The Old Believers and the New Religion

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For nearly two hundred years the history of the Raskol, the Russian Church schism of the seventeenth century, was a secret one. To be sure, the Old Believers wrote, and in enormous quantities, but they wrote—by hand—secret manuscripts, copied secretly and circulated secretly. And, except for official condemnations of schismatic teachings and the publication of laws directed against the raskol' Nikki, more or less serious historical investigation started only in the last years of the reign of Emperor Nicholas I and was confined to printed but highly restricted memoranda passed around in the Ministry of Internal Affairs. Even the nature and the chronology of early Raskol historiography raise questions about the nature of the schism. Why was the history of the Raskol secret for such a long time? Why were the Old Believers persecuted by the government for so long? Was it all, as the government maintained, because they were ignorant, illiterate, superstitious, fanatical, and disobedient toward the Church?

With the death of Nicholas the persecution of the Old Believers slackened, and the historiography of the schism emerged into the open. In the last century an enormous amount has been published on the Raskol—its meaning, early history, and development—and in most of this work the motivation and presuppositions are unequivocal.

First, there is the official Orthodox position, represented largely by professors at the various imperial theological academies. The historians of this "school" did excellent work in publishing the source material; their explanation of the schism and the schismatics was simple: the rejection of the Nikonian church reform in the seventeenth century was a reflection of popular (and clerical) ignorance and obscurantism, the mistaking of ritual for substance. Rejecting all progress and change, the schismatics had rejected and continued to reject legitimate authority—of the church hierarchy, on which their souls depended, and of the state as well, inasmuch as it supported the official church—sinking ever deeper into a fanaticism of either total and irreverent individualism and sectarianism or of hopeless internal theological and ritualistic contradictions. The Old Believers were impelled by a superstitious religiosity, though this basic motivation carried political overtones to the extent that the raskol' Nikki disobeyed the authorities who tried to rescue them from perdition. There is little one need say about these nineteenth-century Orthodox professors. They were convinced that the Old Believers were heretics or, at best, schismatics for rejecting the authority and legitimacy of the Church hierarchy; they published a great deal of source material, and we should not expect anything else.

Simultaneously with the Orthodox view emerged a liberal, populist position. Led by Shchapov, a whole group of historians suggested a more comprehensive explanation of the schism which produced the Old Believers. The Raskol, as they saw it, was only superficially a religious split. Religious issues provided the opportunity for the expression of social and political protest: social, against the ever-increasing importations from the West—clothes, customs, institutions; political, against the central fact of seventeenth-century Russian history—the legal in 1649 of the complete enserfment of the peasants. These historians observed that, after the first few years, the schismatics were exclusively of lower-class origin—peasants and some of the poorer townspeople—but that, rather than being the ignorant and dark element of Russia, they contained and continued to contain a much higher percentage of literate people than the Orthodox population. Hence, the Old Believers represented general popular opinion and its desire to preserve, if nothing more, popular customs and institutions against the encroachment of the centralizing and bureaucratizing state. The conception of the Raskol as social protest is shared, of course, by Soviet historians, though initially few interested themselves in this problem. But in the last fifteen years, under the impetus of the enthusiasm and erudition of V. I. Malyshev, Old Believer studies have acquired a new prominence. The chief concerns of Soviet scholars have been with the social structure and ideology of the Old Believers and with the writings of the Old Believer church fathers—Avvakum, Epifanii, Lazar', Feodor—as secular literature.

Within this historiographic context, recent American scholarship sounds a curious note. No special work on the schism as such has been written yet, but all the recent (or recently revised) general histories of Russia, of course, mention the Raskol, presenting it as the expression of Muscovite traditionalism, attention to form rather than substance, ignorance, inertia—the antithesis to the Western Reformation and its search for change.

What does it mean to speak of the Russian masses in the seventeenth century as tradition-bound? Compared with whom? Traditions are not immutable, and each age has its own. In the West as well as in the East, all Christian reform movements offered a return to the past (whatever the real motives of the movements may have been). The problem always has been which of the many pasts to defend. Why is it more "intelligent" to use three fingers in crossing oneself than two? Despite patronizing references to the "strange practices" of the Old Believers, all religious practices, or perhaps none, have "scholarly foundation"; in matters of ritual and theology a source can always be found to support one's
position, and the Old Believers could and did point to many very ancient icons showing the two-fingered sign of the cross. True, as Florinsky has stated, there seems to have been little "principle or dogma" involved, but the issue of a double or triple "hallelujah" is equal in importance to the filioque clause and the leavened-unleavened bread controversies which, supposedly, have divided the Roman and Greek churches, until today. These categories then—traditionalism, the "perfectly correct form," even national self-awareness—are abstractions which explain nothing and which, in turn, create other abstractions—the Reformation, Orthodoxy, "scholarly foundations" of ritual.

From the contributions of populists and Soviet scholars, we can derive four general observations without going into the details of the arguments. A very significant number of Russians embraced the schism—from the start, probably as many as 20 percent were Old Believers. The Raskol was most widespread in the areas where the power of the central government was less effective than elsewhere for a variety of reasons—lack of serfdom, distance, political considerations. Hence northern Russia, the Urals, Siberia, the Cossack lands, and large sections of the western frontier were overwhelmingly schismatic. Old Believers were severely, and often brutally, persecuted from the beginning of the schism until the middle of the nineteenth century. And the Raskol began in a century of profound social upheaval and tension. It is hard to find a decade of the seventeenth century which is not marked by rebellions and unrest of peasants or Cossacks, townspeople or "strelytsy." Parallelly these are the triumph of the gentry service class after the Time of Troubles, the Ulzhenie (Law Code) of 1649, which legalized serfdom, the state-church controversy of Tsar Alexis and Patriarch Nikon, and the beginning of the Petrine reforms.

In other words, the Raskol assumed huge dimensions; it was most prevalent where government authority could be most easily resisted or disregarded. It was considered a serious and major problem by the government. And there were more than enough concrete political and social reasons to account for its origins and spread. This is not to argue that the other factors in the schism—cultural tradition, theology, ritual—did not exist. But all heterodox or schismatic movements, the Raskol developed and expressed its ideality in the language of religion. This language is ours today and hence offers difficulties of interpretation. The issue is not that the Old Believers (or the Russians, or medieval man in general) necessarily thought in a manner so different from ours about politics, economics, social problems, or their life in general but that they used a particular and comprehensive vocabulary to express their thoughts. And this theological or religious language, like all language, possessed a logic of its own. And, indeed, in the course of their history the Old Believers (like the Protestants in the West) could be forced into rather radical theological views because theological terms, no matter why used, evoke theological consequences. Still, this language can be analyzed, its origins suggested, and its meaning understood in its proper context.

The Old Believers wrote about many things—details of ritual, dogma, way of life—but at all times one of their chief concerns was with authority, government, or, symbolically, the tsar. For, in the final analysis, it was the tsar, wielding absolute power over both state and church, who cut them off from the rest of society, approved their being excommunicated and even anathematized, forced them to be so different, distinct from others, and persecuted them with such violence. This strand of Old Believer thought, regarding the state and the tsar but expressed in theological terms—what one may call the political theology of the Raskol—is our theme. Our first concern, then, is with the language in which the concrete social and political problems involving imperial power were couched. Where did the Old Believers find the terms they used, what was the logic of their thought, what were the consequences of this thought, and by whom was it understood?

The obvious starting point is the religious reforms in the middle of the seventeenth century which provoked the schism—but without losing sight of the fact that correction of texts and changes in ritual began in Russia before Nikon became patriarch in 1652. In the fourteenth century, when Hesychast influence transmitted the Neoplatonic concern with words and meanings, Russia was probably flooded by corrected texts from the South Slavic lands; in the fifteenth century a Grand Prince, Ivan III, and a Metropolitan of Russia, Gerontii, clashed violently on points of ritual; and in 1551 Ivan IV (the Terrible) called together the so-called Strogalev Council to legislate reforms of morals and ritual. Finally, as N. F. Kaptorov showed some seventy years ago, a systematic program to correct liturgical texts began, probably under Patriarch Filaret in the 1620s, and at the latest under Patriarch Iosif in the 1640s; consequently, Nikon and the higher clergy in general were the executors of reforms initiated and guided by the tsar, that is, the secular government. The reform movement, in fact, was by no means monolithic, and one can distinguish three strands of reform thought and action. There were what one may call purely administrative reforms—legislation affected by the state, culminating in the article of the Ulzhenie which established the Monastyryshi Prikaz (Department of Monasteries) and which, in effect, abolished separate ecclesiastical jurisdiction and much of ecclesiastical economic power. This strand necessarily overlapped with the administrative-intellectual reform—correction or emendation of texts and ritual out of desire for accuracy and uniformity. This reform can be identified with Greek and South Russian scholars subsidized and supported by Tsar Alexis and by his chamberlain (pastel'nik), the boyar F. Ritschev, who paid for much of the research and founded a school for theological and linguistic studies. Then there were the "Zealots of Piety" (Renzitel' blagoechestia), a group of priests under the leadership of the archpriest Stepan Voiniatiev, confessor to Tsar Alexis. The concern of these priests was the moral, spiritual reform. This does not mean that they were not involved with the administrative and intellectual reforms, as in the case of the famous issue of ednoglosie, but their main efforts were directed toward improvement of public morality, toward a religious revival. Their chief vehicle, one which was dormant in Russian ecclesiastical practice, was the public sermon. In fact, the
Nikonian changes at their most vulnerable point—their scholarly foundation. The deacon Feodor pointed out that the six editions of the missal published by Nikon all differed from one another. With the best will in the world and despite the help of the monasteries of Mt. Athos, the scholars employed by Nikon could not obtain and properly date and collate all the necessary materials, and the results of their work were inevitably inconsistent. Hence, what shocked and outraged Avvakum and his followers was the arbitrariness of Nikon's despotism in matters of faith. The changes were inconsistent, confusing, wrong; yet the Patriarch threw in his whole enormous police power to enforce them against the opposition of the lower clergy. Was it all the personal whim of Nikon? Avvakum thought so at the beginning, but then found that the explanation could not suffice. The issue was whether the Nikonian reforms were necessary, and what they signified.

Inasmuch as both the Nikonians and the anti-Nikonians stood for reform to some degree, the justification for their positions had to be found in the past. For the anti-Nikonian priests, with their emphasis on the moral and the spiritual, true religious reform touched only the inner man. The past these men drew upon was the individual past, for all men really knew or could be reminded of what was good. The Nikonian reform, though, raised quite different issues. It lies outside our scope to search for the original reasons for textual and ritual emendations, but there is little evidence to support the hypothesis that the reforms were motivated by foreign policy ambitions of the Russian government. A more simple explanation may be merely the presence in Moscow of Ukrainian theologians, well trained as philologists. Concern with texts, translations, collation, and nuances was their profession, in defending Orthodoxy from Catholicism in the Ukraine. And turning their critical apparatus on Muscovite texts, they could point out many problems. Neither the problems nor the Nikonian reforms involved any principle or dogma. Both Nikon and Tsar Alexis probably thought of them, in the beginning, as at best desirable rather than vital. But how were these changes to be proven necessary, and how were they to be justified? The first principle used for justification was authority; the patriarch had the right to legislate changes in texts and rituals, and this right was confirmed by the council of 1654; the duty of his flock, and that included priests, was to obey (it was the use of this principle with all its implications of arbitrary decisions that provoked the violent hatred for the person of Nikon). At the same time, there was the legitimate appeal to the past—to the furthest past of Russian Christianity, which was Greek Orthodoxy. That past, however, was ambiguous. Nikon incurred from the dead past to the living—the Eastern patriarchs of his own day. Here came the most revealing aspect of the Nikonian reforms. For the answer from Constantineople was that the new practices conformed to the Greek practices but that no issue of dogma was involved; so that, in effect, there was no reason to forbid the traditional Russian usages. The internal logic of Nikon's legislative reforms rendered this answer unacceptable, however, exactly because the reforms were legislative. Tsar Alexis had been able to issue his new Law Code in 1649 with the rationale that the old

clerics of this group owed much of their power and influence to their effectiveness as preachers in the various churches of Moscow. The members of this group were, in effect, the founding fathers of the Raskol—reformers who were closely associated with Nikon before he became patriarch but who opposed his later reforms to the point of schism. Hence, even on a purely religious plane it is not possible to contrast "reform" and "tradition." All the parties involved, ecclesiastical and lay, were for reform of some kind or other.

Now a summary of the ecclesiastical controversy. In the first two years of his patriarchate, 1652–54, Nikon decreed changes in ritual—the sign of the cross, the number and manner of prostrations, the hallelujah glorification—and published new service books. He was opposed by the majority of the white clergy and many of the prelates. In a series of councils between 1654 and 1666 Nikon forced through acceptance of his reforms and condemnation of his priestly opponents who would not submit. By 1656 these were, apparently, very few in number—a small group of the Moscow preachers led by the archpriest Avvakum. They were severely punished and exiled, in the line of hierarchical discipline, but in the last two years of his tenure Nikon appears to have lost interest in the whole reform issue. After the abdication—or removal—of Nikon in 1658 the obstreperous priests took heart. They were allowed to return to Moscow, where they continued to argue against the ritual and textual changes and to plead with the Tsar to abolish the work of the deposed patriarch. So far, then, no issue of schism; at most, an ecclesiastical controversy and a problem of discipline—priests enjoined to obey their hierarchical superiors and the Russian Tsar. The explanation for this mildness on the part of Church and state authorities is probably in the fact that both the prelates and the Tsar were too much involved with the problem of the patriarchate—Nikon's attempts to regain his see and to involve the whole Orthodox world in this issue—to bother with a few disobedient and popular priests. As late as 1666 a council of Russian bishops offered, in effect, a compromise—it confirmed the Nikonian reforms but without condemning the earlier practices and texts and, in return, asked the Avvakumians (for so they may be called by this date) to refrain from insisting that the new practices and texts were heretical. Avvakum and his colleagues rejected the compromise, and the Patriarchal Council of 1666–67, led by the patriarchs of Antioch and Alexandria, settled the issue; the old practices and texts were proclaimed heretical, and those refusing to obey the council were anathematized. The council also insisted on secular punishment. Avvakum and his companions Feodor, Lazar, and Epifaniy (all three with their tongues cut out) were imprisoned in the far north, at Pustomorsk. In 1682 they were burned at the stake.

The schism, instituted in 1667, seems at first to have been between the Russian Church on the one side and four Russian clerics on the other. Yet by the 1680s Old Believers were spreading over much of Russia. At some points and in some ways, then, the thought of the Raskol fathers have intersected with other ideological strands within Russian society. What were the thoughts of these lonely clerics? From the beginning, of course, they were able to attack the
laws were either inadequate or no longer relevant. Nikon, and the Tsar, legislating on ritual and sacred texts, could not use this rationale. The only justification possible for religious changes was that the old ritual and the old texts were wrong; and, if wrong, they had to be condemned and forbidden. For this reason the Russian prelates had to anathematize the two-fingered sign of the cross in 1666, and the Patriarchal Council of 1666–67, in supporting Nikonian reforms, had to go on all the way and deny the legitimacy of the Sioğlav Council of Ivan the Terrible, which, too, had legislated on ritual and usage. The issue, then, was the legitimation of Church legislation parallel to that of the secular civil legislation of 1649. But, given the nature of the necessary justification for religious changes, this issue of legislation resulted not only in a reaffirmation of the ideal Christian past but also in a condemnation of the Russian historical past.

The fathers of the Raskol accepted the challenge with eagerness. Time and again they posed the confrontation: if one is to impute heresy, one must make one's choice either for the Russian past, the saints, and the Holy Council presided over by the pious and Orthodox tsar, Ivan IV, or for the despotic Nikon.

And thus they evoked the obscure doctrine of "Moscow the Third Rome" meaning to them that in the process of translato imperii Moscow was the spiritual capital of Christianity and that her unique and exclusive orthodoxy was historically proven and divinely confirmed. And, as the Third Rome was also the last, this meant that Muscovite Orthodoxy was the only currency of the economy of salvation. If Moscow were to fall from grace, betray the faith as had the first two Romes, it would mean not only the fall of Moscow as a state, as divine punishment, but the end of the whole world; a fourth Rome there could not be, and Moscow's fall would signify the end of the possibility of salvation for all men, and the coming of the last days. Both the utility and the danger of this doctrine are obvious. On the one hand, it allowed the Old Believers to dismiss the authority of the Eastern patriarchs, representatives of the Second, and fallen, Rome. On the other hand, the issue was imbued with enormous tension and urgency; one could not afford a mistake, even a temporary one, for the stakes were ultimate and the penalty irreversible.

The framework of Moscow the Third Rome, of the confrontation of Ivan the Terrible with Nikon, made the argument a historical one, over the meaning of the Russian past and the significance of the Russian present. The historical focus allowed and encouraged the expression of prejudices—dislike for the Greeks coming for aims, for the learned Ukrainians corrupted by "Latinity," and for the presence of Western foreigners of all sorts in Moscow, with their heretical religions and strange customs; all these stirred noisy argument on Russia and its religion. But within the religious controversy there seems to have been very little religion. For the Nikonians the issue was one of authority, of discipline, of the right to legislate, and how little the substance of the reforms mattered to the arrogant and obstinate Patriarch can be seen from his lack of interest in them after his first abdication in 1658. If Nikon was inconstant, the anti-Nikonians were inconsistent. For them, too, the issue seems to have been authority, the right of legislation. And the Third Rome doctrine made them peculiarly vulnerable in this respect. For what they denied to Nikon and Tsar Alexis—the right to legislate on ritual—they gladly granted to Metropolitan Makari, Tsar Ivan IV, and the council of 1551.

The problem does not end here, however, for it is clear that the Nikonians, too, accepted the doctrine of the Third Rome. Nikon used the authority of the Greeks as long as he found it useful, but after 1658 his denunciation of their corruption and hisesy more than matched that of Avvakum. True, the Greeks became Nikon's political enemies in his struggle with Tsar Alexis, but to express his enmity he used a Third Rome, anti-Greek vocabulary which was, apparently, becoming commonplace. And Alexis' view of the Greeks (and hence, of Russian Orthodoxy) was best shown at the council of 1666–67. There the Tsar learned (as did everyone else) that the patriarchs who condemned Nikon, confirmed Nikon's reforms, and anathematized the Old Believers were—both Macarios of Antioch and Paisios of Alexandria—deposed and no longer patriarchs.

Although the Tsar spent much effort to have them restored to their sees, in his contempt for the Greeks—and even for the Russian prelates—he did not see fit to question the decisions of a council conducted under such dubious chairmanship. The issue, therefore, was not whether one rejected or accepted Moscow as the Third Rome, but what the Third Rome meant. Nikon and Alexis could afford to drop the Greek patriarchs, or anyone else, precisely because Moscow was the Third Rome; for, then, anything that the tsar and the patriarch of the Third Rome did was, by definition, orthodox and legitimate.

At a more profound level, then, the controversy was not really historical but theological. It was equally possible to argue that, because Moscow was the essence of Orthodoxy, all its actions and changes were legitimate, as to contend that, because Moscow was Orthodoxy, nothing might be changed. But the theology was political in its implications. This is best illustrated by the fact that, for both Nikonians and Avvakumians, the final and supreme authority in matters of faith, of ritual, of the Church was the tsar. At the center of the Third Rome doctrine, and at the center of Russian seventeenth-century political theory, stood the theocratic Russian tsar. In the eyes of the monk Filofei, who first formulated the Third Rome ideology, it was the Russian ruler who preserved Orthodoxy in Russia and hence in the whole world, and the burden of the Third Rome, of keeping the faith, rested on his shoulders. The seventeenth century, the reign of Alexis in particular, was the apogee of the theocratic ideal. Elected by God, Crowned by God, Most Pious and Orthodox, the Most Gentle Tsar ruled Russia as autocrat, but his life was conducted, down to the smallest detail, to correspond to the religious ideal. Certainly Alexis lived up to this ceremonial ideal as successfully as had Ivan the Terrible, the pious tsar of the Sioğlav Council. The controversy thus becomes still more puzzling—why and how resist the Most Gentle Tsar, how deny him the right to do what his pious and saintly predecessors had done legitimately?

The answer I would like to suggest is that the theocratic tsar began to ring a little false in the ears of the raskol'niki, that something different and new was beginning to show through the theocracy. What that something was can be
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illustrated by the first law of the Ulozhenie of 1649, which established a new category of crimes, political crimes. The law itself only gave form to a conception which had arisen in the early seventeenth century, conveyed by the sacramental phrase slovo i deilo gosudarenvo (word and deed concerning the sovereign).

In other words, we have here a symbolic indication of the early secular state, for which the sacramental phrase was crime d'état, as for the full-blown secular state it was, and is, raison d'état.

The tenous nature of my illustration should warn us, however, that the process described here was very complex and subtle. Secularization, that is, the justification of this world by this world, showed through but little and was not, of course, recognized as such, and the theocratic ideology persisted for a long time. Men went on using the old formulas as their content slowly evaporated or changed. So, while Nikon acted, and could only act, with the support of the Tsar, the Raskol fathers deluged the "Most Pious, Most Orthodox and Most Gentle" Tsar with their appeals to defend the Orthodoxo of his saintly ancestors, to save the faith and make salvation possible. To these appeals no answer came, and the council of 1666-67 left little room for hope. What could one make of all this? The logic of schismatic thought is extremely simple, deceptively simple, for it does not convey the enormous painfulness of the whole issue, the shock of the logically necessary deductions, and their revolutionary significance for the Old Believers.

There was only one general conclusion possible: if Moscow, the Third Rome, had instituted religious changes which required the condemnation of itself in its own past, then Moscow had accepted heresy—and the end was at hand. The end was not something vague or ambiguous. It was the apocalypse, described in greatest detail by St. John of Patmos and St. Cyril of Jerusalem. The end of the world was preceded by the second coming of Christ, who, in turn, was preceded by the Antichrist. To repeat, this conclusion was emotionally so monstrous that even Avvakum could not come to it easily; he struggled hard to postpone the ultimate confrontation. The Cyrilian interpretations gave him some leeway: Antichrist was a person, but there was also the spirit of Antichrist, manifest whenever apostasy took place. Apostasy on a mass scale certainly presaged the physical Antichrist but still left room for hope that the process could be stopped and even reversed. Nevertheless, the spirit of Antichrist needed some material instrument through which to work, and the candidate for such an instrument was not hard to find—a patriarch of the Third Rome who was a manifest heretic.

Nikon as the precursor of Antichrist was shocking enough, although sheer hatred for the person of the Patriarch may have made the idea less painful. But this explanation was not sufficient, first, because Antichrist himself was an imperial, not an ecclesiastical figure and, second, because Nikon was not acting on his own authority. Behind him was the figure of the pious and Orthodox Tsar, traditionally responsible for Orthodoxy and salvation. This is to say that, as apostates, Nikon, Alexis, and the bishops who obeyed them all signed the spirit of Antichrist. But, as holders of supreme power, Nikon and particularly Alexis had a greater responsibility. They were not just part of the general spirit of the times but were guiding the work of Antichrist; they were, in a sense,

a part of Antichrist, or at least of the apocalyptic vision—being cast interchangeably as precursor, as Antichrist himself, or as the Beast of the Apocalypse. Tsar Alexis as a precursor, or symbolically one of the two "horns," of Antichrist was far more painful to accept; nothing could more surely mean the end of the world than the Orthodox Tsar as a horn of Antichrist. But it made sense, particularly after 1658, when Nikon was gone and the reforms were nonetheless maintained. Still, Nikon, too, had done his work, and therefore both Tsar and Patriarch, the former as Antichrist, the latter as the Beast of the Apocalypse, appear in an illustrated apocalypse (Figure 1). It is certainly hard to prove that the portrait is that of Alexis (not to mention Nikon). But in comparing the imperial crowned figure of the miniature with the official portrait of Tsar Alexis (Figure 2) and, particularly, with that of his father, Tsar Michael (Figure 3)—and confusion of these two in official portraiture would be natural enough—the resemblance is suggestive. Equally suggestive is an eighteenth-century miniature showing the "rulers and judges" bowing before the spirit of Satan (Figure 4), especially when compared with an early portrait of Alexis (Figure 5). And any doubts about the identification are completely removed by a nineteenth-century miniature, drawing upon an old iconographic tradition, which shows the unholy trinity—Alexis, Nikon, and Arsenii Sukhanov (a scholar much involved on the work of the textual reforms) as the serpent, the beast, and the false prophet of the Apocalypse (Figure 6). The human number and the number of the beast—666—rules over both the complementary images.

If Tsar Alexis was the precursor of Antichrist, he could not have become that overnight. In fact, as deacon Fedor, one of the four Pustozersk fathers heard, Alexis was from the start—that is, 1645, when he inherited the throne—a horn of Antichrist. In other words, the conclusion had to be drawn that the apostasy of the Tsar was not an accident, temporary and random, but part of an irrevocable divine and satanic process. If so, when was Antichrist himself to come? The Old Believer position on the dating of the apocalypse was established by the mid-1650s, at the very beginning of the schism, and subsequent events confirmed it by giving substance to the date of 1666. Cabalistically this worked out quite nicely in at least two computations, given that 666 was the number of Antichrist. Substantively, the council of 1666-67 acted as the final proof, although most of those waiting for the apocalypse—Avvakum among them—still could not face the logical conclusion that the end of the world was really at hand. It may have been the enormous vitality of the archpriest that prevented him from accepting the idea of the total end; and while he spared few curse words when describing Nikon and even Alexis, he preferred to emphasize that only the spirit of Antichrist was present—that is, the apostasy which was not final as long as men were willing to hold out against it. Yet this reluctance of Avvakum to face the apocalypse may have led him to ideas which hint at the political underpinnings of apocalyptic theology. For, in order not to accept Antichrist, Avvakum in effect attacked the theocratic nature and role of the Russian tsar. By this stage he was familiar with Nikon's exaltation of the "most pious, most gentle, most autocratic sovereign." Nikon was praising the Tsar above all the saints, and called him Alexis sviatoi tsar' (holy tsar). Though Avvakum argued that Nikon...
confusing the person of the tsar with the imperial office, the very image of the theocratic tsar was inevitably based on this confusion. 97 But even the office of the tsar was not exempt from Avvakum's arguments: the tsar had no right to "possess the Church and change dogma"; his task was only to protect the faithful, "not teach [them] how to hold the faith." 98 In other words, if Alexis was not responsible for the faith of the Third Rome, then his heresy was not so decisive. Thus Avvakum seems to have abandoned the "traditionalist," conservative position on the level of political theology, just as he had on the level of pure theology. Obviously, there were inconsistencies within his view, as when

Figure 1

Figure 2

to denied Alexis the imperial rights which he defended for the Tsar's ancestors; but then, Ivan the Terrible was dead and gone and no longer a problem. Alexis was alive and pressing, and in desperation Avvakum pleaded with him: "After all, we are not taking away from you your empire... but are defending our faith." 99 Despite the various inconsistencies, however, toward both Church and state, the Old Believer, Avvakumian positions appear far more consistently evolutionary and "reformist" than they have been generally thought.

The Raskol fathers were driven by their circumstances to explore the logic of their own views. But if they were understood and followed by others, as they were, it meant that their language and their logic were also understood and accepted. One reason for this understanding was the apocalyptic mood of the mid-seventeenth century. Parenthetically, one might note that apocalyptic thought, the expectation of the end, does not seem to arise at moments of great apparently cataclysmic threats to Russian (nor, probably any other) society: the Mongol conquest, the Time of Troubles with its Polish intervention—but
rather at a time when society is undergoing an internal crisis of basic transformation and change. In the seventeenth century we can date this mood at least as early as May 1644, when the government's Printing Office published the so-called Book of Cyril, a collection of South Slavic and Ukrainian apocalyptic writings. The volume sold over 500 copies in one month—an incredible sale for the time. The book, and others like it printed a little later, obviously met intense popular demand. Probably, however, the apocalyptic strand of thought was present as early as the 1630s. It is associated with the name of Kapiton, a hermit renowned for his asceticism, founder of a hermitage near Tottma in the north in 1630. Very little is known of his theology, but his name is linked with the earliest—pre-Old Belief—cases of self-immolation, and Kapitonovschina was a movement of flight from the world, the expectation of an immediate apocalypse.

In fact, it was from the hermit Mikhail, a follower of Kapiton, that deacon Feodor learned that Tsar Alexis was "not a tsar but a horn of Antichrist." By the 1640s, then, there was a certain mood or ideology of insecurity, of rejection, in which men associated the evil they were rejecting, or fleeing from, with the Tsar. And the ideology of the early Raskol intersected with, if it did not draw upon, this mood.

The apocalyptic outlook was not restricted to the Kapitonovschina runaways, hermits, and dissatisfied lower clergy. This is not the place to discuss the great controversy between Patriarch Nikon and Tsar Alexis; on the face of it, Nikon's drive for power and his motivations in general were quite different from those of Avvakum. But after the break came, in 1658, Nikon began to sound very much like Avvakum. We have already noted that the disgraced Patriarch accepted and used, in his defense, the doctrine of the Third Rome. But Nikon went much further than this, for he attacked the theocratic role of the "most pious, most gentle" Tsar. "How did you acquire the insolence to inquire about us [prelates] and to judge us?" wrote Nikon to Alexis. In his insistence that the priesthood was above secular authority, Nikon denied the Tsar any role in the Church.
except as an obedient executor. His greatest fury he directed at the Ulozhenie—the Law Code of 1649—which established the Monastyrskii Prikaz and generally assumed to legislate on the Church. The compiler of the Code, Prince N. Golovskii, pretended to refer to the old sacred laws of the apostles, the Church fathers, and the Byzantine emperors; but, in fact, he was making up new laws, like a new Luther! And these laws were suggested to him by his teacher, the Antichrist. So, Nikon, too, ended up denying Alexis the rights he allowed to Ivan the Terrible or to the Byzantine emperors. He could draw only one conclusion from the situation as he saw it—the reign of Antichrist had come. In accord with St. John the Divine, Nikon wrote, he envisaged the Antichrist as spiritual rather than incarnate; the power of the Antichrist would be manifested by the fact that “lay authority, stepping over divine commandments, will take possession of the Church,” and this, obviously, had come to pass. In other words, Nikon’s logic paralleled that of Kapiton and Avvakum within a general apocalyptic mood. The end of the world was near, and the responsibility for this holocaust lay with the Tsar, whose power was spreading out into new areas or was no longer legitimate in areas where it had once prevailed. Hence, the apocalypse as political theology focused pretty exclusively on Antichrist; few men seem to have been interested in what was theologically to follow—the second
coming of Christ. The Russian Church, beginning with the successor of Nikon, Iosaf, and on through the great prelates of Petrine Russia—Dimitrii of Rostov, Stepan Iavorskii, Feofan Prokopovich—hammered away at the fact that the second coming was a mystery and that men were forbidden to try to anticipate God’s will concerning it. But no one was trying to anticipate the second coming, and an Old Believer “Booklet about Antichrist” of 1707 cunningly pointed out that the proscription against guessing the date applied to the coming of Christ only; the coming of Antichrist was not a mystery and obviously belonged to a different theology.

It is clear that the political theology of Avvakum and his friends interacted with a tradition that was both older and broader than the immediate religious controversy in which these men were involved. Still, so far we have been discussing a general mood and an ecclesiastical controversy. At what point and in what way did it all become a schism, the Raskol proper? It is not possible, for lack of evidence, to trace the spread of the Raskol in time, place, and numbers. But three major events took place during the lifetime of the Raskol fathers, and these events can serve to illustrate at least what it was that was spreading so rapidly over large parts of the Russian state. First, there is the case of the Solovetskiy Monastery, one of the holiest places of Russia, situated on an island in the Arctic Ocean, rich, remote (and hence accustomed to independence)—the monastery, like so many of the white clergy, refused to accept the Nikonian reforms. The monks went much further, however, than the majority of the opposition; they embarked upon outright rebellion, and closed the monastery to imperial authority. Their arguments were not new; like Avvakum, they did not admit any disloyalty to the Tsar, but professed a greater loyalty to their faith and their salvation, which were being threatened. Still, they refused to obey the Tsar, ceased to pray for him, and endured a siege of eight years (1668–76) before the monastery fell and the monks and laymen within it were massacred. The significance of this drama is heightened by the second of our events—the great rebellion of Stepan Razin, 1670–71. The rebellion followed what had been the classical pattern since the Time of Troubles, at the beginning of the century—it was started and organized by Cossacks, then spread to the peasants. The organized, Cossack phase of the rebellion was over within a year, though the government was badly shaken by the massive nature of the revolt. There seems to be no evidence that the Razin uprising included Old Believer elements or ideology, though Razin himself, in previous years, had twice visited the Solovetskiy Monastery as a pilgrim. But the reverse was certainly not the case. Whether to exonerate themselves or to say things which their interlocutors expected and welcomed, the captives taken after the fall of the monastery all testified to the leading role of outsiders—followers of Kapiton, runaways, Don Cossacks—in the monastery. Certainly the government believed that the main impetus to resistance in the monastery was provided by former members of Razin’s scattered armies.

It is not possible to prove conclusively a connection between the Razin uprising and that of the Solovetskiy Monastery; the significance of this conjunction lies in the fact that the Moscow government firmly believed in such a connection and that it even acted accordingly. It is at least difficult to see as pure coincidence the fact that the year of the outbreak of the Razin rebellion, 1670, marked new and brutally severe measures toward Avvakum and his fellow prisoners of Pustozersk. But if one may have doubts about the intersection of Old Belief and Razinovskyia, one can exist regarding the third event in this series—the streltsy uprising of 1682. True, this uprising did not occur within the life span proper of Avvakum and his colleagues—they were executed in April, while the streltsy rose in May of 1682—but the dates are close enough, and the streltsy did not know, when they marched on the Kremlin, that Avvakum was dead. The many political and economic grievances of the streltsy had been complicated by the delicate palace situation of the two young co-tsars (Peter I, ten years old, and his half brother, Ivan V, sixteen and half-witted) being edged out by their older sister, Sophia. In any event, the “Petition” of the streltsy was an Old Belief tract, drawn up by the Raskol priest Nikita Dobrynin “Pustosviet” (the Bigot), who was in close touch with Pustozersk. All the economic and political grievances were submerged in the religious language of the “Petition.” The streltsy pleaded for tolerance: What was wrong in using two fingers to make the sign of the cross? Should one mutilate and burn men for this? Moscow, after all, was the Third Rome, and its faith should not be determined by renegade Eastern patriarchs. At the debate which took place in the imperial palace, however, the plea for toleration quickly turned into a demand for religious restoration. If the reforms were suggested by renegades, they were heretical, and, as Tsarevna Sophia pointed out in a burst of anger, the streltsy were accusing of heresy not only Nikon but her father, Tsar Alexei, as well.

The soldiers were pacified by a mixture of force and concessions, and they repudiated Nikita, who was executed on Red Square. But again the government showed its awareness of the intersection of Raskol ideology with popular discontent; and again one wonders whether the execution of the Pustozersk prisoners at a time of great streltsy unrest, just before the outbreak in May, was purely a coincidence. Shortly afterwards the government demonstrated its conviction that the theology of the Raskol was primarily a political one; a law of 1684 made adherence to the schism a secular, state crime with the punishment of death for the nonrepentant schismatic. And the government had reason: beginning with the insurrection of 1682, every popular uprising in Russia—the continued streltsy troubles, the Cossack rebellions under Peter I (Azov, Astrahan, Bulavin’s uprising), and the climax of the great uprising of Pugachev under Catherine II—was fought under the banner of the Old Belief; the restoration of ancient battles in the aristocracy and abolishing serfdom. Thus, the early 1680s mark the beginning of the real Raskol, the mass movement within the Russian state, which came with the death of the first generation, the ideologues of Old Belief who still had hopes for ecclesiastical victory; the first uprising with Raskol ideas and program; and the initiation of relentless government persecution of Raskol as a crime against the state.
As a mass movement with complex motivations, the Raskol soon lost its theological unity, for in the realm of theology the choices and possibilities were virtually unlimited, as they always are when men are suddenly bound only by the limits of their individual reason. In the sphere of the politics of apocalypse which concerns us here, however, three choices were possible. One was the belief that the end was here and now; the last days had come and Antichrist was present in person. The second was the conception of the spiritual Antichrist, manifest in general apostasy and corruption, focused in the government as the source of all power, but diffused over all of Russian society and the world at large. These were legitimate theological alternatives. The third choice was expressed in a curious synthesis of the first two: the idea of an incarnate Antichrist ruling on earth, but without the theological consequence of this fact, that is, the end of the world and the second coming within forty-two months (Antichrist’s reign was supposed to last three and a half years). The escape from this impasse lay in the positioning of an Antichrist who, though corporeal, was a body corporate—that is, the person of Antichrist was the Russian imperial dynasty. So long, then, as the dynasty went on reigning, the world continued, though corrupt, as in the eyes of those who believed in the spirit of Antichrist only; but the source of all corruption was a flesh-and-blood entity—each successive Russian ruler, who was the physical Antichrist while he ruled.

How one chose one’s apocalyptic politics and what the choice meant can be seen most easily in the case of the most extreme choice. If Antichrist was here on earth, in person, there was only one way to escape him, and that was by death. It is significant that as a solution appeared (and the first reported instances of collective self-immolation occurred) within Kapitono-Slobchina, before the Raskol fathers took a position on the question. The logic was clear: Believers fled Antichrist, hiding in the forests, but if he reached out for them, if he sent his servants—officials, soldiers, tax collectors, census takers—and they died, preferably by the cleansing fire, before salvation was endangered by contact with, or submission to, Antichrist. The Raskol fathers were not in agreement about this solution, but Avvakum, for one, acknowledged its legitimacy as a last resort in the struggle against the Antichrist. Beginning some time before 1662 and reaching its climax in the reign of Peter I, the wave of self-immolation carried away whole communities, and the total number of suicides ran into tens of thousands (on a small scale the practice continued at least until 1860). Our knowledge of the motives for the mass suicides necessarily comes from government reports, and the government, for once, felt confused and unsure as to what traditional and reliable means of persuasion—the whip and Siberia—proved singularly irrelevant. But we know the general setting for the self-immolations: in every case, a peasant group or community of Old Believers; in every case, as impending government intervention of some sort, either rumored or real. And in at least one case, in 1756, we know the motives, stated by the leader of the suicides just before they set fire to the chapel in which they had barricaded themselves: Za mnogimi nyne narodnymi tiagostiamy, nikolokh chelovek s mino spati sobia ni kah ne mozhat, a kogda de sozhiatia, to de spasenie poluchit' nego (Because of the many present burdens on the people, no man in the world can save himself by any means; but if they burn themselves, then they can obtain salvation). The theological conclusion is based on concrete secular conditions. The argument is powerful and touching—life, the purpose of which was to allow men to gain salvation, had become so difficult and burdensome that it no longer provided even the possibility of salvation.

In the world of the imminent Antichrist the other side of the coin of despair was outright rebellion. The shift to this other side is suggested by the fact that in nearly all cases of mass suicide there was active resistance to the police or soldiers sent by the government. The apocalyptic ideology continued to survive for a long time; hence the many rebels during the reign of Peter I fought him as the Antichrist but also argued that he was an impostor, not the real and legitimate tsar. Yet, as in the case of the suicides, underlying the correct theology were eschatological motivations: Chto nam tsar? Takailikh mar 'kak i nashe... Vot, povsem na Moskvu... tak, kog s Sten'ko s nami uzhe ne sledat' (What about the tsar? They [tsars] have mothers just as we do.... This time, when we march on Moscow... they will not manage to do us what they did to Sten'ka Razin), argued the Cossacks in 1686. In other words, the Cossacks were rejecting the world in which they lived, with its political (and other) values, including the conception of the unique and exalted Most Gentle Tsar; for them too, in that world, there was no "salvation."

Not very many men, of course, were driven to accept the extreme solution—killing oneself or the world around one—and the extreme political theology that corresponded to it. The surprising thing is how many did accept it. For the great majority of the Old Believers the apocalyptic choice and the problems it involved can be illustrated by the case of the Vyg Pustyn (Hermitage). Situated on the Vyg, between St. Petersburg and Arkhangelsk, this very early Old Believer community helped Peter I to develop the vital northern route, built ships, found and worked iron mines, and, given effective protection by the Emperor, enjoyed virtually complete autonomy. Under the Empress Anna, in the 1730s, however, the community was twice denounced and a government investigation followed, in the course of which the old hidden debate came out into the open: Was one living in a world filled with the spirit, and only the spirit, of Antichrist, or was the Antichrist present and visible, to be identified by all? The charge against the community, however, was that the Old Believers had not been and were not offering any prayers for the ruler, refusing to perform the most traditional and obvious duty of a subject. The crime was a political one, and so was the debate, in effect. The Denisov brothers, founders and leaders of the community, argued that Antichrist was a spirit, manifested in all cases of apostasy and heresy; hence the problem did not lie with the ruler. They did not defend Peter the Great’s lapse from Orthodoxy (nor that of Catherine I, Peter II, or Anna), but they argued that even apostolic law required prayers at "alien," pagan rulers and that Peter, after all, was a descendant of God-fearing and pious ancestors. Under him the Old Believers (that is, the Vyg community) were free from persecution and even prospered greatly. When in
1738, on pain of destruction, the prosperous community had to decide, the leadership and a small majority voted to pray for the ruler; that is, they voted for a spiritual and invisible Antichrist, ever-present, dangerous, corruptive, and pervasive, but not identical with political authority.

A large minority refused to go along and left the Vug, starting a new splinter sect—the Filippovtsy, named after their spokesman, the elder Filipp. Their choice was the third, the synthesis. They were not prepared to die nor to rise in rebellion; but for them Antichrist was incarnate in the person of the Russian ruler. The theology of their politics was best formulated in the 1780s by Evfimi, founder of the sect of Sramotiki (Pilgrims, Wanderers), or Begnovi (Fugitives). Peter I was the material Antichrist, the real and the last Antichrist; his successors were but extensions of the physical Antichrist in time. Evfimi simply extended the forty-two months of Antichrist's reign indefinitely, but maintained that nothing would change, no hope was justified. The Beast of the Apocalypse, in fact, was imperial power as such: the "icon" (or image) of the Beast was all civil authority; its body, spiritual authority. Here is the crux of the matter—government as such the Beast of the Apocalypse?

To repeat, the Raskol splintered away into dozens of sects separated by the finest and pettiest theological distinctions. Overarching all of them, however, was one great distinction: the spiritual or the material Antichrist, praying or not praying for the ruler. The nature of the choice was indicated by the Vug community; it had prospered, and the world, though dangerous, was bearable if not pleasant. The majority of the Old Believers did not prosper. And so, while a theological debate on the prayer went on endlessly, the merchants, as Evfimi himself suggested, prayed for the ruler (however reluctantly); the peasants did not.

The politics of apocalypse reached their climax in the first four decades of the eighteenth century. But here a caution about the sources is in order. The Old Believers wrote enormously; in particular, hundreds, if not thousands, of illustrated apocalypses, handwritten, have come down to us. But if they wrote anything explicitly political, in the eighteenth century the risks they ran were monstrous—the whip and Siberia could be counted a stroke of luck. So Old Believer literature is strongly dichotomous. On the one side is the enormous mass of tracts—repetitive, cautious, hinting but not really saying very much, sometimes daring and then pulling back. On the other side is the smaller number of tracts said or written by men who could keep silence no longer, who frequently were looking for martyrdom. Even the government of Peter I was disturbed by this phenomenon; a law of 1722 tried to prove that self-willed martyrdom, a result of criminal and traitorous acts, was not true martyrdom and could not bring glory and salvation. Moreover, it argued, "suffers who insult and dishonor your judge, even if he is unrighteous, are not following the footsteps of Christ. And, if one does not follow Christ, how can one be legitimately martyred and hope for a heavenly crown?" Men who did this were suicides and blasphemers. Yet these were the men, "extremists" though the were, that are now our best sources, conveying both the drama and the flavor of apocalyptic politics.

Grigorii Talitski was a Moscow scribe, copying books and manuscripts for sale. Some time before 1700 he became obsessed with the problem of Antichrist. He set down his conclusions in two tracts: "Concerning the Coming of Antichrist into the World, and the Time from the Creation of the World to Its End" and "The Gates," which proved, with elaborate calculations, that Peter I, as the eighth tsar of the apocalyptic, was the Antichrist and that the last days had come. Talitski enjoined the people not to obey Peter or pay taxes. He made copies of his writings and sold them widely and, apparently, quite openly. One of his customers was Ignatii, bishop of Tambov, who wept as he listened to the scribe's exhortations, kissed him, and gave him five rubles. Finally Talitski decided to give away his tracts free and tried to have the texts engraved on boards with the purpose of printing many copies. At this point, on June 28, 1700, he was denounced and taken to the Preobrazhenskiy Prikaz—the political or state police office. There, questioned and tortured, Talitski readily admitted all that he had done, planned, and thought. He named eighteen people among those who had aided, listened to, or agreed with him, including Bishop Ignatii and Prince Ivan Khovanskii, scion of a family with strong strel'tsa and hence Raskol connections. All were found guilty by the Prikaz and repented, except for Talitski and his friend, an icon painter named Ivan Savin. Talitski, Savin, and three priests in the group were condemned to death, the others to the whip, branding, and Siberia. Talitski and Savin, unrepentant, were condemned to kopechnie—being smoked to death like bacon. In the course of this ordeal Talitski gave way; he was taken down and confessed that all he said and written was a lie. Hearing this, Savin, too, asked to be taken down and also confessed, meanwhile reproaching Talitski for having lied to him and misled him. The record breaks off at this point, but, according to Old Believer tradition, both men earned the milder death at the stake. There is no evidence in his case that Talitski, or anyone else involved, was an Old Believer.
to be branded would receive any bread, that Peter had drilled three companies of troops on the surface of the waters of a river, and that Peter had transformed water into blood. Most of Levin's informants were soldiers or corporals in the guard regiments. In 1721, Levin decided to go to an obscure monastery close to his home—Zhavdovskaya Pustyn—and there preach the existence of Antichrist. On December 6, 1721, Levin was attending mass in church; as the priest came forth with the cross to bless the parishioners, Levin shouted: "Listen, Orthodox Christians, listen! Soon there will be the end of the world! The Sovereign has collected the entire people of Moscow and will destroy it there." Pointing to his palm, he went on: "Right here, on this spot, the Tsar will brand them, and they will believe in him then." The end came for Levin in 1722 when, already a monk, he was preaching his repertoire to a country fair from the roof of a house. On his testimony—Levin implicated everybody—the inhabitants of an entire monastery were shipped in irons to Moscow. After five torture sessions Lenin admitted that he had implicated some people, his family for instance, hoping that they would want to share his martyrdom; he stuck to everything else he said and declared that he would speak no more. He was condemned to death by torture, but when the execution began, he recanted, as did Talitskii, and was beheaded a week later.109

In 1733, Akinfi Sysoev was caught giving alms to Old Believers who had been arrested and were on their way to jail. When he was searched, a notebook in his handwriting, containing a great deal of cabalistic information, was found. According to his calculations (slightly outdated) there was to have been (and had been) great news and commotion in the world in 1731. Desolation and rebellion were to have come in 1732; the sun and moon would change places, portents would appear in the sky. In 1733 and 1734 all the world would recognize Christ again. In 1735–36 one quarter of the world would perish. In 1737, the false Christ would come, and then, in 1738–39, Christ himself would come to judge all men. Under torture Sysoev said that Peter was the first Beast of the Apocalypse and then for a time refused to say more despite all the skilled persuasion of the Secret Chancellery (successor of the Preobrazhenskii Prikaz). Finally, he asked for a copy of the Book of Revelation and read his exegesis to his curious and most peculiar audience: the seven heads of the Beast of the Apocalypse were Ivan the Terrible, his son Fedor, Tsar Michael, Tsar Alexis, Ivan V, Peter I, and Peter II.110 Sysoev even had an explanation for the ten crowned horns on the seven heads: these were the ten oligarchs, Vremenichiki, who tried to rule after Peter II by imposing a limited monarchy on the new emperor, Anna. (One might argue that, for the so-called constitutional crisis of 1730 and the oligarchic constitution of the ten aristocrats and Petrov executives, apocalyptic politics provide as good an explanation as Realpolitik.) Sysoev thought that all the heretical Church reforms were introduced by Peter I simultaneously with the laws on beards and foreign clothing. Further confirmation of Peter as the Beast of the Apocalypse was that the Beast had the feet of a bear and the mouth of a lion. An acute observation, this—for Peter was pigeon-toed, and his mouth was grim enough. The Empress Anna was identified easily by reading Revelation, Chapter 17, about the great whore sitting upon the waters. Sysoev died in prison, after five torture sessions, including one by fire.111 These are three cases among many,112 but they are representative enough to convey some features of the apocalyptic atmosphere in early eighteenth-century Russia. One of the striking aspects of this atmosphere is the intermingling or identity of Old Believer and non-Old Believer ideology. Talitskii had no Raskol connections at all; Levin had known Old Believers in his childhood but took his vows in a monastery of the official Church; Sysoev gave alms to Old Believer prisoners, but except for the fact that his case is to be found in the Raskol section of the archives, there is no evidence that he was an Old Believer himself, and he denied having any questionable associations. Yet all three men expressed the pure Raskol political theology. And at least the first two had been able to express it to an astonishingly wide public, literally shouting it from the roof tops, for a long time with impunity. Only after years of active preaching were they denounced, and one must assume that their audience shared their views or sympathized with them.113 (An interesting feature of these audiences, by the way, is the very great number of lower clergy—priests, monks—involved in such cases; the tradition of priestly participation in the schism was being carried on and indeed spread at a time when, with the abolition of the patriarchate and the establishment of the Holy Synod under a lay procurator, the Church had become a bureaucratic department of the government.) The thought of these ideological rebels displayed a truly scholastic consistency: every event, every feature (even Peter's feet and mouth), every portent were fitted into the apocalyptic scheme and explained thereby. Hence the fanatic strength of conviction, the nonviolent but total opposition to the government, the acceptance, and even seeking, of martyrdom—all broken, if at all, only by unspokeable tortures.

To an enormous degree the apocalyptic vision, before 1725 and after, was focused on Peter I. But it would be incorrect to assume that Peter forced the Old Believers to a new conception, that his actions and policies, independent of his predecessors, evoked the image of Antichrist. The streltsy, the Cossacks, Talitskii, Levin, and many others whose names fill the records of the Preobrazhenskii Prikaz thought of Peter as Antichrist before 1700, before Petrov policies and reforms could really be identified and rejected. Still, the world which the Old Believers tried to explain was dominated by him far more than by Nikon, Alexis, or anyone else because, as we shall see, he defined that world more bluntly and more violently than anyone else. There is at least one vivid iconographic testimony to this—the illuminated Apocalypse of the Museum Collection in the State Historical Museum, done shortly after 1725.114 In this case, there is no need to speculate about the possible identifications. The illustration for the verse reading that Antichrist will be born of the tribe of Dan shows Antichrist with the face of Peter I, dressed in the uniform of the Preobrazhenskii Regiment (Figure 7). The baby Antichrist, sitting on the arm of his mother, Antichrist's wife, is a small double of his father.115 Again, Antichrist supervising the building of the new temple in Jerusalem is Peter in his usual
uniform; except for one companion and the demons, the people in the miniature are dressed in traditional Russian clothes (Figure 8). (There is a complete resemblance between this Peter-Antichrist and the Peter of the numerous secular paintings which show the Emperor, with outstretched arm, supervising the building of St. Petersburg.) Every one of the dozens of miniatures in this manuscript hammers away at the same point, that the world of Peter is the world of Antichrist: the demons are dressed in Petrine army uniforms; the woman sitting upon the waters is portrayed in the garb of a Russian empress of the early eighteenth century; the text describing the time of Antichrist as one of war and trouble is illustrated by a battle scene between Cossacks and Petrine demon-soldiers; the prophecy that the army of Antichrist would come and devastate the land is illumined by the Russian guards regiments, and so on. Again there is the consistency of explanation, the daring (in view of the risk), and the profound conviction that Peter and everything Petrine embodied Antichrist, material and immediate.

If Peter was Antichrist (or even only the Beast of the Apocalypse, the eighth tsar-Antichrist of the Third Rome), how did one know this, or, rather, how did one substantiate one’s conviction within the closed circle of apocalyptic logic? Levin indicated some of the points and some events, such as the execution of Tsarevich Alexis, and Sysoev anachronistically attributed the Nikonian reforms to Peter; but while we can hardly expect historical accuracy from the sources, it is worthwhile to fill in, in greater detail, the Raskol image of Peter. A virtually universal premise among the Old Believers and the discontented, a tribute to the strength of the theocratic ideal, was that Peter I was illegitimate. Some expressed the theologically correct position that, inasmuch as Peter was born in 1672, after Alexis’ apostasy, he was by definition not the legitimate and true tsar. Most thought of him as a changeling, brought into the palace after the birth of a daughter to the wife of Alexis, or substituted for the real Peter in the latter’s travels abroad; the man on the Russian throne was a non-Orthodox foreigner, a German. But whatever the variations on the theme, Peter was not a true tsar, for the Antichrist could not be of true imperial birth.

His name, too, gave him away. His original name was Augustus, according to one tradition, but he was then given the name of Peter, signifying “stone” to reveal the nature of his reign. The name “Peter” had a higher rationale, according to Evfimii, for it was part of the tension Simon-Peter ~ Simon Magus, and hence Simon-Peter, in this case, was the proper name of Antichrist. Peter himself named his new capital St. Petersburg, Evfimii pointed out, saying that he was as holy as St. Peter the Apostle. His titles were even more revealing. In 1721 he usurped the title of the patriarchal office, which he himself had abolished, by calling himself otets otchestva (father of his country). In the same year he all but openly declared himself by taking on the new title of imperator, which was a slight disguise; but if analyzed and spelled out as imperator, it revealed the number 666—which was the mark of Antichrist. Thus, with Peter’s two titles—biakostistyi gosudar’ (the pious sovereign) and

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imperator—he bore two horns, the horns of Antichrist. Constantly emphasizing the dualism of Peter—the proper and the terrible title, the imperial and the patriarchal title, the acting out of more than the one proper role—the Old Believers saw one of the chief symbols of the state, the two-headed eagle of the Russian coat of arms, as a reflection of these two horns and accused Peter of taking it from the satanic Pope of Rome. Not all Old Believer sources attributed to Peter the two-headed eagle (adopted at the end of the fifteenth century by Ivan III), but in the general tradition it was a symbol of Antichrist, and the Antichrist-Emperor was made to carry it together with the patriarchal staff (Figure 9).

All these aspects of Peter-Antichrist illustrate the peculiarly dialectic nature of apocalyptic thought. The point about Antichrist was that he was a mirror image of Christ; hence, once the premise that he was present had been accepted, he was to be identified by his Christlike features. The same qualities which identified the Most Great Tsar, the Christlike (Byzantine) Emperor, the saintly prince, the theocratic ruler in general, also, and for that very reason, identified the Antichrist, when the aim of political theology had been changed. This logic was applied to the issue of imperial anointment as well. Peter, it was asserted, had been anointed all over his body, “in the Jewish manner,” and therefore was given the title which distinguished Antichrist—pomazannik, the anointed one. The “Booklet about Antichrist” of 1707 pointed out that Peter, prince of this world, whose title was abdereschatel’ vsego mira (possessor of the whole world) and who was the false Christ, was called Christ (khristas), and by whom? By the archbishop Stefan Iavorski, who should have called him, correctly, “Antichrist.” Actual anointment with oil at the coronation was adopted only in the seventeenth century, at the coronation of Michael, and hence was something of an innovation, and the perfectly correct appellation—the anointed one (pomazannik in Russian, khristas in Greek)—began to be used, interestingly enough, only with Peter. There was room, therefore, for confusion and misunderstanding of terms. But Old Believer causality and methodology remain quite clear: that Peter was Antichrist was not deduced from evidence but revealed as a premise, and the more Christomorphic Peter was, the more the premise was confirmed; and again, the same consistent utilization of every fact— anointment, Russian translation, Greek original word—for every fact was revealing for those who had eyes to see and ears to hear. A fascinating and final illustration of this kind of reasoning: Peter, according to Old Believer tradition, instituted a governing Synod of the Russian Church made up of twelve prelates, so that he, presiding over it, would be the thirteenth, that is, Christ, thus again revealing his true nature as Antichrist. In other words, Peter was accused of doing something which every Christian ruler from Constantine the Great had done—imitating Christ—and the irony of this accusation is that the Old Believers had to tamper with facts in order to make this charge—the Synod of the Russian Church had only eleven members.

Peter the Antichrist meant doom for the whole world and threatened the souls of all men. But this doom was also prefigured, over and over, in the daily
policy conducted by the ruler-Antichrist, which made life more and more intolerable. One aspect of this policy, of course, was the extraordinary brutality Peter displayed. In broader terms, Petrine policy was conveyed, rather effectively, by an epithet applied to Peter—tsar voiv, the warrior tsar. The coming of Antichrist meant war and destruction, and therefore it was fitting that Peter's whole reign was virtually one long war. Death and destruction as features of the reign of Antichrist, however, are still a theological conception fully justified by sacred texts. The Old Believers went a good bit further, into the sphere of apocalyptic sociology. What did the reign of Antichrist mean, concretely, to those living under his rule? The answer was given by Satan or Antichrist himself, in response to an imaginary plea for justice: "Your passport, please, your soul tax for this year, and any other back taxes [first], inasmuch as you live on my land." In this instance the theological language becomes quite transparent. Certainly the Old Believers took advantage of the term podushka podatk (soul tax), with all its obvious levels of meaning; and the passport, a consequence of the census which the new individualized tax required but which carried all the implications of the Augustan census, was also pregnant with apocalyptic meaning. (This is what Levin was trying to convey with his image of the brand of Antichrist.) But under all this was the simple fact that one had to pay more money and that the government knew who one was and could collect more efficiently.

The apocalyptic word-play and the reality behind it allowed the radical Evfimii to construct a striking image of apocalyptic society and state. Before the census, this display of state control, men were free, he argued; now counted—stamped with the seal of Antichrist—they belonged to Antichrist. The social evil of Peter-Antichrist was that he divided men, introducing the idea of sown, "one's own"—the idea of property—which was the ultimate evil. Peter, in fact, introduced three evil passions among men: avarice, self-love, and voluptuousness. That is to say, Peter created a social order or society such as we know, which was so unacceptable to Evfimii that he saw in it the origin of all social evils. Hence to his earlier description of Antichrist as having an icon (image) and a body, he added a third component: Antichrist was made up of image, body, and corpses; the government was the image or visage, spiritual authority was the body of Antichrist, and the people were the corpses.

Though all such arguments were based, to some degree, on the Revelation of St. John, the connection was rather tenuous. Political theology, in effect, allowed, as always, a reversal of causality—it was not the Antichrist of Revelation who determined the features of Peter I, but Peter I who determined the features and behavior of Antichrist. And Peter contributed to at least one rather curious aspect of Antichrist. From the beginning, as we have seen, one of the features of Antichrist for the Old Believers was that he united in himself both spiritual and temporal authority. Lazar', the companion of Avvakum, had written that Antichrist reigned in Rome because "the spiritual man, the pope, has usurped imperial divine power." The formulation is a bit strange, yet recognizable; "spiritual" rather than "ecclesiastical" or "clerical" could hardly be accidental and, repeated time and again, seems designed to evoke a particular association. The most obvious is the famous Pauline formula—the spiritual man judges all and is judged by none—designed to describe the free man under God, and utilized historically to buttress papal claims to universal judicial supremacy. It is most likely that, from Nikon's claims for the supremacy of the ecclesiastical over the temporal, the Old Believers knew about the papal use of the formula, but their translation of St. Paul involved much more than a traditional condensation of the Roman papacy: The Antichrist, not the spiritual man, "subjects all [men] to his judgment but will not himself be subject to the judgment of any man" (vsekh sudy svoemu podverzhetsk, a sam nikomu podsudnym byt' ne pokhoshechest). I am not able to suggest any clues to either the origins or the
implications of this extraordinary conception. Perhaps, with all the associations of the Last Judgment, at which Christ is the Judge Ordinary of all men, it relates to the final and ultimate accusation raised by the Old Believers against Peter the Great. The basic issue, argued their "Petition, or History of Peter the Great," was that Peter made himself god; he was the god on earth (zemnoi bog), the mirror image and total antithesis of the God in Heaven.148

So far we have dealt, in some detail, with the very complex, yet steady reaction by the Old Believers to the many and also complex changes, most of them non-religious, that took place in Russian society and the state during the first decades of the Raskol. These details have been arranged in the rather procrustean, overarching scheme of political theology with its climactic conception of the Russian ruler as Antichrist and god on earth. Rather than attempt to trace more closely the various social and political changes and relate them to the details of Old Believer thought, I would like to suggest an equally overarching conception which sums up these many changes and describes them in the language of political theology.

The obvious focus for these issues of political theologies is the Petrine paradox. Whatever the Old Believers were opposing was, clearly, concentrated in Peter I, expressed by Peter I, hated in Peter I. Yet one of Peter’s early laws (1702) proclaimed the principle of religious toleration as the law of the Russian state.149 Admittedly, religious tolerance was not practiced widely, and there were legal limitations to the profession of Old Belief. Old Believers could live openly and practice their faith by registering as Old Believers and paying double taxes;150 they had no right to preach their doctrines;151 they could not be elected or appointed to any public office.152 Still, in comparison with the law of 1684, Peter’s religious legislation was truly enlightened, as the leader of the Vyg community, Andrei Denisov, emphasized in arguing that one should pray for Peter. But then we must repeat the question, why was Peter seen as the enemy above all others, as god on earth? The reign of Peter I was also the time of the worst persecutions, of horrible and endless torture and investigation. And Peter, who passed laws on religious tolerance, pointed up this paradox in a law in which he fulminated against "treasonable and Raskol inventions" (vorovskije i raskol’niche i vymyshlennja), equating treason and Old Belief in heinousness.153

The contradiction is compounded if we consider Peter’s personal religiosity, significant enough in the context of absolutism. One need only think of the All Holy Drunken Council (Vasvackeishe Plisny Sobor), established by Peter and headed by the Prince-Pope, Nikita Zotov, personal servant and court jester of Peter. At the frequent meetings of this "Council," which included every prominent man in the government, all conceivably and inconceivably blasphemies were performed; and though Peter himself held only the rank of deacon, he was obviously the leader in them.154 Yet Peter’s views on religion were not limited to his drunken mock council. Golikov, in his Anecdotes, tells us what happened when Peter heard that the historian and statesman V. N. Tatishchev was engaging in free-thinking, castigating greedy and ignorant clergy and superstition in general. The Tsar called out to him at a court assembly: "How dare you weaken a string which forms the harmony of the whole tone? And, on top of this, you did not speak with sufficient respect about some of the sacred writings... I will teach you..." And the Emperor hit Tatishchev with his cane: "Don’t tempt believing souls... don’t introduce free-thinking, which is fatal to good order; I did not train you and teach you so that you should end up an enemy to society and to the Tsar!"155

The paradox, on the face of it, remains unresolved. Religious tolerance and the double tax, appeals against suicide and the equating of the Raskol with treason, blasphemy and the conception that religion was the well of the social fabric—what in all this was the unifying principle for Peter, and what was it for the Old Believers, convinced that Peter was Antichrist? The answer clearly lies not in the religious sphere but in the nature of the Petrine state and society—a state and society which can be characterized, sketchily and only symbolically, by some of Peter’s laws (not necessarily representative of the whole mass of Petrine legislation but suggestive of the essence of the Petrine state): In 1698 Peter ordered all members of the ruling class—aristocracy, office holders (d’akts), service gentry—to shave off their beards.156 A law of 1706 ordered the same people, as well as all the registered townspople—merchants, artisans—to wear "Hungarian"-style clothes, with precise specifications provided by the government.157 A law of 1714 forbade the sale of Russian-style clothes and boots on pain of the whip and hard labor in Siberia.158 A law of 1715 pointed out that Russian boots were soled with nails and metal strips; the punishment for selling these items was hard labor in Siberia.159 Another law of 1715 imposed fines for not confessing and attending communion at least once a year.160 The Ecclesiastical Code (Dukhovnij Reglament) of 1721 required reports from parish priests on those who did not confess yearly.161 A law of 1722 transferred to lay courts cases of nonperformance of "Christian duties," including confession and communion.162 The law of July 3, 1722, set out the particular holidays on which church attendance was obligatory (they were about evenly divided between Christian and imperial holidays).163 The law of May 17, 1722, required priests to report to the authorities secrets heard at confession, if they involved either crimes planned for the future or crimes for which the confessant did not repent.164 A law of 1717 forbade the writing of letters behind closed doors (except for teachers in church schools) and punished those who did not report such secret letter-writing as offenders against His Majesty’s honor, even though "they did not know what was being written, but only that someone was writing behind locked doors."165

The law of Alexei on political crime, in 1649, was a hint; proclaimed half a century later, these all-embracing laws reveal the essence of the absolutist secular state. The material foundations of such a state cannot be dealt with here; suffice it to say that secular absolutism means mobilization of the resources of a society on a larger scale than previously, the reordering of the social structure (for example, the gentry) to achieve this mobilization, the control of society for the purposes of efficient exploitation and of eliminating the opposition created by this mobilization and this social restructuring, and,
They were the subject of ecclesiastical injunctions, prescriptions, and insistence, but until Peter I they were not the subject of legislation. What do the Petrine laws on clothes, beards, habits, and customs mean? They are, theoretically, the definitions of the new priesthood required by the new religion; whereas canon laws had previously prescribed priestly and episcopal garments in minute detail, departure from which implied heresy, now such details prescribed the appearance of clergymen, service gentry, aristocracy, and particularly the new ecclesia arisata, the army.\footnote{168}

Iconographic evidence on this new priesthood and its symbol, the Emperor, is overwhelming in quantity, but the illustrations provided by the opposite side, the Old Believers, are more dramatic and also indicate how great was Raskol awareness of the issue. One drawing held by the Leningrad Museum of the History of Religion and Atheism—unfortunately, not of sufficient definition to reproduce here—depicts the Nikonian church. The altar is surrounded by Nikonian symbols—the “Latin” four-pointed cross, the “new” spelling of the name of Jesus (Iisus), the episcopal staff; and, standing to the right of the altar, is a new priest—booted, sworded, clean-shaven—an officer of a guards regiment.\footnote{169}

Figures 10–12 are from a manuscript entitled “On the Two-Fingered Sign of the Cross” (O Dvoepeasti). The manuscript, of the late nineteenth or even early twentieth century, is aesthetically crude and yet powerful in its total commitment to the new traditional and rigid identification of the evil in this world. Figure 10 illustrates the apocalyptic text of martyrs about to be executed by the evil tsar who forbids them to worship Christ, and the tsar is a rather good portrait of Alexander II.\footnote{170} In Figure 11, overlooked by the sun of the Apocalypse, the prophet Ezekiel is about to die again at the hands of the servant of Antichrist, dressed in the uniform of a general serving as aide (general-adjutant) to Alexander II and hence having the right to the initial of the Emperor on his epaulettes.\footnote{171} Figure 12 illustrates the two churches, of Christ and of Antichrist, with the latter borne on the shoulders of his priests, carefully arrayed in the uniform of nineteenth-century Russian gendarmes; one of them carries the big gendarme sword, the palash, in his right hand.\footnote{172}

Finally, there are the illustrations of an apocalypse of the nineteenth century, done in an aesthetic genre which suggests a cartoon series entitled either “The Adventures of St. John” or “The Adventures of Antichrist.” One of the miniatures shows the dramatic moment when, with the breaking of the second seal, the red horseman of the Apocalypse rides forth—the horseman who will destroy peace and law on earth and spread destruction with his sword (Figure 13).\footnote{175} What we see as the destroyer of peace and order is a gendarme, the embodiment of imperial law and order, waving his large sword, shooting off a revolver (the smoke rings indicate this), and smoking a big cigar.\footnote{174}

In the eyes of the Old Believers the new priesthood served Antichrist, and within the secular state it served the new god, the ruler, whether it was the Emperor Peter I, who was also Petr Alekseevich, most pious and gentle tsar,\footnote{175} or the Empress Anna (daughter of Ivan V but duchess of Courland and a woman),
who was incongruous as a theocratic tsar. This does not mean that the old
religion of the state and the old theocratic imagery were abandoned. The new
religion was, as usual, a syncretism of old political theologies, and the sermons
of the eighteenth century are filled with images of the Emperor as Christ, as
David, as Moses, as Constantine, as well as the newly added images of the
ruler as Hercules, Apollo, Astraea, and Minerva. Theologically, one can
argue that the secular absolute ruler meant in general the shift from the ruler
as the image of Christ to the ruler as the image of God the Father. This made
sense, for the Christomimosis of the theocratic ruler involved a model and a
standard which were above the ruler and outside his realm; or, to put it in another
way, the ruler who judged all was judged by at least one Christ. To be God the
Father was to be the lawgiver, the Creator, and this was the constant theme in
the panegyrics to Peter I. "Our father, Peter the Great! You have led us from
nonexistence to existence... The drops of sweat of your labors were our
aromatic myrrh," wrote P. N. Krekshin, and though the sweat imagery was
borrowed from the Christlike Byzantine emperors, it was applied to the labor of
creation.
To create from nothing, denying the past, being the fatherless Peter I, the Great, rather than the Tsar Petr Alekseevich, son of Alexis, was certainly a mark of divinity. For those who lived within the self-contained universe created by the secular ruler, he was the god, and this is what the priests of Peter, his officers and servants, called him—zemnoi bog, the god on earth. The Old Believers knew the famous verse of Lomonosov, On bog tvoj, bog tvoi! O Rossia... (He is your god, your god! O Russia...), and threw it back into the faces of the new priests: “You call him the God of Russia!” If here the Old Believers and the new religion seem to have shared a common political theology, it is only because the new religion continued to use the old theological language, although the meaning of the terms and the context had changed; and in all their writings the Old Believers showed their awareness of this fact and their bitter outrage over it.

Why the outrage? Again, the answer can be given in theological terms. The Old Believers were of the lower classes and represented the ideology and aspirations of the Russian masses. The new dispensation, the good life here on earth, offered them nothing; it was a caricature of the old salvation. Yet, as I have tried to show, even the old dispensation, socially at least, no longer worked, for in the seventeenth century men increasingly doubted the efficacy of theocracy. So, for the Old Believers, ever growing in numbers, there was no way out. Rejecting the new salvation which offered them nothing, they lived in a state of permanent apocalypse.

Obviously these forms of the secular absolutist state and the Old Believer reaction to it were, in many ways, peculiarly Russian; uniquely so in the inability of the secular state to provide salvation for the great masses and hence in the permanence and ideological violence of the reaction, symbolized by the Raskol. Yet some Russian aspects of the transition from the theocratic centralist state to the secular absolutist state seem to carry outside the Russian borders. It is surely not pure coincidence that the Spanish Inquisition reached its heights not during the Middle Ages but during the secularization of the Spanish state in the seventeenth century; that the rigid laws of Religious Conformity were imposed in England, in the seventeenth century, by a secular-minded government; that the German Reformation, completed politically by the Thirty Years' War, produced the curiously theological principle Culus regio, eius religio; and that the revocation of the Edict of Nantes took place at the end of the seventeenth century under Louis XIV, whose secular concern was expressed in the slogan engraved on some of his medallions, again expressing a curious theology: Un roi, une foi, une loi.

If this is so, however, the secularization of state being constructed, sympathy might well be found for the cry of the Old Believers which symbolized their real protest: All power is Antichrist because u net vsila chalovets v pokorstvo sostoitsa (all men are in subservience to it).
religions practices ... appeared to be the work of the devil" (Sidney Harcave, *Russian History* [3rd ed.; New York, 1956], pp. 39–42). "Attention to the form rather than the substance of Christianity, which had long characterized Russian Orthodoxy, brought stubborn support for the strange practices even when they were shown to be without scholarly foundation. (Michael C. Wiener, *The Course of Russian History* [New York, 1958], p. 237). "First and foremost was Muscovy's traditional attachment to external observances ... no question of principle or dogma was involved." (Michael T. Florinsky, *Russia: A Short History* [London, 1964], p. 150). "The long periods of time, especially in the Grand Princes' era, when Muscovite social and religious life were shaped by Muscovite religious texts and rituals ... But in the face of general ignorance, inertia and opposition little was done until later. (Nicholas V. Riasanovsky, *A History of Russia* [New York, 1969], p. 219; see also pp. 220 ff). The only accurate and also detailed account is by Sergei A. Zemskov, "The Russian Church Schism: Its Background and Repercussions," *The Russian Review*, Vol. XVI, No. 4 (1959). His interpretation follows those of pre-Soviet historians such as Kupatov and Mel'nikov."

10. On this whole issue on the symbolism of the two and the three, and on the fact that the course of Christian history, the number of fingers used has ranged from one to three, see, for example, P. S. Smirnov, *O perestoloshennii* (St. Petersburg, 1904).


12. We have no statistics for the Old Believers until 1652, when a secret government committee came to the conclusion that the official figures represented about one tenth the real number. Subsequent to that year the government and the liberal scholars agreed on the figure of about 20 percent. See the government estimates made by the expedition of 1852, by N. A. Novgorodov and by L. Papadac and by V. S. Kostetskii; and, for an example of liberal calculations, I. I. Itzov, *Russkie dissidenty, starovieri i duchovnye khristiane* (St. Petersburg, 1881), Chap. 3. Nothing convinces them that the fact is that, in his rebellion, Pugachev offered the people their "old faith" again, and, as far as we know, none of the great mass that he reached turned him down.

13. Partly, of course, because the Old Believers fled to the peripheries but also because their propaganda was particularly successful in those areas.

14. Except for the times of Catherine II and Alexander I; see S. A. Zemskov and V. V. Semyanov, "Dvadtsat veka za russkii periiologizm" (St. Petersburg, 1939). In general, legislation on the Raskol can serve as a textbook for the evolution of government policy in Russia as a whole. The civil wars of the Time of Troubles, the peasant unrest in the 1630s, the two rebellions in the 1650s and 1660s, the Cosack uprisings in the 1660s and 1670s (which were connected with the messianic sects), the *streltsy* frontier in the 1680s and 1690s. The *streltsy* were the military regiments created by Ivan the Terrible and armed with muskets.

15. As was the case in the religious conflicts of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries in western Europe. On this problem see the very interesting suggestions of Ja. S. Justice, "Izuchennia klavsovskogo kharkhata drevnerusskoi literatury," *TODR*, XX (1961), 104–117.

16. See note 5 above. For example, Professor Nikomin, the Old Believer bishop, who in 1691 wrote a letter to the Patriarch of Moscow, who in turn wrote to the Patriarch of Constantinople, which was printed in the *Russkii Vestnik* (1885), 250–260.

17. As is shown by the *Trocki* in the *Russkii Vestnik* (1885), 250–260.

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22. N. F. Kupatov, *Patriarkh Nikon i ego protsess* (2nd ed.; St. Petersburg, 1885), passim. Published also as *Nikon i protestant*.

23. PSZ, Vol. I, "Ozhehenie," Chap. 13; see also M. Arkhangelskii, O sobornom Ozhishchenii v otosnovlenii k pravoslavnomu tsarkii" (St. Petersburg, 1881). The Code also registered legislation which was clearly formulated at the council of 1666–67, by which parish priests, forsoaked by their parishioners, were heretofore appointed by the bishops, under whose control they passed.


25. See Kupatov, *Nikon i protestant*, pp. 105 ff. The makeup of the Zealots reflected the national split in the Eastern Church; between the white clergy—priests required to marry—of the black, who were monaks. Again traditionally, only monks could become bishops and so control both the monastic and the episcopal hierarchy.

26. The issue was edinoglossie (single voice), i.e., the conduct of the service with each litany recited separately in sequence, versus minoglossie (many voices), an arrangement in which, at least for some decades would number a dozen or more and proceed simultaneously, bringing together different parts of the church. On the dispute in the Slavic Church and its history, including Tikhon's legislation concerning it, see Kupatov, *Nikon i protestant*, pp. 131 ff; ebd. Some of these priests, beginning with Avvakum himself, were such fiery preachers that they had to flee to Moscow from infuriated provincial parishioners whose sins they tried to atone for.

27. See the formulation of P. Pascal, *Avvakum i les debut d'raskol* (Paris, 1939), pp. 88 ff; he, in effect, rejects both the Orthodox and the liberal interpretations and suggests the controversy originated from a clash between two conceptions of Christianity, spiritualized and secularized, that existed in Russia.


29. Nikon failed to get any active support from Constantinople but managed to get the formal approval of Patriarch Macarios of Antioch, who was in Moscow in 1655. See the essay of Macarius, Son, *Patriologi ortodoks* (in *Ekaterino* Vozhd*), Vol. XXIII, Part 1; Vol. XXIV, Part 4. The Russian translation, "Putevki ruskikh sobolok v vostok," was published by G. Murakos in *Chzina*, No. 4, 1866; No. 4, 1873; and No. 4, 1877.

30. This lack of interest continued during all the long years after his abdication, until his death 12 years later.

31. To avoid confusion I call the council of Russian bishops which opened in April 1666 "Church Council of 1666"; and the council presided over by the Eastern patriarchs, opened in December 1666, the "Patriarchal Council of 1666-67." Kupatov's account, in *Nikon i Aleksei*, II, 350 ff, was that the decisions of the second of these councils were the result of the cleverness of the Greeks—filing them as were contemptible for the slaves—in bringing pressure on the council to condone all things Russian. But the argument does not hold, for Kupatov himself showed how totally dependent the Greek prelates were particularly while in Russia on the Russian government and how careful they were to decide every wish of Tsar Alexei (and then impose it on the Russian prelates).

32. See Pascal (p. 545, note 158), who points out correctly that we have no definitive evidence for the burning. The details of the execution are known to us only via Old Believer sources.

33. This is, of course, an exaggeration; a number of priests shared the views of the prisoners, with them behaving with more circumspection. And then there was the active and fanatical influence of the famous Sokolov sisters—Fedorovna, married to the boyar Morozov, and younger Evdotia, married to Prince Ursukov. Both sisters were eventually imprisoned for continued participation in the schism. See Pascal, esp. pp. 34 ff.

34. Nearly all their writings are published in *Subotin; Barsov, Novye materialy*; and Ia. Fomkin, *Pamjatniki i izvostatnii sovyatikov prestol* (St. Petersburg, 1907); "Ruskaia chzina biblioteka," Vol. XXXIII.

35. Subotin, IV, 90 ff; see also Kupatov, *Nikon i Aleksei*, I, 451 ff.


37. I.e., plans for hegemony amongst the South Slavs and in Constantinople. Robinson, * Russianskaia", adheres to this view but gives no reasons for doing so; he gives the literature problem on p. 17, note 58.


40. See Avvakum's reminder, in all his letters to Tsar Alexei, of the latter's "pious anger." For a highly dramatic and very late illustration of this tension, see the statement in Ermakov during his interrogation in 1855: "The civil laws are created not by the will of the authorities (nachalnikov)... Therefore I found these laws false and illegal, and my conscience is the Law of God" (Keitel's, I, 221). Ermakov rejected not ecclesiastical but all laws passed after Ivan IV.

41. See Subbotin, III, 247, esp. 158–59; V, 227 (Avvakum). It is interesting that in one of references to Moscow the Third Rome (Subbotin, VII, 86–89) the monk Filofei of Pskov
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marked by the beginning of heresy, famine, and unrest; and then, 6 years later, the final coming. The variation provides a nice symmetry—600, 6, and then 6.

1. In L. Barskov, Pamiatnitki istorii staroobrjadhestva XVII veka, col. 464. See also Robinson, Zhiznepismia, p. 39, where he argues that the glorification of the ruler grew greater between 1651 and 1657, that where the service book (sluzhebnik) of 1651 commemorates the tsar only, the service books of 1657 published by Nikon commemorate "Our Most Pious Tsar and Grand Prince Peter." There is no doubt that the reign of Alexis was the triumph of theocratic ritual and practices, but in this instance Robinson made a mistake. He is correct about the 1651 text (edition of July 12, 1651), but he checked only one of the liturgies, and not a prominent one. The liturgy of St. John Chrysostom has the usual glorification of the tsar (p. 161), and the liturgy of St. Basil the Great included the real memorial, the prayer for the "well-being and salvation of our tsar." Following Severin, p. 112.) This format is repeated, word for word, in the Bosluslavl liturgy of the edition of April 2, 1657. In fact, in checking all the printed service books published in Russia between 1602 and 1676, I was unable to find any significant changes or variants in the memorial prayers for the tsar.

2. In L. Barskov, Pamiatnitki istorii staroobrjadhestva XVII veka, col. 464; Subbotin, V. 279 ff.

3. For Avvakum's arguments, and also for his violent personal attacks against Alexis, see the references gathered in Robinson, Zhiznepismia, pp. 28 ff. On the identity of person and office in Russian theocratic rulership, see Tsar and People. Chap. 2.

4. In L. Barskov, Pamiatnitki istorii staroobrjadhestva XVII veka, col. 467. See also, for example, N. A. Karakova and Ia. S. Lura, Antifaideal'nye prestizhcheskie dobyviia Massa, XVII veka (Moscow, 1955), for the apocalyptic thought of the late seventeenth century, which accords with the emergence of the centralized state under Ivan V. III.

5. S. A. Belokurov, O dukhovnom zhizni Moskovskogo obshhestva XVII v. (Moscow, 1921), pp. 152 ff. The role of the printing press in forming public concerns or mood deserves study, though it would be most difficult to do for Russia. One can hypothesize, however, that the mass production of a book would at least create a situation in which an enormous number of people (by medieval standards) would be concerned with the same problem at the same moment. And this, in turn, could generate a sort of dynamic spontaneity on a scale unthinkable for a society dependent on manuscripts.

6. For the literature on Kapiton, see Pascal, p. 62 and notes.

7. Ibid., pp. 35 ff.; Barskov, Pamiatnitki pervykh let russkogo staroobrjadhestva, pp. 41 ff.

8. See Pascal, p. 49 above and note 62.

9. The best account of the Nikon-Alexis controversy and the most complete sources for the studies of Kaptierve cited above.

10. ZRAO, II, 543.

11. See ibid., passim; Kaptierve, Nikon i Aleksii, II, 178 ff. The sources of Nikon's Hidebrande doctrine (Ukrainian scholars, a Muscovite tradition?), however, have not been sufficiently explored.


13. Ibid., p. 207, note. Nikon wrote this in a letter to his friend, the boyar Zhuzin, who paid heavily for this friendship. See Delo o Pavlikove Nikon (St. Petersburg, 1897), pp. 190 ff. (A publication of the Arkheograficheskii Komisii.

14. BAN, Druzhinin ms 134 ("Kizhina o Antifruste").

15. For sources on the Solov'skii rebellion, see the works by Barskov cited above (notes 35 and 65) and, in particular, Barskov, Novye materialy, and Akti i istorii (St. Petersburg, 1931-32), Vol. IV, p. 533.

16. See Andrei Denezov (one of the founders of the great Yagm community of Old Believers), istoria o otsekhs i setvodakh solovetskh, ed. V. T. Usov (Moscow, 1997), pp. 20-21.

17. See Pascal, p. 443 and note 12, for the legend that Razin, in his rebellion, was accompanied by Patriarch Nikon. In popular tradition, therefore, everything got mixed up—Nikon, Avvakum, Razin, the Tsar—and the one clear fact that remained was rebellion itself.


19. See ibid., "Akty oneshchishchena i istorii Solovetskogo buna," for the reports of the local governor on the interrogations of prisoners.

88. The full account of this affair is to be found in the Istoria rossi i chelobitnaya o strelekh, the ex-prison of Sava Romanov, who wrote it in 1682. A seventeenth-century manuscript of this work was for the edition by Nikolai S. Tikhonovatov, in Letopisi rasskaz literaturnykh deistvietel. V. Sec. XII. 111–48.
89. Tikhonovatov, p. 139.
90. PSZh, Vol. I, item 1102.
91. For the whole problem, see D. I. Sapozhnikov, Samosozdanie v russkoi raskole (Moscow, 1981); also published in Chemia, No. 3 (subsequent citations refer to the publication in book form).
93. Sapozhnikov, p. 126.
94. N. Kosolapov, "Sestra raskola u raskol'nikov," Vsevolg Vel'sky, No. 4, 1871, p. 49; in general, see V. G. Druzhinin, Raskol na Dene v XVII veke (St. Petersburg, 1880).
96. Ibid., pp. 169 ff.
99. V. G. Druzhinin, Raskol na Dene v XVII veke, p. 12 ff. 100. The Stramniki would have nothing to do with any sort of Antichrist; they would not touch money, which bore the ruler’s portrait and the state coat of arms; they would not obtain a passport, pay taxes, etc. To survive, the sect created the institution of shelter-givers; these people would live in the world, and, in effect, sacrifice, or pollute themselves, by worldly success. Their function was to provide shelter, food, and safety for the true Stramniki. Frequently a shelter-giver would be initiated as a true Stramniki on his deathbed, so that he too might be saved completely. See S. S. S., in Varya i Razum, No. 23, 1892, p. 642 ff.
101. For the argument that the forty-two months must be understood symbolically and that they could actually last many years, see P. S. Smirnov, Spory o razdeniia v raskole v pered chertviret XVII veke (St. Petersburg, 1909), p. 173.
103. Ibid., p. 279; see also I. Iuzov (I. Kahlita), "Politicheskaia vozrazheniia Starovera," Russkii Mir, No. 5, 1892, p. 156. That the merchants prayed, although reluctantly, is well illustrated by the famous Gusan case. The Preobrazhenskii Cemetery in Moscow was the richest and most powerful Old Believer community in Russia, for years under the patronage of the Moscow governors general and, during the reign of Alexander I, in effect under imperial protection. In 1820, however, the government learned that everything was not quite as usual in the community. Police officers who came to search the baths and the chapel found, in fact, a portrait of Alexander I, with horns and tail, the number 666 on the imperial forehead. The painter, named Gusan, managed to flee in time, and the portrait (fortunately for us) was destroyed. See Kelsiy, I, 111; Tryzly Imperatorskoi Kievei Kieholovoi Akademi, No. 1, 1876, p. 115.
104. For instance, PB, no Q. 111, an illustrated apocalypse in which there are empty frames wherever the images of Antichrist or of his demons should appear. In contrast, an example from the year 1892 is an apocalyptic Getaway by Old Believers who then drew in the four-pointed “Latin” crosses and the “reformed” episcopal staffs in “indecent places,” see Barsov, Novye materialy, p. 17.
105. PSZh, item 4053.
106. On the evolution of the Preobrazhenskii Prikaz into a political police, see Golikova, pp. 243–50.
107. In his eagerness to suffer martyrdom, Talitski is a striking example of that category referred to by Peter in the law quoted above; he and others like him (see the Levin case below) were more than eager to talk and explain their theories. This did not exempt them, of course, from the classic Preobrazhenskii Prikaz routine: interrogation with torture, confrontations, interrogation with torture until the same testimony was obtained three times running—then on to the next witness. No difference in procedure obtained between the accused and the witnesses.
109. The case is published in Esipov, pp. 5–55.
110. Of course Svyetov had to make the tsars match the symbols of the prophecy, but it is interesting that he included the half-witted half brother of Peter, Ivan V, and omitted Fedor (II), son of Alexei and oldest brother of Peter, as well as Boris Godunov and Vassili Shishkin, both of whom were not members of the Shuvalov-Romanov dynasty.
111. Tsentralfnii Gosudarstvennyii Archiv Drevnikh Actov (TsGADA), fond 7, Raskol'nichii dela, delo 359.
112. Raskol'nichii dela, passim; M. I. Semenov, Slave i Delo (St. Petersburg, 1885); Esipov, Izhaki storogo veke (St. Petersburg, 1880); Solov'ev, Istoria Rossii, Vol. XV; Chemia, from 1863, passim; and the TsGADA folders of the Preobrazhenskii Prikaz and the Secret Censorship (Tsentral'noi Kontrol'noi).
113. The yard, he was, and again, how many were punished in these investigations for being talk like this and not reporting it. According to the law, this made them guilty of the same crime, that is, in matters of state crime, misrepresentation of reason was equivalent to reason.
114. For example, in the early 1770s an astonishing number of priests used any dodge, fair or foul, to avoid swearing allegiance to or praying for Empress Anna-examples of illness, absence, ignorance of the requirement, or lack of opportunity. See the cases below the Most Holy Synod in the year 1773 alone, in Tsentralfnii Gosudarstvennyii Istoricheskii Arkhiv (TsGIAL), Leningrad, fond 766, 1733, cases no. 14, 168, 185, 226, 233, 240, 269, 270, 265, 270. Tsentralfnii Gosudarstvennyii Istoricheskii Musei (GUM), Musevnoe Sobranie, No. 156 (“Tolkovy Apokalips”) of V. N. Shelepikhin, “Dva litovskiya stolnika Istoricheskogo Museia,” Arkheologicheskaia iezida i Zemli V, No. 4 (1897), 97–102. The manuscript was written in the Far North, between 1760 and 1773, in the Far North Arctic coastal area, and is, apparently, unique in the boldness of its iconography.
115. 350’. If the baby is the Tsarevich Alexei, he was obviously associated (correctly) with his father’s policies, rather than as seen as a symbol of opposition to Peterine reforms and as the defender of ancient Orthodoxy.
116. Ibid.
117. Because the State Historical Museum manuscript was being readied for publication, I was allowed photographs of only the two miniatures which had been published by Shchepkin in 1897.
118. This arithmetic conjunction is emphasized in BAN, Druzhinin ms 117, p. 167. The usual count was from Ivan III, Avvakum got Tsar Alexei as the eighth tsar by counting Vassili III and including all the tsars. See Subbotin, IV, 247.
119. For a number of the numerous exceptions to this connection, see the literature listed in note 112.
120. On the nature of the true and legitimate tsar, see my Tsar and People, pp. 55 ff.
121. At this point it is impossible for me to reject a personal anecdote. While working in June 1965 on the frescoes of the Arkhangelskii Cathedral in Moscow, I was engaged in conversation from a guard from the Kremlin Museum, assigned that day to the Cathedral. In asking me about my work, he displayed great interest in the question of balance between church and state power. He said that not only under Peter did the state win complete domination over the Church. I pointed out that, yes, but Alexei seemed to be clearly in charge of the situation. The government, he said, was not standing next to Alexei’s tomb. But that was quite different, he argued. The clash was a personal one. Alexei was away at war quite often, and the patriarchal and imperial palaces were connected by a passage. So, Nikon used to stroll over and... anyway... Peter was really Nikon’s son, and this was the reason for Alexei’s enmity. (In fact, of course, Nikon abdicated in 1668, and Peter was born in 1672.) The man was not an Old Believer (I asked him about this), he was a professional atheist. Yet, in 1665, he believed in a legend which clearly belongs to the Raskol ethos.
122. See, for example, "Kniizhna o Antichristise" (BAN, Druzhinin ms 134), pp. 26 ff. In fact, according to a tradition dating back to the second century, Antichrist had to be a few (of the tribe of Dan), a requirement which presented some problems for Old Believer
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146. For example, Evfimiin always used the term dukhovnaia vlast' for ecclesiastical authority.
149. PSZ, item 1910.
150. Ibid., item 1910.
151. Polnoe sobranie poslanenii i rasporazhenii po vedeniu prawoslavnogo ispravlenia Rossiskogo Imperii (St. Petersburg, 1869-1916), II, 102, 410.
152. Ibid., p. 27. For other discriminatory legislation see Smirnov, Spory i razdeleniya, pp. 3 ff.
153. PSZ, item 2877; see also item 3479.
154. For example, Prince I. Khovanskii’s later confession to Tatishkii that he had been involved in a “metropolitan” in the “council” and might have gained eternal life by refusing and undergoing martyrdom but that he lacked the courage. Estov, Rascol’nikhii dela, I, 13-69.
156. See Solov’ev, XIV, 570 and notes. See also PSZ, item 2874, Dec. 29, 1714; all these prescriptions were repeated over and over; with reminders of the heavy fines imposed for disobedience.
157. PSZ, item 1724; see also item 1837 (in the year 1701). Dummies dressed in such clothing were prominently displayed for the benefit of the public.
158. Ibid., item 2874.
159. Ibid., item 1837.
160. Ibid., item 1837 (in the year 1718).
161. Ibid., item 3169, dated January 19, 1721.
162. Ibid., item 3169.
163. Ibid., item 4052. Birthdays and name days of the royal family and anniversaries of coronations were called isaschi dny (tsar’s days, or imperial holidays).
164. Ibid., item 3893.
165. Ibid., item 3223.
166. One striking expression of this can be seen in the amusing proclamation after the victorious peace with Sweden in 1721. It applied to all criminals, but Old Believers sentenced to hard labor were forgiven only if they renounced their “obstinate” beliefs (PSZ, item 3893). Another interesting aspect of this attitude was the welcome Peter extended to all foreigners, guaranteeing them full tolerance and protection, except for one group—the Jews (ibid., item 1910). They, too, of course, were always “outside.”
168. See PSZ, item 1898, prescribing the parade dress proper for ceremonial days and holidays. On the significance of the uniform and its role in the religion of the state, see E. H. Kantorowicz, "Gods in Uniform," Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society, CV, No. 4 (1961), 368-93.
169. Eighteenth-century drawing on cardboard from MIRA, Druzhinin Collection (no acquisition number).
170. MIRA, nos B-607-IV, p. 12.
171. Ibid., p. 80ab.
172. Ibid., p. 50ab.
173. IKLI (Pushkin Museum, Kerzhennikov Sobranie, nos 74, p. 87. 174. Alexander Herzen, with his usual insight, saw the chelobitniia created by Peter’s “revolution” as a civil clergy, “performing holy services in courts and police” (Byloe i danny (Moscow, 1956), I, 252 [Sobranie sochinenii v tridiatst tomakh, Vol. VIII]).
175. For the Old Believers, “Peter I” was, in itself, proof of Peter-Antichrist; for the omission of the patronymic it is acknowledged what they suspected, that Peter was not the son of Alexei; as Antichrist, he had no father, and hence was the first of his name.
176. For a madly incomparable image of Catherine I, the servant-girl wife of Peter, as St. Olga (grandmother of St. Vladimir, who, according to historical legend, brought Christianity to Russia in the tenth century), see Address of the Most Holy Ruling Synod, July 5, 1725, in Barsov, Novye materialy, p. 159.
177. See the sermons of Iavorskii (Propoved blagonya pamtsti Stefana Ivorskogo) and of...
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