asserting that a color-blind person lacked a sense of color.

A distinguishing characteristic of esthetic experience is that the beautiful object satisfies us, although no previous dissatisfaction has existed. It exhibits "purposiveness without purpose," and is associated with the volitional rather than the intellectual part of our nature. Its "purposiveness" suggests the larger question of the part played generally by the purposive and teleological aspects of phenomena. Organic phenomena are not wholly explicable to our minds by the same principle of mechanical and efficient causation as the structure of our understanding imposes upon phenomena in general. Though this may be due to a fault or peculiarity in our nature rather than to an actual failure of efficient causation to cover the cases in question, the discrepancy between final and efficient causation does exist for us, and can only be overcome by supposing that neither method is more than relative to our type of mind, and that both are aspects of some higher principle of explanation whose nature we cannot know.

At the same time, the discrepancy forces us to consider the possibility of a teleological explanation of the mechanical as well as a mechanical explanation of the purposive. Such a consideration leads us to regard man, not indeed in his animal, but in his moral, nature, as the final purpose at which natural processes are aimed, and to interpret nature's indifference and even active hostility towards him
as a discipline by which his higher self is put to the test and given an opportunity for displaying and justifying itself. Extended, after the analogy of the ideas of pure reason, to the world of things-in-themselves, it suggests that the final purpose of that testing, and therefore of all creation, may be the exercise of his freedom and his self-legislation. This suggests, in its turn, that the ultimate explanation of all things may be purposive in character, and that the Reality from which both subjective and objective things-in-themselves proceed may be a divine being possessed of absolute power, wisdom, and benevolence. Once more, the moral argument for the existence of God, freedom, and immortality is the best argument we have. Ethics to have a rational basis must be founded on theology. But here, too, we must remember that moral necessities and the implications of teleology are not proof, and that a theology, though the inevitable outcome of thinking along purposive lines, remains merely a speculation about the nature of things-in-themselves, whose validity cannot be demonstrated. It may envisage practical certainties, but not absolute ones.

CHAPTER VI

FICHTE AND SCHELLING

I. MINOR SUCCESSORS OF KANT

Into the Kantian system flowed the two great streams of seventeenth and eighteenth century European thought. On the one hand, it absorbed the constructive, mathematical rationalist thinking, initiated by Bacon and followed by Hobbes, Descartes, Spinoza, and Leibnitz, all of whom believed firmly in the power of reason to solve the problems of philosophy. On the other, it received the critical, skeptical, empirical current with which Hume complacently steamed and by which Locke and Berkeley, despite incidental struggles to escape its full force, were swept along. In the great lake thus formed the empirical and the rationalistic waters, though mingled, were not entirely fused, as a certain turgidity and confusion in Kant’s system shows. Its size, however, and the extent of the watershed it drained compensated for its lack of crystal clearness, and fitted it to be the reservoir by which all subsequent philosophy has been so largely fed. So comprehensive and so profound a system could not be drained by mere evaporation. It had to overflow, and the stream of Neo-Kantianism issuing from it was to irrigate the nineteenth century. And today, at the end of the first third of the twentieth, its influence, though at the moment it has tended to seep underground, still affords a water table which the roots of no contemporary philosophy can entirely avoid.

Near its source, the force of Kant’s influence was so irresistible as to make the systems of the German Idealists, who were his immediate successors, appear little more than minor alterations of his system or an emphasis upon some one portion of his philosophy to the subordination, if not the exclusion, of the others. In reading Fichte and Hegel and Schopenhauer we shall feel, I think, as if we were at the cinema watching a moving-picture adapted from a book with which we are familiar. Some episodes have been cut, others added, a romantic interest has been introduced, the ending has been changed, with no great improvement, we may perhaps think, upon the original story; but the picture is still quite obviously not